A car bomb went off in central Bogotá at 5:30 Thursday morning, injuring 9 people. It is believed that the target was the nearby headquarters of the Caracol radio network. President Juan Manuel Santos did not immediately blame it on the FARC guerrillas. A pro-FARC website claims the attack was carried out not by guerrillas but by “mafias,” though the methods resemble those used in the 2003 bombing of the El Nogal social club a few blocks away, a crime the FARC also denied but was later revealed to have committed. The “La Silla Vacía” website lays out the cases for why the bombing might be, or might not be, the work of the FARC: “Some believe that it was evidently the FARC, since the attack fit within its modus operandi and its motives. Others, on the contrary, believe that it is a message from the extreme right that Juan Manuel Santos must not move away from the uribista hard line, and that Santos must not open a space for negotiations with the guerrillas.”
Venezuela and Colombia re-established diplomatic relations this week after a meeting between Presidents Chávez and Santos. It remains unclear how the two countries will deal with the issue that has detonated several past crises between the two countries: the presence of FARC guerrillas in Venezuelan territory. Asked by El Tiempo whether there will be “verification of the guerrilla presence in Venezuela,” Colombian Foreign Minister María Ángela Holguín replied, “No. Verification, no. We are looking forward.”
Asked a series of “questions for the record” by Sen. Richard Lugar, U.S. Ambassador-Designate to Venezuela Larry Palmer answered very frankly, using language stronger than the State Department has in the past. (“The Venezuelan government has been unwilling to prevent Colombian guerillas [sic.] from entering and establishing camps in Venezuelan territory. … [Military] morale is reported to be considerably low, particularly due to politically-oriented appointments. … As Cuba and Venezuela increase their military-to-military ties, I am concerned that Cuba’s influence within the Venezuelan military will grow.”) As a result, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has announced that Palmer is not welcome in Caracas. The Washington Post editorial page contends that it would be better for the United States not to have an ambassador at all.
On Tuesday, Colombia’s Constitutional Court will decide whether the country’s new defense agreement with the United States, signed last October, is truly constitutional. The court may require Colombia’s Congress to vote to approve it. Sources tell “La Silla Vacía” that a majority of justices are likely to rule against the agreement.
Starting next month, former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe will be a Distinguished Scholar in the Practice of Global Leadership at Georgetown University.
The new head of Colombia’s armed forces is a Navy admiral for only the second time ever. “La Silla Vacía” (linked for a third time in today’s post) has profiles of President Santos’ new high command. “These men,” reporter Dora Montero writes, “don’t follow the same line as the former high command – led by Gen. Freddy Padilla – that accompanied President Álvaro Uribe for years, and was seen by the rest of the military as more ‘political’ than ‘military.’ … The troops perceive this group of generals as closer to them.” Part of this “closeness,” Montero explains, is a likely willingness to defend the force more fiercely against accusations of human rights abuse.
The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress [PDF] of a possible $162 million sale of nine Blackhawk helicopters to Colombia’s Army, Police and Air Force. Already, “Colombia operates the world’s third-largest BLACK HAWK helicopter fleet,” according to the aircraft’s manufacturer, Connecticut-based Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.
Three and a half years after adopting a hard-line approach to drug-related violence, Mexican President Felipe Calderón “finally accepted that the strategy had failed to rein in the cartels,” as The Guardianput it. “I know that the strategy has been questioned, and my administration is more than willing to revise, strengthen or change it if needed,” he said in a meeting with opposition leaders this week. Security Secretary Genaro García Luna blamed Mexico’s severe public security setbacks on “at least 30 years of structural abandonment of the country’s police forces.” The Associated Press obtained data indicating a badly broken judicial system: “only about 15 percent of drug suspects detained between December 2006 and September 2009 have been convicted or acquitted.” The Washington Postcovered one strategic change currently underway: a $270 million program of new social spending in Ciudad Juárez, the most violent city in the hemisphere. On his blog, meanwhile, former President Vicente Fox called for the legalization of drugs.
