Over the past few years, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been working with the Colombian government on a new security and development strategy. At times called "Integrated Action," the Colombian government refers to it as the National Consolidation Plan--PCN for its acronym in Spanish.

This strategy was designed to be a phased, coordinated process of bringing a functioning government into zones throughout the country that have never known one. As described in the Center for International Policy's recent publication, After Plan Colombia, the plan begins with the military entering a zone, scattering illegal armed groups and creating a security perimeter. Once this perimeter is established, the rest of the government enters, including police, justice, land-titlers, road-builders, health, education and productive projects. Similar to what the United States is attempting in Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, the idea is that the population will support the new government presence and the illegal armed groups that were pushed out will not have the support or influence needed to return.

The United States has been supporting this plan over the past three years in two main zones--the Montes de María zone near the Caribbean coast since 2009, and the La Macarena zone in southern Colombia since 2007. It has tentatively expanded support for the concept in the southwestern port city of Tumaco and the mountains of central Tolima department.

The Center for International Policy's evaluation of this project so far has been mixed. While it recognizes that learning has occurred since "Plan Colombia," the "After Plan Colombia" report notes that armed groups have been resilient, civilian aid has been slow to arrive, and the military is playing a host of non-military roles in the chosen zones.

Now, the United States plans to expand its support into three additional areas, calling the new framework the Colombia Security and Development Initiative (CSDI). These five zones (or corridors) are: 1) Montes de Maria; 2) Nariño/Putumayo (Southern Band); 3) a Central Band (from La Macarena in Meta west through southern Tolima and Valle del Cauca to Buenaventura on the Pacific); 4) a corridor from Bajo Cauca to Catatumbo (Northern Band); and 5) Uraba and Chocó (Pacific Band). The first three corridors mentioned are the current priorities of U.S. aid.

On June 30th, USAID issued its request for proposals (RFP) for a contractor to carry out the next phase of the CSDI. This phase is much larger--both in funds and time frame--than USAID's previous support of the program. This new request will result in a 5-year, $95-115 million contract for the part of CSDI they are calling the "Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative-Central Region" or CELI-Central. This will be one of the largest single USAID contracts in Colombia since "Plan Colombia" began in 2000.

This new program, therefore, focuses on the Central Band that stretches across Colombia from La Macarena in Meta west through southern Tolima and Valle del Cauca to Buenaventura. This new, much larger phase will build on the previously existing program in the La Macarena zone, and coincides with the departure at the end of this fiscal year of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID-OTI), a part of USAID that usually stays in a country for a few years carrying out rapid, short-term projects. The new project, however, is much more ambitious, as it covers a very large and diverse area of Colombia and aims to achieve "consolidation" in five years.

According to USAID, this proposed contract will work alongside the Government of Colombia to carry out its National Consolidation Plan. The work the contractor carries out will depend on the level of security in the different zones. The RFP reads:

In transition zones where the GOC has only recently established minimum security, the contractor will emphasize immediate, short-term activities to meet urgent economic and social needs with the goal of demonstrating presence of the state and to help the target areas recover quickly from the effects of the conflict and eradication. Small, quick-impact projects will help to create confidence in the GOC, provide the opportunity to build relations between communities and local government, and respond to local dynamics and urgent needs. In areas where security is better established, the contractor will support longer-term interventions in coordination with the government, private sector and civil society with a particular emphasis on accompaniment and the provision of technical assistance to permanently consolidate state presence.

The goals of this program are to achieve a sustainable end-state where "peace and security are permanent, civilian state entities are providing the services expected of any legitimate and democratically-elected government, legal livelihoods supplant illegal economic activities, and active citizen participation demands accountable and transparent governance."

This new program will be awarded as a contract, and not a grant. This means the contractor will have less flexibility in how it carries out the work, and may not be easily able to adjust its work in response to a change in conditions on the ground. According to the RFP, USAID and the contractor "function as an integrated, operational team with shared program vision for achieving program success. The Contractor shall be responsible for implementation of the program strategy that is set and adjusted through an iterative, coordinated process between the Contractor, USAID, and the GOC to achieve the goal of strengthening the consolidation of state presence in critical conflict zones within the Central Region."

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released its annual reports on coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador yesterday.

The main headline surrounding this year's release of the three main reports is Peru's significant increase and Colombia's decrease in coca cultivation in 2009--making Peru a contender for taking Colombia's title as the region's--and world's--top coca cultivator. "If the current trend continues, Peru will soon overtake Colombia as the world's biggest coca producer - a notorious status that it has not had since the mid-1990s," warned UNODC executive director Antonio Maria Costa.

Coca cultivation in Peru increased 6.8% in 2009--from 56,100 hectares in 2008 to 59,900. Cultivation of coca in Colombia, however, decreased in 2009 by 16%--from 81,000 hectares in 2008 to 68,000 hectares in 2009. Despite Colombia's sharp decline, total coca cultivation in the Andean region only decreased 5.2% in 2009.

