Adam interviews Roxana Altholz of the University of California at Berkeley Law School Human Rights Clinic, author of "Truth Behind Bars," a hard-hitting report on 30 Colombian paramilitary leaders' extradition to the United States, which has complicated efforts to win justice for their victims.

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Yesterday, the Department of State released its 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. This annual report submitted to Congress "describes the efforts of key countries to attack all aspects of the international drug trade in Calendar Year 2009."

Volume I of the 2010 report includes new statistics on the coca cultivation and counter-drug efforts in the Andean region. Here are our most up-to-date statistics on the war on drugs in the Andean region. Click on each graphic to see a bigger version.

U.S. estimate of coca cultivation in the Andean region from 1999 to 2008.

Cultivation trends:

UNODC estimate of coca cultivation from 1999 to 2008.

U.S. estimate of potential pure cocaine production in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru from 1998 to 2008, measured in tons. Again, the United States reports 2009 numbers for Bolivia, but not for Peru or Colombia.

Production trends:

UNODC estimate of cocaine production in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru from 1997 to 2008.

U.S. statistics on the interdiction rate in Colombia from 1998 to 2009 - measured in both tons of coca paste/base and tons of cocaine seized.

Interdiction trends:

The number of hectares of coca eradicated in Colombia from 1998 to 2009 through both manual and aerial eradication.

Eradication trends:

Abigail and Adam discuss the Cancún summit, human rights in Venezuela, reelection in Colombia, and Hillary Clinton's trip to the region next week.

The "Just the Facts" podcast is available here and on iTunes. Thank you for listening.

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Adam reviews recent arms sales from Brazil, Europe, Israel and the United States to several countries throughout the region.

The "Just the Facts" podcast is available here and on iTunes. Thank you for listening.

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The Obama administration's Fiscal Year 2011 foreign aid request, submitted to Congress earlier this week, includes a new counternarcotics and security initiative: the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).

Here is what we know about the CBSI so far:

• It is a "multiyear, multifaceted effort by the U.S. Government and Caribbean partners to develop a joint regional citizen safety strategy to tackle the full range of security and criminal threats to the Caribbean Basin," according to the Obama administration's FY2011 foreign aid request. The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) Program and Budget Guide for FY2010 says the initiative will be a 5-year program. (Download the Program and Budget Guide here)
• Developing the CBSI "became a priority as the Mérida Initiative began yielding positive results in Mexico and Central America, making the Caribbean an increasingly attractive transit zone for transnational organized criminals, terrorists and illicit traffickers."
• The CBSI was first announced by President Obama at the Summit of the Americas in April 2009.
• Fifteen countries of the Caribbean Basin are included in the CBSI: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
• Funding for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative will come out of the Development Assistance, Economic Support Fund, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, and Foreign Military Financing accounts. So far, the CBSI budget for FY2010 and FY2011 looks like this:
• In the FY2010 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, Congress appropriated "not less than $37 million" for the initiative "to provide equipment and training to combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform, institution building, education, anti-corruption, rule of law activities, and maritime security." Congress specifies that at least $21.1 million of that amount should be used for social justice and education programs.
• For FY2010, the INL Program and Budget Guide allocates $6,365,000 for the initiative, which comes from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement accounts. The FY2010 allocation is described as "an investment" in anticipation of the program's official launch in FY2011. This INL funding is broken down into $715,000 for "Caribbean Training and Logistical Team Support," $2,325,000 for combating money laundering, and $3,325,000 for legislative function and process programs. (More details about the program from the Program and Budget Guide can be found here.)
• The Obama administration's FY2011 foreign aid request allocates just under $73 million in both military and economic aid to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative: $37,463,000 for INL, $18,160,000 for Foreign Military Financing, and $17,000,000 for the Economic Support Fund.
• The FY2010 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill requires the Secretary of State to submit a spending plan for the initiative to the Committees on Appropriations by January 29, 2010. The report includes a "detailed plan for funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the countries of the Caribbean Basin by this Act, with concrete goals, actions to be taken, budget proposals, and anticipated results."
• The CBSI will eventually include a U.S. vessel, with an international crew, deployed to the region. The INL Program and Budget Guide reads:
  

  Caribbean Training and Logistical Support Teams will provide a platform for leading U.S. engagement and support for maritime interdiction in the Caribbean. Teams will deploy to the region to provide training, logistical and maintenance support. The primary goal for these teams is to provide onsite support until a U.S. vessel, with an international crew, can be deployed to provide those services. That vessel will foster international cooperation by offering the opportunity for a diverse, international and joint/interagency crew to work together and support all of the cooperating countries in the Caribbean. The Caribbean support vessel will deliver a total support package including a mobile professional training program and maintenance team with potential for shops, tools, technicians, and limited onboard classroom/berthing/messing for students. Additionally, it may provide a centralized supply source for standard spare parts, turn-in items, etc., and will have the capability to deliver cargo.