Ecuador’s El Universowrites about the cocaine trade along the country’s Pacific border with Colombia: “Here, an arroba [about 25 pounds] of coca seeds is sold for US$100, according to the campesinos. 40 arrobas can plant a hectare. The crops begin to produce within three months, and every arroba of coca leaf sells for US$15; a hectare produces 70 arrobas. After processing, the growers make basic cocaine paste. 40 arrobas of leaves make a kilo of paste, which in this zone sells for US$1,100.” Elsewhere on the border, in Ecuador’s north-central province of Carchi, El Universocontends that greater government presence has reduced the threat posed by guerrillas and other Colombian armed groups.
Suriname’s former dictator Desi Bouterse, wanted in the Netherlands for narcotrafficking and on trial at home for a 1982 mass murder, was inaugurated as the country’s President on Thursday. A week earlier, reports the U.S. Southern Command, “Six U.S. Army medical personnel traveled to Paramaribo, Suriname, to exchange medical procedures with 45-medical personnel from the Suriname Armed Forces.”
Sixteen U.S. military officers, including seven generals, paid a visit to Managua “to strengthen relations with the Nicaraguan army,” reportsLa Prensa. Meanwhile, McClatchy reports, “entities controlled by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega have received at least $1 billion in no-strings-attached donations through an oil deal brokered by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela.”
The costs of earthquake rebuilding will force Chile to cut its defense budget next year, President Sebastián Piñera explained to the high command.
Argentina’s foreign minister, Héctor Timerman, visited Washington and met with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela will be in China next week for “the fourth round of U.S - China sub-dialogues on Latin America.”
As Brazil’s October 3 elections draw nearer, The Economist reports that Dilma Rouseff, the candidate of President Lula da Silva’s Workers’ Party, is polling at 41 percent, nearly 10 points ahead of opponent José Serra. Earlier in the week, Serra angered Bolivia’s government by claiming that President Evo Morales’s administration has been “lazy with regard to controlling cocaine.” Serra said in May that 80 or 90 percent of cocaine that arrives in Brazil comes from Bolivia; Brazil’s police offer a figure of 59 percent.
A recent poll places Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s approval rating at 37 percent. Though Ecuador and Colombia still have not re-established diplomatic relations after a 2008 crisis, Correa attended the August 7 inauguration of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, and urged Santos to visit Quito “quickly.”
A corruption scandal forced the resignation of the chief of Uruguay’s navy, Adm. Oscar Debali.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released its annual reports on coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador yesterday.
The main headline surrounding this year's release of the three main reports is Peru's significant increase and Colombia's decrease in coca cultivation in 2009--making Peru a contender for taking Colombia's title as the region's--and world's--top coca cultivator. "If the current trend continues, Peru will soon overtake Colombia as the world's biggest coca producer - a notorious status that it has not had since the mid-1990s," warned UNODC executive director Antonio Maria Costa.
Coca cultivation in Peru increased 6.8% in 2009--from 56,100 hectares in 2008 to 59,900. Cultivation of coca in Colombia, however, decreased in 2009 by 16%--from 81,000 hectares in 2008 to 68,000 hectares in 2009. Despite Colombia's sharp decline, total coca cultivation in the Andean region only decreased 5.2% in 2009.
According to the UNODC data, cultivation of coca in Bolivia barely changed between 2008 to 2009, increasing only by 400 hectares (about 1%--from 30,500 hectares in 2008 to 30,900 in 2009). This contradicts the United States' estimate for Bolivia, which shows a 9.4% increase in cultivation between 2008 and 2009 (and a 2009 cultivation estimate that is 4,100 hectares higher than the UNODC's estimate).
The above coca cultivation estimate reflects what the UNODC believes to be left over after all eradication takes place. Below is a chart that shows the total attempted number of hectares of coca under cultivation in the region, which is calculated by adding the cultivation data to the eradication data. This graph shows that even before eradication, Colombian coca growers were planting less of the crop in 2009. Colombia's attempted coca growing decreased 25% from 2008 to 2009, while the actual amount of uneradicated coca decreased by only 16%.
Colombia registered its second consecutive annual decrease in coca cultivation, dropping from 81,000 to 68,000 hectares. This is the lowest figure UNODC has detected in Colombia since it began measurements in the late 1990s.