According to the UNODC data, cultivation of coca in Bolivia barely changed between 2008 to 2009, increasing only by 400 hectares (about 1%--from 30,500 hectares in 2008 to 30,900 in 2009). This contradicts the United States' estimate for Bolivia, which shows a 9.4% increase in cultivation between 2008 and 2009 (and a 2009 cultivation estimate that is 4,100 hectares higher than the UNODC's estimate).

Click to see a larger graph

Click to see a larger graph

The above coca cultivation estimate reflects what the UNODC believes to be left over after all eradication takes place. Below is a chart that shows the total attempted number of hectares of coca under cultivation in the region, which is calculated by adding the cultivation data to the eradication data. This graph shows that even before eradication, Colombian coca growers were planting less of the crop in 2009. Colombia's attempted coca growing decreased 25% from 2008 to 2009, while the actual amount of uneradicated coca decreased by only 16%.

Click to see a larger graph

Below are more country-specific details from the 2009 UNODC reports:

COLOMBIA (PDF)

Colombia registered its second consecutive annual decrease in coca cultivation, dropping from 81,000 to 68,000 hectares. This is the lowest figure UNODC has detected in Colombia since it began measurements in the late 1990s.

Curiously, the drop occurred during a year in which coca eradication - both aerial and manual - fell sharply. U.S.-funded aircraft sprayed 104,771 hectares in Colombia in 2009, a 39 percent drop from the 172,026 hectares sprayed in 2006. Meanwhile manual eradication – teams of eradicators pulling plants out of the ground — dropped 37 percent from 2008 to 2009 (from 96,115 to 60,544 hectares).

Click to see a larger graph

The UNODC data seem to indicate that increased forced eradication does not correlate closely with reduced coca-growing. The same phenomenon was evident in past years, when increased coca cultivation came at the same time as increased eradication.

UNODC's explanation of Colombia's 2009 drop does, though, give some credit to forced eradication. It notes, however, that the reduction also owes to an increase in Colombian government presence in many remote coca-growing areas — part of an effort to "consolidate" control of territories dominated by illegal armed groups. It also notes an increase in investment in alternative development programs. "Dry weather conditions in 2009," UNODC adds, "also played a role."

The Colombia report notes a sharp (17 percent) drop in the estimated annual income of a coca-growing household, from US$10,508 in 2008 to US$8,710 last year. That adds up to a per capita income of only US$2,120 per year - far less than half the national average. Coca is not offering growers the attractive economic option that it once did. The UNODC found no significant variation last year in the farm-gate price of coca or coca paste, nor did it find any change in the price of cocaine in Colombia's internal market.

Colombia's largest coca-growing department continued to be Nariño in the far southwest. Colombia's entire Pacific coastal plain — from Nariño north through Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Chocó — now accounts for 37 percent of all the country's coca and may be the most violent part of the country. Though the Pacific zone decreased, a sharp increase was detected in Guaviare, the south-central department where the U.S.-funded aerial spray program began in the mid-1990s.

After a few years' growth, coca cultivation declined sharply again in the department of Putumayo along the Ecuador border, where massive eradication operations under "Plan Colombia" first began in late 2000. Putumayo's 45 percent one-year decline was surprising because the department not only saw a sharp decrease in eradication from 2008 to 2009, but it was experiencing severe economic hardship. The population was hard hit in late 2008 by the collapse of pyramid schemes that had thousands of investors. Meanwhile, efforts to "consolidate" or build state presence in Putumayo are incipient at best. The report is unable to explain the drop.

Click to see a larger graph

BOLIVIA (PDF in Spanish)

Chewing coca leaf is a centuries-old tradition among Bolivia's large indigenous population, and Bolivian President Evo Morales, a former coca-grower, has tolerated "rational" amounts of coca cultivation. The United States has harshly criticized Morales for refusing to eradicate coca leaf more aggressively, arguing that much of the crop is being turned into cocaine and exported. U.S. officials have cited three years of increased coca-growing in Bolivia as evidence that Morales' "legal cocaine, zero coca" policy isn't working.

In its latest report, UNODC detected increased Bolivian coca-growing for a fourth consecutive year--but this time the growth is insignificant, from 30,500 to 30,900 hectares (about 1 percent). The stagnation in coca-growing, UNODC finds, owes in part to the relative success that the Morales approach is enjoying in the President's home region, the Chapare region of Cochabamba department. Most recent growth instead has occurred in a difficult to access zone near La Paz, the Yungas, which now accounts for 68 percent of all coca in Bolivia.

UNODC also notes that the value of Bolivia's coca market fell by 10 percent in 2009, which may have offered a disincentive to new planting. It is not clear why this drop occurred after several years of increases.

PERU (PDF in Spanish)

The biggest headline from the UNODC findings was the continued increase in Peru's coca cultivation. UNODC found 59,900 hectares in Peru in 2009, 3,800 more than in 2008 and the highest figure detected since UNODC began monitoring in Peru in 2001. (This is far lower, however, than levels of Peruvian coca the United States detected between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, when Peru was the region's main coca producer.)

Even though Peru grew about 8,000 hectares fewer than Colombia last year, UNODC estimates that Peruvian growers harvested more coca leaf from these hectares than did their Colombian counterparts. This is the first time in nearly 15 years that Colombia — which still has the highest coca acreage — is not the Andes' largest coca-leaf producer.