• The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on the CBSI in early December 2009. The transcript of the hearing can be downloaded as a PDF here. Written testimonies by each of the witnesses and a webcast are also available online.

  During his opening remarks, Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) said:

  I also believe that we need to take a holistic view of the entire region when we begin implementing CBSI. I am very concerned that if we do not act quickly to bolster our friends in the Caribbean, the positive impact of the Merida Initiative in Mexico and Central America will push the drug trade further into the Caribbean and increase the already alarming rates of violence.
  ...
  CBSI was announced at the Summit last April, there have been three meetings held on this initiative. Initial U.S.-Caribbean meetings were held in Suriname, Barbados, and the Dominican Republic in 2009, and a ministerial meeting is expected to take place in Washington in early 2010 at which a political declaration, action plan, and framework for the CBSI will be adopted.

On January 21, three U.S. senators on committees with jurisdiction over U.S. aid to Colombia sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The letter calls for the United States to "reevaluate U.S. assistance to Colombia," and notes that despite allocating nearly $7 billion in aid to Colombia from fiscal year 2000 to 2009, "the amount of cocaine entering the United States ... has not changed appreciably... Moreover, progress in other priority areas - human rights and the strengthening of democratic institutions - is lacking."

Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI) sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) chairs the Senate Appropriations/Foreign Operations Subcommittee.

The letter expresses concern over various trends in Colombia, including:

• The "false positives" scandal, "in which Colombian soldiers killed hundreds of civilians and dressed them in guerrilla clothing in order to inflate body counts;"
• Colombian military leaders' continued denial of "the scope of the executions" and opposition to "civilian court jurisdiction in many cases involving abuses of human rights;" and
• The "particularly troubling" abuses of the presidential intelligence agency, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), in which the "DAS was systematically conducting illegal surveillance of human rights groups, journalists, opposition politicians, Supreme Court judges, trade unionists, and international human rights organizations."

Senators Feingold, Dodd, and Leahy add that "a possible third term for the current president threatens to further erode the checks and balances that help protect Colombia's fragile democracy."

The three senators call for President Obama's fiscal year 2011 budget request to Congress to reflect new priorities and a new approach toward Colombia. This new approach would include:

• Reducing coca cultivation and cocaine production through "greater emphasis on farmer-led programs with voluntary eradication coupled with effective alternative development programs;"
• Strengthening judicial and law enforcement programs "to dismantle criminal networks, combat the money laundering that enables the narcotics trade, and reduce impunity for corruption and human rights abuses;"
• Reducing "military aid while continuing judicial and law enforcement, development and humanitarian assistance; and
• "Explor[ing] more vigorously the possibilities for peace in Colombia."

The 3-page letter can be downloaded here as a PDF file.

Last Friday, the Brookings Institution and the Inter-American Dialogue co-sponsored "A Conversation with U.S. Ambassadors to the Andean Region." As the title suggests, the panel included U.S. ambassadors to the Andean countries, and the United States' new ambassador to the Organization of American States. However, a perspective on U.S. relations with one Andean country was noticeably absent.

The United States has not had an ambassador in Bolivia since September 2008, when Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled Philip Goldberg and declared him "persona non grata" for meeting with the opposition and allegedly conspiring against the Bolivian government. The United States responded by expelling Bolivian Ambassador to the United States Gustavo Guzmán.

In May 2009, the United States and Bolivia began a dialogue to review and improve bilateral relations, with the goal of exchanging new ambassadors. The assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the time, Thomas Shannon, traveled to La Paz to begin this process. However, the next step in the process was not taken until October 2009 - five months later. During this five month hiatus, the United States decertified Bolivia as a partner in the fight against drugs and refused to extend Andean Trade Preference (ATPDEA) benefits to Bolivia for a second consecutive year - a move which the Andean Information Network said "contrasted sharply with the diplomatic tone of previous negotiations."

The attempt at dialogue resumed in Washington on October 27th, with Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca leading the Bolivian delegation. A State Department press release prior to the meeting read, "The dialogue reflects both countries' commitment to review and improve relations on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests. Key areas of discussion will include cooperation on development, social inclusion and our shared responsibility to combat drug trafficking."

After the meeting, it looked as if Bolivia and the United States were on the fast track to renewed diplomatic relations. The United States and Bolivia announced that they were on the verge of reaching an agreement of "mutual respect." Foreign Minister Choquehuanca said the meeting had resulted in "excellent advances on all subjects" and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs María Otero said "we hope to finalize and implement this agreement in the near future." At the culmination of the talks in October, it was suggested that the agreement would be signed at the third round of meetings scheduled for November in La Paz, which would be followed by the repositioning of ambassadors to both countries.