Curiously, the drop occurred during a year in which coca eradication - both aerial and manual - fell sharply. U.S.-funded aircraft sprayed 104,771 hectares in Colombia in 2009, a 39 percent drop from the 172,026 hectares sprayed in 2006. Meanwhile manual eradication – teams of eradicators pulling plants out of the ground — dropped 37 percent from 2008 to 2009 (from 96,115 to 60,544 hectares).
The UNODC data seem to indicate that increased forced eradication does not correlate closely with reduced coca-growing. The same phenomenon was evident in past years, when increased coca cultivation came at the same time as increased eradication.
UNODC's explanation of Colombia's 2009 drop does, though, give some credit to forced eradication. It notes, however, that the reduction also owes to an increase in Colombian government presence in many remote coca-growing areas — part of an effort to "consolidate" control of territories dominated by illegal armed groups. It also notes an increase in investment in alternative development programs. "Dry weather conditions in 2009," UNODC adds, "also played a role."
The Colombia report notes a sharp (17 percent) drop in the estimated annual income of a coca-growing household, from US$10,508 in 2008 to US$8,710 last year. That adds up to a per capita income of only US$2,120 per year - far less than half the national average. Coca is not offering growers the attractive economic option that it once did. The UNODC found no significant variation last year in the farm-gate price of coca or coca paste, nor did it find any change in the price of cocaine in Colombia's internal market.
Colombia's largest coca-growing department continued to be Nariño in the far southwest. Colombia's entire Pacific coastal plain — from Nariño north through Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Chocó — now accounts for 37 percent of all the country's coca and may be the most violent part of the country. Though the Pacific zone decreased, a sharp increase was detected in Guaviare, the south-central department where the U.S.-funded aerial spray program began in the mid-1990s.
After a few years' growth, coca cultivation declined sharply again in the department of Putumayo along the Ecuador border, where massive eradication operations under "Plan Colombia" first began in late 2000. Putumayo's 45 percent one-year decline was surprising because the department not only saw a sharp decrease in eradication from 2008 to 2009, but it was experiencing severe economic hardship. The population was hard hit in late 2008 by the collapse of pyramid schemes that had thousands of investors. Meanwhile, efforts to "consolidate" or build state presence in Putumayo are incipient at best. The report is unable to explain the drop.
Chewing coca leaf is a centuries-old tradition among Bolivia's large indigenous population, and Bolivian President Evo Morales, a former coca-grower, has tolerated "rational" amounts of coca cultivation. The United States has harshly criticized Morales for refusing to eradicate coca leaf more aggressively, arguing that much of the crop is being turned into cocaine and exported. U.S. officials have cited three years of increased coca-growing in Bolivia as evidence that Morales' "legal cocaine, zero coca" policy isn't working.
In its latest report, UNODC detected increased Bolivian coca-growing for a fourth consecutive year--but this time the growth is insignificant, from 30,500 to 30,900 hectares (about 1 percent). The stagnation in coca-growing, UNODC finds, owes in part to the relative success that the Morales approach is enjoying in the President's home region, the Chapare region of Cochabamba department. Most recent growth instead has occurred in a difficult to access zone near La Paz, the Yungas, which now accounts for 68 percent of all coca in Bolivia.
UNODC also notes that the value of Bolivia's coca market fell by 10 percent in 2009, which may have offered a disincentive to new planting. It is not clear why this drop occurred after several years of increases.
The biggest headline from the UNODC findings was the continued increase in Peru's coca cultivation. UNODC found 59,900 hectares in Peru in 2009, 3,800 more than in 2008 and the highest figure detected since UNODC began monitoring in Peru in 2001. (This is far lower, however, than levels of Peruvian coca the United States detected between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, when Peru was the region's main coca producer.)
Even though Peru grew about 8,000 hectares fewer than Colombia last year, UNODC estimates that Peruvian growers harvested more coca leaf from these hectares than did their Colombian counterparts. This is the first time in nearly 15 years that Colombia — which still has the highest coca acreage — is not the Andes' largest coca-leaf producer.
This appears to be a classic, textbook example of the "balloon effect" — a much-used metaphor to describe U.S. drug-supply efforts in Latin America. Like squeezing a half-inflated balloon, pressure applied in one area causes the problem to emerge in another area. With the "balloon" being squeezed in Colombia, the "air" is rushing into Peru, where the remnants of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group encourage production and Colombian and Mexican cartels are battling for control of the trade.