This appears to be a classic, textbook example of the "balloon effect" — a much-used metaphor to describe U.S. drug-supply efforts in Latin America. Like squeezing a half-inflated balloon, pressure applied in one area causes the problem to emerge in another area. With the "balloon" being squeezed in Colombia, the "air" is rushing into Peru, where the remnants of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group encourage production and Colombian and Mexican cartels are battling for control of the trade.

Most of Peru's increase occurred in jungle zones that had little or no coca as recently as five years ago. Two of these zones are near the Colombian and Bolivian borders. However, over 80 percent of Peru's coca continues to be grown in three "traditional" zones: the Alto Huallaga river zone in north-central Peru, the Apurímac and Ene valleys (VRAE) in central Peru, and the La Convención-Lares zone just to the east of the VRAE.

This post was written by Abigail Poe and Adam Isacson

This post was written by CIP's Cuba program intern Meghan Vail

On May 27th, two House of Representatives committees held a joint hearing on U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. The Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on Homeland Security and the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs were specifically interested in the next steps for the Mérida Initiative, the $1.4 billion U.S. counternarcotics and security program for Mexico.

A webcast of the hearing is available here.

While members of the committees voiced their individual concerns regarding current implementation of the Mérida Initiative and the funds committed to this program, several common concerns emerged in the course of the hearing, which occurred within weeks of the passage of the Arizona state immigration law (SB 1070) and within days of President Obama’s authorization of 1,200 National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border to assist border patrol and local law enforcement. Accordingly, many of the questions addressed to the panel dealt not only with the delayed utilization of obligated Mérida funds, but also the significance of the National Guard deployment, the specified roles of governmental and non-governmental agencies in border protection and security, and the suitability of Arizona as a national model for securing the border.

Below is a summary of House members’ opening remarks and the testimonies and Q&A period of the first panel. You can watch the entire hearing here.

Opening Remarks
The hearing began with opening statements from House members Henry Cuellar (D-TX), Candice Miller (R-MI), Eliot Engel (D-NY), Connie Mack (R-FL) and Bennie Thompson (D-MS).

Chairman Cuellar expressed the committees’ desire to see an increase in the pace at which the funds obligated for the Mérida Initiative since 2007 are put to use. He expressed interest in the panelists’ perspectives on previous and future implementation of Mérida, as well as the significance of the Obama Administration’s deployment of the National Guard to the U.S.-Mexico border earlier this week.

Rep. Miller expressed her desire to see an even greater presence of the National Guard at the U.S.-Mexico border than has currently been ordered. She claimed that Mexican gangs are the greatest threat to U.S. security. Despite the bipartisan support for the Mérida Initiative, implementation has been inexplicably delayed. From her perspective, Congressional legislation is necessary to confirm that U.S. agencies are carrying out their responsibilities regarding Mérida. Rep. Miller cautioned that the actions taken by the Mexican government to stem the violence must also be recognized.

Chairman Engel posed several questions about the nature and length of the National Guard deployment. How long will the troops be deployed there? Are measures being taken to ensure that the National Guard will not undermine existing security efforts? He said that while he respects President Obama’s decision to send the troops and felt that President Obama had to do it, he warns that the National Guard is not police or law enforcement and is “temporary at best.” He argued that the Guard deployment cannot be seen as a campaign against immigrants.

According to Chairman Engel, a plan to strengthen key U.S. agencies and their Mexican counterparts is necessary. It is the relationship with government that will make Mérida successful, and the behavior of all agencies must be transparent. There are three things with regard to the Mérida Initiative that Rep. Engel would like to see:

• Expedited assistance - only 2% of obligated funds had been spent by September 2009.
• Acceptance of the Senate’s proposal of $175 million in funding for the new judicial system to be created by 2016.
• President Obama’s reinstatement of the existing ban on military weapons, a decision that would require no legislation. Security systems are not enough, he argues, when Americans are the consumers and the providers of arms for cartels.

Rep. Mack began his opening statement by identifying what in his perspective was a “red flag” – Mexican President Calderon’s proposal that the U.S. create new guns laws. He argued that the existing laws should be enforced and that the situation of violence at the border should not be used to enforce a ban agenda. He was similarly troubled by the fact that less than 2% of the obligated funds had been implemented, and argued that taxpayers couldn’t be told that security was being provided under these circumstances. He asked, why is there no time sensitive, targeted assistance?

Rep. Mack argued that the Mérida parties need to create a comprehensive regional drug strategy and promote strong commercial ties. On these grounds, he advocates for passage of the free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. As for implementation of the Mérida Initiative in the past, his perspective is that little implementation appears comprehensive in nature. He argued that the existing security resources should be improved and that the Arizona law is not a solution.

Rep. Thompson concluded the opening statements by remarking that efficiency in implementation must be accompanied by accountability. As for future implementation, he argues strongly in favor of seeking feedback and involvement from people at the border, cautioning that their perspective is much better than the D.C. perspective.