November - a month that saw Bolivia in the runup to presidential elections - came and went without a third round of meetings, a signed agreement of mutual respect, or new ambassadors, and it is unclear when or whether the bilateral dialogue between the two countries will restart. Since October, both countries have expressed a desire to continue a dialogue, though the condition of "mutual respect" for each country's sovereignty seems to be causing a roadblock in negotiations, with Bolivia calling for a change in the United States' attitude toward Bolivian political affairs.

One week after Foreign Minister Choquehuanca traveled to Washington in October, President Morales accused the United States of "fomenting terrorism and narcotrafficking in Colombia in order to justify the military bases," in allusion to the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, which grants the United States use of seven Colombian military bases. Later in the month, Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García accused the United States of "political interference," explaining that the United States "continues a policy under the rug, it continues moving political pieces. While it maintains this attitude of political interference (...), while it doesn't change its attitude, this healthy and sovereign distance is the minimum that we can do as a country that respects itself."

President Evo Morales was re-elected in December and the United States congratulated him, declaring that the Obama administration "look(s) forward to working with President Morales and his administration to continue advancing the bilateral dialogue started by our governments earlier this year." Days later, Bolivian Vice President García, in reaction to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's remarks about Iran's interest in countries like Venezuela and Bolivia as being "really a bad idea," sustained that until the United States changes its "colonial attitude in times that there are no longer colonies," the bilateral negotiations would not advance:

When the United States abandons its pretension to impose, to meddle, to tell us what to do and what not to do, when it abandons the patron-like and colonial attitude, and its interference in Bolivian political affairs, in that second that everything is perfect, we are going to sign (the agreeement).

Again in early January, U.S. charge d'affairs John Creamer reiterated the United States' desire to restart the dialogue with Bolivia after Evo Morales' inauguration to a second term on January 22nd. And again, Vice President García said that the dialogue and agreement is contingent on a change in the United States' attitude: "We also are hoping for better relations, but this hoping will not change on the 22nd, the 15th, or the 31st of January. Better relations depend on a change in the attitude of that (the U.S.) government."

President Morales was re-inaugurated on Friday, at a ceremony attended by a U.S. delegation led by Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and Under Secretary of State María Otero. According to the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia, the delegation "brought a message of friendship from President Barack Obama to President Morales and the Bolivian people" and Under Secretary Otero expressed that "relations between Bolivia and the United States are based on an effort from both countries to work together, to dialogue, to discuss everything with mutual respect and carry us to a broader relationship than we have now."

Though it appears that the United States is eager to continue the bilateral dialogue, Bolivia's call for an improved U.S. attitude toward its policies is not out of line. President Obama promised a new type of partnership - an "equal partnership" based on "mutual respect" - between Latin America and the United States at the Summit of the Americas in April 2009. As Doug Hertzler put it today on the Andean Information Network's blog, "it's time to allow Bolivia to try its own ideas. As Evo Morales begins his second term in office, the U.S. should move forward to reach agreement with Bolivia on respectful relations, transparent aid and a new exchange of ambassadors."

One week has passed since a devastating earthquake brought one of the world's worst-ever humanitarian emergencies to the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, and its surrounding areas. Over the past seven days, search-and-rescue operations have pulled over 121 people from the rubble left behind by the earthquake. The chance of finding survivors diminishes as every day passes; as of yesterday, however, 36 international search-and-rescue teams remained in Haiti in an effort to continue rescue operations. Despite heroic attempts, the death toll estimate now exceeds 200,000 people, with over 70,000 cadavers already buried by the Haitian government.

In addition to those who lost their lives during the earthquake, over 3 million Haitians were estimated to be adversely affected, and the need to distribute humanitarian relief and provide medical assistance is urgent. Medical care, handling of the dead, shelter, water, food and sanitation remain the priorities for international relief operations, but getting supplies into Haiti and distributed to the most affected populations has proven to be logistically difficult.

One factor contributing to slow delivery of aid, according to some humanitarian relief organizations, was the United States' control of air traffic operations at the overcrowded airport in Port-au-Prince. According to an article by the Inter-Press Service, the French Cooperation Minister, the World Food Programme (WFP), and Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders issued complaints over the U.S. military's alleged favoritism of giving priority to U.S. military flights over planes carrying humanitarian assistance, including food and needed medical supplies. A Doctors without Borders cargo plane with 12 tons of medical supplies was turned away three times on Sunday, delaying the delivery of supplies to field hospitals. The French Cooperation Minister Alain Joyandet was quoted saying that, "This is about helping Haiti, not about occupying Haiti." An air logistics official with the WFP said, "Their [The U.S. military's] priorities are to secure to country. Ours are to feed. We have got to get those priorities in sync."