Most of Peru's increase occurred in jungle zones that had little or no coca as recently as five years ago. Two of these zones are near the Colombian and Bolivian borders. However, over 80 percent of Peru's coca continues to be grown in three "traditional" zones: the Alto Huallaga river zone in north-central Peru, the Apurímac and Ene valleys (VRAE) in central Peru, and the La Convención-Lares zone just to the east of the VRAE.
This post was written by Abigail Poe and Adam Isacson
Three articles in today's news provided interesting statistics about security and narcotrafficking in Latin America:
Bolivia's chief of the FELCN (the U.S.-aided Police Special Forces for Counternarcotics), Félix Molina, provided the following statistics about FELCN operations in 2010:
6,237 counternarcotics operations have been carried out so far this year;
14.8 tons of cocaine and more than 922 tons of marijuana have been seized;
2,713 hectares of coca have been eradicated
1,777 people linked to the narcotrafficking have been detained, 127 of whom are foreigners;
Of the 127 foreigners, 72 were Colombians, 55 Peruvians, 19 Brazilians, and 7 Chileans. Other countries listed include Argentinians, Spanish, French, Mexicans and more (We know this adds up to more than 127, but these are the numbers as they appear in the El Deber article).
The ACAN-EFE wire service published numbers announced at a conference by an official of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which reveal Central America as a region with one of the world's highest murder rates. According to the article, the vice-president of the IACHR, Paulo Sérgio Pinherio, argued that the policies used to combat insecurity in the region "are insufficient" and are "suicide in that they do not strengthen the rule of law and democracy."
The murder-rates for 2008 for the Central American countries included in the article are as follows:
El Salvador: 71 murders/100,000 inhabitants;
Honduras: 58 murders/100,000 inhabitants;
Guatemala: 48 murders/100,000 inhabitants;
Costa Rica: 11 murders/100,000 inhabitants.
And finally, as Mexico is experiencing its "bloodiest days yet," today's Wall Street Journal includes an article about a New Mexico State University librarian, Molly Molloy, who has been keeping a tally of drug-cartel-related killings in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. According to Ms. Molloy's count, in 2009 alone, Ciudad Juárez experienced 2,633 drug-related homicides. This outnumbers all murders in the top eight U.S. cities combined. Below is the Wall Street Journal's graphic representing this finding.
Polls for the second and final round of Colombia’s presidential elections, scheduled for June 20, have pro-government candidate Juan Manuel Santos leading former Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus by a 2-1 margin. Read my analysis of Colombia’s first-round elections at the OpenDemocracy.net website. Links to much more coverage of Colombia’s election campaign are here.
Colombian President Álvaro Uribe lashed out last week against a prosecutor who, apparently in error, issued a citation to investigate Gen. Freddy Padilla de León, the chief of the country’s armed forces, for alleged involvement in human rights abuses. “I raise my voice in opposition to the accusations against Gen. Padilla de León. They [the accusers] are useful idiots of terrorism who do nothing more than make false accusations. … Terrorism wants to win by acting through scribblers who want to truncate the Democratic Security policy’s advances.”
Last Friday’s Washington Post led with a report on the Obama administration’s expanding use of Special Operations Forces troops worldwide. “Special Operations forces have grown both in number and budget, and are deployed in 75 countries, compared with about 60 at the beginning of last year.” In The Nation, Jeremy Scahill adds that these countries, in Latin America, have included Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.
Here is a transcript and video of Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela’s briefing on Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s visit to Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Barbados.
Bolivian President Evo Morales called on the armed forces to be more involved in counternarcotics, asking them “to prepare a strategy for the fight against narcotrafficking to guard national sovereignty against foreign interests, principally the United States.” The commander of the Bolivian Army’s U.S.-aided 8th Division responded that his unit has already been involved in counternarcotics for many years.
“The U.S. Southern Command's (Southcom) Joint Task Force Haiti officially completed its mission today marking the end of Operation Unified Response,” reported Southern Command. About 500 National Guard troops remain in Haiti carrying out humanitarian assistance exercises. Much remains to be done in Haiti, a Washington Posteditorial recalls.