First Panel
The first panel of witnesses at the hearing was comprised of Obama administration officials from various departments: Roberta Jacobson of the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; Mariko Silver, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of International Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security; Alonzo Peña of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; and Allen Gina of Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

After all panelists had spoken, Roberta Jacobson responded to the first question addressed to the panelists from Chairman Cuellar, who inquired if the State Department had established a plan to expedite the allocation of funds obligated to implement the Mérida Initiative. Jacobson responded that the Department had improved its processes given that it had a lot of structures to put in place. She spoke of a 275% “increased presence in Mexico” and the establishment of a bilateral implementation working group that meets monthly. She estimated an implementation of approximately $600 million of Mérida-allocated funds by the end of this fiscal year.

Chairman Engel indicated that the Committees sought assurances that the pace of implementation of funds would be increased, noting that funding may be cut if the funds were not put to use. He inquired about the use of performance measures and argued that the government could not ignore the flow of weapons across the border. He questioned the panel as to why President Obama was not moving more “forcefully” on this issue.

Chairman Cuellar questioned the federal government’s overall strategy to secure the border and the specific collaborative roles of the federal, state, and local governments. He argued that each governmental agency’s role should be established in writing.

As to where the agencies were in the process of securing the border, Mr. Peña responded that he didn’t know if there was an overall strategy for federal, state and local governments. He commented that the implementation of a plan had begun in Arizona and was being expanded to incorporate Texas. Chairman Cuellar responded that Mr. Peña’s comments indicated that no model was in fact in place. Representative Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ) asserted that if Arizona was to become the national model for a secure border, Arizona’s input must be considered.

In response to a question from a committee member regarding whether or not a directive had been issued that immigrants picked up under Arizona’s law would be processed and deported, Mr. Peña responded that no such directive existed. He commented that resource priorities are criminal aliens who affect national security and that officers have to exercise prosecutorial discretion.

The panel was also questioned as to what the National Guard was accomplishing at the border that agencies could not, and Ms. Silver and Mr. Peña responded that the Guard was providing counterintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Chairman Engel questioned if U.S. citizens were now being targeted at the border, and Ms. Silver responded that an investigation into Chairman Engel’s question was forthcoming. The results of this investigation would be produced to the subcommittees.

Rep. Mack further stressed the issue of delayed Mérida implementation, to which Ms. Silver responded that the border at present is staffed better than at any other point in history. She asserted that the measures taken at the border are not merely a reaction to the Arizona law and that some existing measures were already in place.

Rep. Thompson commented on the President’s proposal for more representation from Customs and Border Protection at the border, not Immigration and Customs Enforcement. After questioning the purpose of the surge of troops, Congressman Thompson pointed out that agencies had not formerly requested more personnel from Congress.

Representative Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) commented that Congress was working hard to combat the violence at the border by approving the increase in border patrol officers from 4,000 to 20,000 nationwide.

Congresswoman Giffords sought to clarify the statement of what it means to place troops on the border and advocated for a placement of troops directly on the border. She insisted that the placement of troops was critical to stemming the violence. If the border patrol is deployed far away, she argued, the border is not, in fact, being watched. Consequently, apprehension is difficult.

She proceeded to ask about the placement of the National Guard and whether or not they have the knowledge and skills to protect and defend themselves. She questioned if they were aware of the rules of engagement. Ms. Silver responded that the Guard would be staffed and protected as needed, but that their placement was intended to free up personnel to be on the border. Chairman Cuellar replied that the National Guard should not be freeing up the Customs and Border Patrol to do their jobs. If the CBP needs assistance, he argued, clerks or assistants should be hired.

Three articles in today's news provided interesting statistics about security and narcotrafficking in Latin America:

Bolivia's chief of the FELCN (the U.S.-aided Police Special Forces for Counternarcotics), Félix Molina, provided the following statistics about FELCN operations in 2010:

• 6,237 counternarcotics operations have been carried out so far this year;
• 14.8 tons of cocaine and more than 922 tons of marijuana have been seized;
• 2,713 hectares of coca have been eradicated
• 1,777 people linked to the narcotrafficking have been detained, 127 of whom are foreigners;
• Of the 127 foreigners, 72 were Colombians, 55 Peruvians, 19 Brazilians, and 7 Chileans. Other countries listed include Argentinians, Spanish, French, Mexicans and more (We know this adds up to more than 127, but these are the numbers as they appear in the El Deber article).

The ACAN-EFE wire service published numbers announced at a conference by an official of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which reveal Central America as a region with one of the world's highest murder rates. According to the article, the vice-president of the IACHR, Paulo Sérgio Pinherio, argued that the policies used to combat insecurity in the region "are insufficient" and are "suicide in that they do not strengthen the rule of law and democracy."

The murder-rates for 2008 for the Central American countries included in the article are as follows:

• El Salvador: 71 murders/100,000 inhabitants;
• Honduras: 58 murders/100,000 inhabitants;
• Guatemala: 48 murders/100,000 inhabitants;
• Costa Rica: 11 murders/100,000 inhabitants.

And finally, as Mexico is experiencing its "bloodiest days yet," today's Wall Street Journal includes an article about a New Mexico State University librarian, Molly Molloy, who has been keeping a tally of drug-cartel-related killings in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. According to Ms. Molloy's count, in 2009 alone, Ciudad Juárez experienced 2,633 drug-related homicides. This outnumbers all murders in the top eight U.S. cities combined. Below is the Wall Street Journal's graphic representing this finding.