U.S. Southern Command disputed this accusation, stating that "On a typical day, the Port-au-Prince airport lands about three aircraft. Since we landed Wednesday, over 600 aircraft have landed and taken off." Though in an attempt to better coordinate the balance of humanitarian and military flights landing in Port-au-Prince, an agreement was made between the U.S. military and the United Nations to give humanitarian flights guaranteed landing slots at the Port-au-Prince airport. As a result, "the flow of aid to the people of Haiti will increase dramatically in the coming days," according to the executive director of the WFP, Josette Sheeran.

In addition to controlling air traffic at the Port-au-Prince airport, the U.S. military has deployed various aircraft, ships, and thousands of military personnel to the region to provide humanitarian assistance and security. According to U.S. Southern Command, "approximately 11,000 U.S. military personnel are currently supporting task force operations within Haiti and from U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels off shore." The website for the U.S. military effort, dubbed "Operation Unified Response," includes a "force tracker" listing all U.S. military vessels, aircraft and personnel both en route to, and in, Haiti.

According to the Pan American Health Organization "Situation Report #7," issued on Tuesday evening, the U.S. military is not the sole military presence currently in Haiti:

Twenty-six countries, including Argentina, Canada, France, Russia and the USA have provided significant military assets for the emergency response. These assets include field hospitals, troops, military aircraft, hospital ships, cargo ships and helicopters. MINUSTAH currently has 3,400 troops and police on the ground. Civil military coordinators are working directly with the US military.

In addition to the criticism leveled at the U.S. military's air traffic control priorities, some Latin American governments have also spoken out against the United States' role in Haiti in general, with statements alluding to a U.S. military occupation of Haiti.

On Sunday, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez said on his weekly television show, "Aló, Presidente," that the United States was "occupying Haiti undercover.... Doctors, medicine, fuel, field hospitals - that's what the United States should send."

"This drama is being manipulated to install U.S. troops in Haiti, who have been taking military control of the Port-au-Prince airport, and this is worrisome," added Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.

On Monday, Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García Linera criticized the United States' militarized response, stating that "what Haiti needs is humanitarian assistance and not the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the United States.... What we need here in Haiti is not so many armed troops, like those that the United States has brought, what we need here are resources: money, food, and infrastructure." Today, Bolivian President Evo Morales announced that he will ask the United Nations to hold an emergency meeting to "reject the military occupation of the United States" in Haiti. According to news source EFE, President Morales continued, "It is not possible that the United States uses a natural disaster to invade and militarily occupy Haiti."

Every year, the U.S. Department of State submits a report to Congress with its detailed budget request for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance. This program is the largest source of military and police assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, and during the past decade has funded programs like Plan Colombia, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the Mérida Initiative for both Mexico and Central America, and the recently approved Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which is an extension of the Mérida Initiative programs in the Caribbean region.

This report, known as the "Program and Budget Guide," is usually made public around September. It provides Congress with more detail about its INCLE budget request for the next fiscal year, and gives detail about how the assistance was spent during the past two years. It was only recently uploaded to the State Department website. (Download the FY2010 Program and Budget Guide)

Information from the FY2010 INCLE Program and Budget Guide relevant to Latin America is now on the Just the Facts database (see country totals here, click on a country for more details on how the assistance was allocated) and a few trends are worth noting, especially with regard to Colombia. As seen in the graph below, INCLE military and police assistance to Colombia has decreased significantly since 2007, when assistance reached almost $400 million, to $209 million budgeted for Fiscal Year 2010, of which Congress approved just under $200 million when it passed the foreign aid budget bill last month.

The decline in INCLE military assistance to Colombia owes mainly to the Democratic Party's takeover of the majority in Congress after the November 2006 legislative elections. Beginning in early 2007, as it considered the 2008 budget, the new leadership sought to reduce the overwhelmingly military emphasis of the program in Colombia, which relied heavily on forced aerial eradication of coca, and to place a greater priority on economic development, humanitarian aid and judicial reform.

The decline in INCLE military aid to Colombia can especially be seen in the decline in funding for both coca eradication and aviation support. INCLE's aviation support for the Colombian Army and National Police includes aviation maintenance and logistics support for the dozens of helicopters and planes used by the Colombian Army and Police. In 2005, INCLE allocated over $195 million to the Colombian Army and National Police for aviation support, while in 2010 the amount budgeted for both programs is $91 million, of which Congress approved $85 million.

Similarly, the funding for coca eradication for the Colombian National Police in 2005 was $82.5 million, compared to $60 million requested for 2010, of which Congress approved $53 million.