Recent arms transfers news: Venezuela will buy K-8 aircraft from China for US$82 million. Argentina will study the possibility of developing nuclear-propelled naval vessels. Brazil, working with France, already has an US$8 billion project to develop a nuclear-powered submarine, scheduled to go online in 2021. The Brookings Institution and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies held a conference last week entitled “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere”; Brookings has made available audio of the event, including my presentation.
Yesterday, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela traveled to La Paz, Bolivia, where he met with Bolivian Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca. Valenzuela's quick trip sought to start talks about the bilateral framework agreement that could lead to the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries.
The United States and Bolivia have not had diplomatic relations since September 2008, when when Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled then-U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Philip Goldberg. Morales was angered by Goldberg's meetings with opposition political figures. As we noted on this blog in January, the United States and Bolivia have been working on and off to improve bilateral relations, with the goal of exchanging new ambassadors, since May 2009. Then, the assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the time, Thomas Shannon, traveled to La Paz to begin the dialogue. At various junctures ever since, both sides have appeared optimistic that relations would soon be renewed. Yet the two countries were never able to take the final steps.
This time, it was Assistant Secretary Valenzuela's turn to travel to Bolivia and work with Foreign Minister Choquehuanca to develop the framework of a bilateral agreement between the two nations. And after the meeting, the two officials announced that an agreement to consolidate a new phase of diplomatic relations between both nations would be signed within the next few weeks.
During the press conference, Assistant Secretary Valenzuela said, "I am in Bolivia because President Obama wants the relationship between the United States and Bolivia to move toward a new phase of cooperation and mutual respect, where we can work to benefit both of our countries."
Foreign Minister Choquehuanca said, "We are working, there are not only good intentions, there are also concrete advances with the United States. I am excited to say that we have advanced more than 99 percent toward signing this new framework agreement of mutual respect." After the meeting, Valenzuela also appeared positive about the meeting, posting to Twitter that he "Just had an excellent discussion with Bolivian Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca." (He also linked to the above picture that was posted on Flickr).
While Valenzuela and Choquehuanca were meeting in La Paz, Bolivian President Evo Morales expressed his hope that relations would resume between his country and the United States. "I hope this new framework agreement of diplomatic relations, commerce, and investment can advance (...). We hope that the visit of the representative of the United States government allows for negotiations to resume."
As reported by La Razon, the new agreement will cover topics such as political dialogue, shared responsibility in the fight against narcotrafficking, international trade agreements and the economic cooperation of the United States. Maybe the third time will be a charm, and the encounter yesterday between Assistant Secretary Valenzuela and Foreign Minister Choquehuanca will actually lead to a signed accord and the reinstatement of ambassadors.
Adam interviews Kathryn Ledebur of the Cochabamba, Bolivia-based Andean Information Network (www.ain-bolivia.org). Ms. Ledebur discusses Bolivia's recent local elections, civil-military relations, drug policy and the state of U.S.-Bolivian relations.
The "Just the Facts" podcast is available here and on iTunes. Thank you for listening.
In this second podcast, Adam discusses recent developments in Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela that indicate the current state of civilian control over the armed forces.
Last Friday, the Brookings Institution and the Inter-American Dialogue co-sponsored "A Conversation with U.S. Ambassadors to the Andean Region." As the title suggests, the panel included U.S. ambassadors to the Andean countries, and the United States' new ambassador to the Organization of American States. However, a perspective on U.S. relations with one Andean country was noticeably absent.
The United States has not had an ambassador in Bolivia since September 2008, when Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled Philip Goldberg and declared him "persona non grata" for meeting with the opposition and allegedly conspiring against the Bolivian government. The United States responded by expelling Bolivian Ambassador to the United States Gustavo Guzmán.
In May 2009, the United States and Bolivia began a dialogue to review and improve bilateral relations, with the goal of exchanging new ambassadors. The assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the time, Thomas Shannon, traveled to La Paz to begin this process. However, the next step in the process was not taken until October 2009 - five months later. During this five month hiatus, the United States decertified Bolivia as a partner in the fight against drugs and refused to extend Andean Trade Preference (ATPDEA) benefits to Bolivia for a second consecutive year - a move which the Andean Information Network said "contrasted sharply with the diplomatic tone of previous negotiations."