The Obama Administration has been working this spring to put its own stamp on security and counternarcotics programs for Latin America. This is starting to come together as four initiatives: the Mérida, Caribbean Basin Security, Central American Regional Security, and Colombian Security Development Initiatives. By covering several different regions of Latin America, the Obama administration believes it will "mitigate any 'balloon effect' - criminal spillover resulting from successful reductions in drug trafficking and transnational crime elsewhere in the region."

To underscore one of the goals of the Obama Administration's approach to security in the region, the State Department released a new fact sheet today on "Citizen Safety in the Western Hemisphere." The fact sheet stresses the president's commitment to working with the region, "creating practical partnerships in the hemisphere to advance shared interests and protect our citizens." The approach to citizen security that the four above-mentioned initiatives encompass includes:

• Emphasizing the need for comprehensive, evidence-based strategies that address underlying causes, not just symptoms;
• Recognizing that the absence of citizen safety undermines efforts to promote equitable economic growth and social opportunity, secure and clean sources of energy, and the strong democratic institutions needed for effective and accountable governance; and
• Focusing on making advances in citizen safety at the neighborhood level while simultaneously countering emerging transnational threats.

A State Department fact sheet on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) released late last week cites three key objectives of this initiative: 1) substantially reduce illicit trafficking; 2) increase public safety and security; and 3) promote social justice. The new initiative was formally launched today at the inaugural U.S.-Caribbean Security Dialogue in Washington.

The meeting was attended by high-level representatives from 15 Caribbean Community countries, the Dominican Republic, and other non-Caribbean observer nations. According to the State Department's release announcing this meeting, "in addition to law enforcement cooperation, partnership activities will include important elements of judicial reform, as well as development and education components intended to provide at-risk youth of the region with improved prospects for social and economic inclusion."

At the meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela told officials that "security must be advanced through our commitment to partner with those who are courageously battling drug cartels, gangs and other criminal networks throughout the Americas." The Assistant Secretary continued to note that the initiative's success "'will require the allocation of adequate resources for enhanced law enforcement and prevention programs' as well as judicial reforms," according to AFP coverage of the meeting.

In the 2010 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, Congress allocated "not less than $37 million" for CBSI, though in various platforms, the State Department has emphasized that it is "fully committed" to fund the President's $45 million request for 2010. The President asked for an additional $79 million for CBSI in his 2011 budget request. According to the Congressional Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 2011, of the $79 million, $17 million would be used economic and social assistance and $62 million for military and police assistance, though a detailed breakdown has yet to be released indicating how much each of the 15 countries in the Caribbean region will receive and, specifically, what it will pay for.

Though this meeting was previously scheduled, it coincides with the recent violence in Jamaica, as its government seeks to arrest and extradite to the United States one of its top drug lords, Christopher "Dudus" Coke. Over the past four days, violent clashes between the Jamaican security forces and armed gangs have resulted in over 50 deaths. Many analysts have linked the violence to "the government's risky tolerance of, and even collusion with, Coke and similar gang bosses who lord over Kingston neighborhoods." Others note that drug traffickers in Jamaica "fill a void left by the Jamaican government's inaction or negligence. They pay for basic services and hand out money. Jamaican youths, especially, complain of a lack of jobs or other opportunities that drives them into the gangs."

Assistant Secretary Valenzuela said at today's U.S.-Caribbean meeting, "I take note of the challenges that Jamaica is facing." However, it is still unclear whether the Obama administration's initiatives in the region will be able to truly address the underlying social, economic and political problems that allow drug traffickers like "Dudus" Coke to function with impunity and prosper in the region.

This post was written by CIP Intern Cristina Salas

On May 5th, Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Chuck Grassley, (R-Iowa) co-chaired a Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control hearing on "Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico: Implications for the United States."

The main topic of discussion at this hearing was the need to prevent drug trafficking-related violence from penetrating furthermore into the United States. The co-chairs insisted on getting answers about what specific measures have to be taken to make that possible. Although most panelists seemed to focus on what their organizations had already accomplished, they all agreed on the need to broaden efforts and intelligence cooperation between all levels of law enforcement.

The caucus heard the testimony of six witnesses involved in federal and local U.S. law enforcement. The first panel included David Johnson (Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State) Janice Ayala (Assistant Director, Office of Investigations Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security) Kevin Perkins (Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation) and Anthony Placido (Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration). The second panel consisted of Leonard Miranda (Captain Chula Vista Police Department, Coordinator of the San Diego Regional Cross Border Violence Project) and Don Reay (Texas Border Sheriffs Coalition).

Opening Remarks
Sen. Feinstein gave an opening statement affirming that the increase of drug trafficking related violence in Mexico is mostly focused on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border. However, recent events have raised red flags on the American side. These include cross-border kidnappings and extortion of the victims' relatives in the United States in which often either the kidnapper or victim had links to drug trafficking organizations. Other incidents of concern are home invasions in Arizona, many of them involving "robbery crews that target drug stash houses to steal and resell the drugs they find inside." Sen. Feinstein referred to the efforts in intelligence cooperation between law enforcement in both countries through the Mérida Initiative, explaining "law enforcement is working to quell such incidents through intelligence sharing between local, state and federal agencies and through support of Mexico's campaign against drug cartels --the Mérida Initiative."