The attempt at dialogue resumed in Washington on October 27th, with Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca leading the Bolivian delegation. A State Department press release prior to the meeting read, "The dialogue reflects both countries' commitment to review and improve relations on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests. Key areas of discussion will include cooperation on development, social inclusion and our shared responsibility to combat drug trafficking."
After the meeting, it looked as if Bolivia and the United States were on the fast track to renewed diplomatic relations. The United States and Bolivia announced that they were on the verge of reaching an agreement of "mutual respect." Foreign Minister Choquehuanca said the meeting had resulted in "excellent advances on all subjects" and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs María Otero said "we hope to finalize and implement this agreement in the near future." At the culmination of the talks in October, it was suggested that the agreement would be signed at the third round of meetings scheduled for November in La Paz, which would be followed by the repositioning of ambassadors to both countries.
November - a month that saw Bolivia in the runup to presidential elections - came and went without a third round of meetings, a signed agreement of mutual respect, or new ambassadors, and it is unclear when or whether the bilateral dialogue between the two countries will restart. Since October, both countries have expressed a desire to continue a dialogue, though the condition of "mutual respect" for each country's sovereignty seems to be causing a roadblock in negotiations, with Bolivia calling for a change in the United States' attitude toward Bolivian political affairs.
One week after Foreign Minister Choquehuanca traveled to Washington in October, President Morales accused the United States of "fomenting terrorism and narcotrafficking in Colombia in order to justify the military bases," in allusion to the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, which grants the United States use of seven Colombian military bases. Later in the month, Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García accused the United States of "political interference," explaining that the United States "continues a policy under the rug, it continues moving political pieces. While it maintains this attitude of political interference (...), while it doesn't change its attitude, this healthy and sovereign distance is the minimum that we can do as a country that respects itself."
President Evo Morales was re-elected in December and the United States congratulated him, declaring that the Obama administration "look(s) forward to working with President Morales and his administration to continue advancing the bilateral dialogue started by our governments earlier this year." Days later, Bolivian Vice President García, in reaction to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's remarks about Iran's interest in countries like Venezuela and Bolivia as being "really a bad idea," sustained that until the United States changes its "colonial attitude in times that there are no longer colonies," the bilateral negotiations would not advance:
When the United States abandons its pretension to impose, to meddle, to tell us what to do and what not to do, when it abandons the patron-like and colonial attitude, and its interference in Bolivian political affairs, in that second that everything is perfect, we are going to sign (the agreeement).
Again in early January, U.S. charge d'affairs John Creamer reiterated the United States' desire to restart the dialogue with Bolivia after Evo Morales' inauguration to a second term on January 22nd. And again, Vice President García said that the dialogue and agreement is contingent on a change in the United States' attitude: "We also are hoping for better relations, but this hoping will not change on the 22nd, the 15th, or the 31st of January. Better relations depend on a change in the attitude of that (the U.S.) government."
President Morales was re-inaugurated on Friday, at a ceremony attended by a U.S. delegation led by Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and Under Secretary of State María Otero. According to the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia, the delegation "brought a message of friendship from President Barack Obama to President Morales and the Bolivian people" and Under Secretary Otero expressed that "relations between Bolivia and the United States are based on an effort from both countries to work together, to dialogue, to discuss everything with mutual respect and carry us to a broader relationship than we have now."
Though it appears that the United States is eager to continue the bilateral dialogue, Bolivia's call for an improved U.S. attitude toward its policies is not out of line. President Obama promised a new type of partnership - an "equal partnership" based on "mutual respect" - between Latin America and the United States at the Summit of the Americas in April 2009. As Doug Hertzler put it today on the Andean Information Network's blog, "it's time to allow Bolivia to try its own ideas. As Evo Morales begins his second term in office, the U.S. should move forward to reach agreement with Bolivia on respectful relations, transparent aid and a new exchange of ambassadors."
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimel recently released its annual reports on Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region - namely in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. This year's surveys, which provide data for 2008 levels of coca cultivation, eradication and seizures, show that the number of hectares in cultivation of coca in Colombia decreased by 18% from 2007-2008, while cultivation in Peru increased by 4.5% and cultivation in Bolivia increased by 6%. Colombia's large decrease in coca cultivation in 2008 follows a substantial increase (27%) in production from 2006-2007, while Peru and Bolivia have both been experiencing a slow but steady climb in coca cultivation over the past few years.
UNODC contends that, since many of Colombia’s remaining coca fields are recently planted, its estimate of tons of cocaine produced in Colombia fell even more sharply, from 600 to 430 tons. As a result, Colombia's percentage share of cocaine in the world market decreased from 60% in 2007 to 51% in 2008. Peru's and Bolivia's shares have both increased as a result of Colombia's decline, resulting in Peru contributing to 36% of world production (up from 29% in 2007) and Bolivia contributing to 13% of world production.
Seizures of cocaine in the three countries have also increased significantly since 2007, with Colombia reporting a 57% increase, Peru a 100% increase and Bolivia a 148% increase.
The increases in the number of hectares under cultivation with coca in Peru and Bolivia could be attributed to failed domestic policies (drug-war hardliners have argued that Bolivia's policies on coca cultivation, which allow 12,000 hectares of cultivation – and, in fact, tolerate a bit more – solely for medicinal and local use, are to blame for Bolivia's increase). However, another contributing factor could be the "balloon effect," a theory that argues that as long as demand is strong, coca cultivation will merely be pushed into new areas as it is squeezed out of existing coca cultivating areas. Therefore, as Colombia more aggressively eradicates coca plants and seizes cocaine and coca paste, the production of coca and cocaine will merely be pushed elsewhere in the Andes.
In support of the "balloon effect" theory, the table above indicates that since 1998, the total coca cultivation in the Andean region has not changed significantly - with 191,000 hectares in cultivation in 1998 compared to 167,600 hectares in 2008, even though cultivation in Colombia has decreased almost 50% since the beginning of Plan Colombia in 1999. Also, the graph below, which shows coca cultivation in the Andean Region since 1988, exemplifies this balloon effect phenomenon. From 1988-1997 Peru was the number one coca cultivator in the region, after which the cultivation of coca moved more prominently into Colombia, leaving this country in the number one spot until today. However, as shown by the graph, Peru is once again starting to catch up with Colombia.
According to press reports, a three-page document issued by the Israeli Foreign Ministry alleges that Bolivia and Venezuela have sold uranium to Iran for use in that country's nuclear program. The document is to be presented by Israeli Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Dani Ayalon at the 39th Regular Session of the OAS which will be held the first week of June in San Pedro Sula, Honduras.
According to Israeli officials the document, which reportedly analyzes the growing relations between Iran and countries in the region, was not meant to be public. Further detail about its content has not been revealed.
The government of right-wing Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, which recently took power in Israel, stated that while it was in no condition to prove the allegations in the document, it is nonetheless concerned by what it views as a "strategic alliance" between Bolivian President Evo Morales, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
“Iran is trying to take positions in Latin America, and unfortunately we see a very close cooperation between Ahmadinejad and the radical regime of Hugo Chávez, and this is something that should worry everyone,” stated Ayalon in an interview with Spain’s Efe wire service.
Bolivian Government officials have strenuously denied the accusations and assure that even though their relationship with the Iranian government is growing closer, they do not support Iran’s nuclear program. Bolivian President Evo Morales broke diplomatic relations with Israel in January to protest Israel’s military actions in Gaza.
“If for some reason there is a document issued by any security agency of Israel that has pointed out the existence of any evidence, then we should simply suspect that the Israeli intelligence agencies are suffering from a severe capacity crisis, and for that matter of a crisis in work ethic. If this is so, we should simply declare any Israeli agency an agency of inept and incompetent clowns, for only a clown can imagine such an atrocity,” declared Juan Ramon Quintana, Bolivia’s minister of the presidency.
Luis Alberto Echazu, Bolivian minister of Mining Industries, declared that there was no precise proof of any geological deposits of uranium, much less of its exploitation.
Last Friday, the Brookings Institution and the Inter-American Dialogue co-sponsored "