Although projects like Gunnrunner and Operation Stonegarden have shown real results in cartel-related arrests and in money and firearms seizures, the United States still shares a great responsibility in the fight against drug trafficking in Mexico, according to Sen. Feinstein. She continued to explain that the reduction of the demand for drugs has to be a priority, as well as stopping the transfer of illicit drug money and weapons from the United States that end up in the cartels' hands.

Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas), who recently attended a briefing in El Paso, Texas, said he was "shocked," particularly about the 23,000 people killed in Mexico since 2006 from drug-related crimes. He acknowledged that violence was not only affecting Mexicans, as the recent murders of U.S. Consulate workers show. He pointed out that the burden of the fight against drug trafficking violence in the United States falls mostly on state and local authorities, and demanded an explanation from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on why technology, like Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (UAV) and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) are not made available to fight crime in the border.

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas) reiterated that El Paso police officers told her that they do not have the technology to deal with the current issues in the border, and also wanted answers about why UAVs were not in the border, since these issues affect the security of Americans as well.

First Panel
David Johnson said there was legitimacy in the concerns of violence in Mexico expressed by senators and their implications for the United States. In his opinion, "violence in Mexico is consequence of a more insidious crime: greed". Therefore, he suggested that the focus should be on drug trafficking as the source of the violence, since the money generated from this illegal activity is used by cartels to buy weapons. He insisted violence in Mexico would not be reduced without dealing with drug trafficking. Johnson agreed with Sen. Feinstein about the United States' shared responsibility for this problem because its demand for drugs fuels drug trafficking in Mexico. He seemed optimistic about the success of the current efforts and compared them to a cancer that will be beaten, but that has to go through chemotherapy first.

Following this remarks, Kevin Perkins explained how the FBI continues to work with all levels of law enforcement to fight these crimes. In particular, he referred to the efforts to fight corruption with a border corruption task force and intelligence and information sharing. The FBI, he added, also fights other financial sources for gangs and cartels, such as kidnapping.

Janice Ayala of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) noted that their presence in Mexico is the largest outside of the United States, which has led to a great success in increasing drug seizures. Operation Firewall is an example of that, achieving more than 4,000 seizures and 600 arrests since 2005. Ayala called attention to the alarming fact that 28 gangs in Mexico are classified as "extremely violent."

Anthony Placido of the DEA discussed how drug trafficking was recognized as a threat early in President Calderón's term, and recognized his willingness to deal with these problems through the Mérida Initiative. Moreover, he praised Calderón's project "We are all Juárez" created to encourage financial alternatives to drug trafficking in the violent border-town Ciudad Juárez. The DEA, according to Placido, supports Mexico's judicial reforms and law enforcement and correctional officers training. He admits there is no single answer to ending violence in the region and that it could increase before it ends.

Q&A period
Sen. Feinstein's first questions for the panel were forceful: "What can we do now?" and "What do you need to end this?" However, the only explicit request came from Perkins, specifying that San Diego had requested agents to deal with kidnappings. Sen. Feinstein said she could look into the possibility of finding financial support for the squads in the region to fight kidnapping.

Sen. Cornyn then asked the panel to rate, from 1 to 10, if the drug related crimes on the United States' side of the border were being ordered by Mexican mafia leaders held in U.S. prisons. Again, Perkins was the only to respond, giving a rating of "from 7 to 8." He also noted that California had imposed cell phone restrictions in its prison to reduce that.

Perkins insisted that it is impossible to deal with drug trafficking if we do not deal with the profits, which is the motivation behind it. However, he complained about the lack of information sharing by ICE, who investigates the financial components of all crimes, which makes it hard to deal with the profits of drug trafficking. Ayala denied this and claimed the information is available.

Sen. Cornyn indicated that generalized violence is not cause for granting asylum in the United States, and wondered about the number of Mexicans in the United States who have crossed the border because of violence or are seeking asylum. None of the panelists had numbers or detailed information about that.

Next, the Senator asked about what experiences in Colombia could serve as lessons in this situation. The panel told him that part of the success in Colombia has been the rigorous background checks it conducts on all of its officers, similar to the process in the United States. Nevertheless, the panel said that intelligence cooperation has been the main lesson learned from Colombia, and there is hope that the use of judicialized wire intercepts is institutionalized in Mexico. Placido said he sees the same leadership in Calderón as in Uribe, and there has been a change in Mexico's way to deal with these problems. Mexico wants a new kind of officer: educated, with degrees and trained with the help of the United States.

Sen. Feinstein pointed out that, according to San Diego police, only 20 to 25% of vessels carrying drugs in through the Pacific are intercepted. The explanation, as the witnesses told her, is that as it continued to get harder to traffic drugs across the border, alternate means had to be found and therefore there has been an increase in maritime transport and tunnels. Sen. Feinstein also showed concern about penetration of the "Aztecas" gang in the United States and the suspected connection it had with the recent killing of the El Paso correctional officer. This could not be confirmed by the panelists.

Senator Cornyn expressed concern about these criminal organizations having access to bomb making materials and possible links to terrorism groups. Ayala confirmed that in 2006-2006 there was a seizure of explosive materials that was heading south towards the border.

Second Panel
Don Reay focused on the success of the Texas Border Sheriffs Coalition, that has been referred to as the "Texas Star" or "Texas Model." The Coalition focuses on patrol activities and has achieved a synergy between local, state and county authorities. For Reay, sheriffs are good indicators of how the citizens are feeling when it comes to security, because they answer to their constituents. He then called attention to the opportunists who are not related to drug cartels, but are taking advantage of the chaos to commit crimes.

Reay then explained that the border sheriffs took a stand against Mérida Initiative because the institutionalization of corruption in Mexico would prevent the money allocated from being used as planned, and because it did not provide any money to the United States for these same issues.

Leonard Miranda spoke about the increase, since 2006, of victims in Chula Vista of crimes in Mexico, which means that relatives are targeted in Mexico and their families in Chula Vista are extorted. In this city, Miranda asserts the merging of task forces on drug trafficking, kidnapping and gang activity has been successful. In his opinion, highly visible presence of law enforcement is important to reduce crimes, but the investigatory component is even more so. According to Miranda, the Chula Vista region has not had grant funding for the HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area) office, an effort to fight drug trafficking coordinately between local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in critical regions of the U.S., for over ten years. He made a specific request for funding which Sen. Feinstein said she would look into.

Sen. Conryn accused the Federal Government of not complying with its responsibility of doing its job with border security, so the question is how to fill the gap. Reay agreed with Sen. Conryn allegation, but explained that once someone has entered the country and they commit a crime, it becomes responsibility of local law enforcement. Therefore, intelligence sharing is crucial. However, Senator Feinstein disagreed with Conryn, saying that the Federal Government has stepped up, but a closer liaison between local and federal law enforcement is needed.

Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) recently introduced legislation (S. 3172) in the Senate intended to direct a more focused approach to regional counternarcotics programs.

The "Counternarcotics and Citizen Security for the Americas Act of 2010" (S.3172) differs widely from H.R.2134, the "Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2009," which was passed by the House of Representatives in December 2009 and now awaits passage in the Senate. While H.R. 2134 aims to establish an independent commission to evaluate U.S. counternarcotics and demand reduction policies, S.3172 attempts to create a multi-year, "comprehensive and coordinated" strategy for the existing U.S. counternarcotics programs in South America, Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean "to thwart the 'balloon effect.'" (The "balloon effect" is a term referring to what happens when one squeezes a half deflated balloon - in this instance, referring to the phenomenon in which successful counternarcotics efforts in one area leads to increased narco-related activities in other areas.)

The bill attempts to reflect "a more nuanced approach to counternarcotics efforts in the region," which would focus on programs aimed at:

• Strengthening civilian institutions;
• Decreasing military involvement in law enforcement;
• Increasing the effectiveness of local, regional, and federal law enforcement institutions;
• Improving the judicial system and the rule of law; and
• Promoting viable and licit alternatives to the drug trade.

These new goals are closely in line with the "new phase" of the Mérida Initiative, which was officially announced last week by the State Department and the Government of Mexico.

The new legislation mandates an "Inter-American Counternarcotics Strategy Report," which would describe, for example:

• A detailed multi-year strategy for the region;
• "The integration of diplomatic, criminal justice, civil society and economic development, demand reduction, military, and other assistance to achieve regional counternarcotics goals;"
• A set of regional and country-specific metrics and monitoring protocols; and
• Government efforts to investigate and prosecute allegations of human rights abuses committed by security agencies.

The legislation also attempts to address the problem of coordination between all U.S. government agencies involved in the counternarcotics programs. According to Sen. Menendez's press release, "program effectiveness can be limited due to fragmented management, unclear reporting chains, and duplicative and overlapping agenda." As a result, S. 3172 places authority in the hands of the Secretary of State. The text (PDF) of the legislation reads: "No United States Government international counternarcotics or anti-crime foreign assistance-related activity may be implemented unless it has been approved by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President."

Finally, this 28-page piece of legislation limits the use of U.S. contractors in a recipient country, modifies reporting and monitoring requirements of the health and environmental impacts of herbicide use in aerial eradication programs, and encourages the input and participation of local government and civil society in developing and carrying out the funded programs.

The text of the legislation has not been added to the Library of Congress' Thomas.gov website, however it can be downloaded as a PDF here.

On Tuesday, March 23rd a delegation of top Obama administration officials traveled to Mexico to discuss the evolving U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics strategy. The "Mérida U.S.-Mexico High Level Consultative Group" delegation included Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen.

The major news that emerged with the trip was the official launch of a new phase of cooperation on the war on drugs, as part of the Mérida Initiative. This new agenda, referred to as the "institution-building" phase by State Department Spokesman P.J. Crowley, is held up by four main pillars:

• Disrupting the capacity of the criminal organizations;
• Reforming and strengthening security and justice institutions;
• Creating a 21st century border that advances citizen safety and commerce; and
• Building stronger, more resilient communities that can resist the influence of the cartels.

Secretary Clinton explained:

We are expanding the Mérida Initiative beyond what it was traditionally considered to be, because it is not just about security. Yes, that is paramount, but it is also about institution building. It is about reaching out to and including communities and civil society, and working together to spur social and economic development.

Secretary Clinton acknowledged the role the demand for drugs and illicit weapons trafficking in the United States plays in Mexico's violence:

We know that the demand for drugs drives much of this illicit trade, that guns purchased in the United States - as we saw some of the examples outside - are used to facilitate violence here in Mexico. And the United States must and is doing its part to help you and us meet those challenges.

However, when asked if there had been any discussion of decriminalizing drugs as a strategy to undercut the power of cartels, Secretary Clinton quickly responded "No."

The State Department has posted more information on the new strategy on its website, which includes three fact sheets on the new border strategy, joint efforts against arms trafficking and money laundering, and a summary of the progress and impact of the Mérida Initiative to date.

The trip and the new joint strategy prompted several opinion articles on the likely - or unlikely - success of the drug war in Mexico.

• The Council on Foreign Relations' Shannon O'Neil provides an overview of the trip and the "new bilateral strategy." She notes that one major change in the strategy will be the allocation of U.S. funding, which in 2011 will be "targeted to Mexico's judicial reforms and programs on good governance," and move away from expensive military equipment and training. O'Neil concludes her article with this:

  The question remaining is whether, as the murders pile up daily along the border and elsewhere in Mexico, politicians in both countries will have the patience to see this strategy through. If they do, there is a chance ten years from now that things will be better in Mexico. If they don't, both countries will be fighting the same drug war in a decade.

• In Newsweek Dan Rosenheck responded to recent comparisons of the conflict in Mexico to the war in Iraq.
  

  But while this has been an effective cudgel for Calderón's critics - who say his drug war has become a quagmire - they are wrong. Not only is the drug war a simpler problem with a simpler (and more reachable) solution, but the comparison to Iraq provides more reasons for Mexico to hope than to despair.

• In the Los Angeles Times, Jorge Castañeda, a former Mexican foreign minister, wrote, "Mexican President Felipe Calderón's militarized, politicized fight against Mexico's drug cartels has been ineffective." He later adds that, in addition to "ineffective," the war on drugs has been "damaging" to Mexico.

  Castañeda offers three options for moving forward - one: continuing the same strategy more quietly; two: press the reset button and start over; or three: Mexico lobbies for decriminalization of at least marijuana in the United States.

• The Miami Herald's Andres Oppenheimer article, titled "Yes, violence in Mexico rising - but it's less than in Washington," starts out by answering a common question - is it safe to travel to Mexico? According to Oppenheimer, if you are willing to travel to Washington, D.C., you can "safely visit most parts of Mexico." While he does not advise travelers to vacation in Ciudad Juárez, Oppenheimer notes that we need to "put Mexico's national figures in perspective." Since, as a whole, Mexico's murder rate is less than that of many other Latin American countries', including Brazil and Jamaica, and much less than Washington, D.C.'s.
• In the Wall Street Journal, Mary O'Grady writes "even militarization has not delivered the peace. The reason is simple enough: The source of the problem is not Mexican supply. It is American demand coupled with prohibition." She continues later to provide a tip for the meeting (this article was written prior to the Secretary's travel):
  

  I suggest that one or two of Mexico's very fine economists trained at the University of Chicago by Milton Friedman sit down with President Obama's team to explain a few things about how markets work. They could begin by outlining the path that a worthless weed travels to become the funding for the cartel's firepower. In this Econ 101 lesson, students will learn how the lion's share of the profit is in getting the stuff over the U.S. border to the American consumer. In football terms, Juárez is first and goal.

The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) just released a new report by Coletta Youngers and John Walsh. Development First: A More Humane and Promising Approach to Reducing Cultivation of Crops for Illicit Markets surveys the evidence on coca and opium crop reduction efforts over the years, and identifies ten lessons to help shape more successful, less harmful policies.

The report can be downloaded as PDF.

Here is a brief summary of the report as it appears on WOLA's website.

Despite billions of dollars spent on aggressive crop eradication efforts, overall coca and poppy production has remained robust, and cocaine and heroin prices on U.S. streets have fallen sharply since the early 1980s. For two decades, the area under coca cultivation in the Andean region has hovered near 200,000 hectares, according to official U.S. estimates.

The evident failure of crop eradication campaigns to achieve sustainable reductions in coca and poppy cultivation is prompting an increased emphasis on creating viable, legal livelihoods that allow farmers to transition away from a reliance on coca and poppy crops. We hope that Development First will contribute toward this long overdue shift to a more promising approach.

The report argues that proper sequencing is crucial to sustainable success in curbing cultivation of crops for illicit markets: development must come first. Eradication campaigns are counter-productive unless alternative livelihoods for growers are already firmly in place. Moreover, development policies must be conceived and implemented in genuine cooperation with the affected farmers and their communities.

The report also recognizes that even the most well-designed rural development strategies will take time to bear fruit, and that the impact will be limited if lucrative cocaine and heroin markets continue to expand around the world.