Yesterday, the White House issued the "Majors List" of narcotics source and transfer countries for 2009. Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the President must submit to Congress an annual report identifying (a) major drug-producing or transit countries and (b) those countries not "cooperating" with U.S. counternarcotics measures and subject to sanctions. Using the "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" published by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) every March, the "Majors List" is compiled each year and presented to the Secretary of State for consideration before being approved by the President and sent to Congress.

This year's list has no surprises or new additions - with all 20 countries on the list already appearing on the 2008 "Majors List." Also similar to last year, Venezuela and Bolivia were cited as having "'failed demonstrably' during the last 12 months to adhere to international counternarcotic agreements and take counternarcotic measures set forth in U.S. law." This is Venezuela's fifth consecutive year on this list, and Bolivia's second.

Designation of a country as having "failed demonstrably" can lead to sanctions, however President Obama issued a waiver "so that the United States may continue to support specific programs to benefit the Bolivian and Venezuelan people." These programs include "civil society programs and small community development programs" in Venezuela and "continued support for agricultural development, exchange programs, small enterprise development, and police training programs" in Bolivia.

During the last week of August, Ecuador signed a counternarcotics and organized crime agreement with the United States, renewing cooperation between the two countries after it was suspended last February. The new agreement includes the exchange of information between the two governments and training for special police units, which will be carried out by the government of Ecuador and in accordance with its laws, in addition to $7 million in U.S. aid to help combat narcotrafficking and organized crime. The agreement also places emphasis on the prevention of drug consumption.

The signing of this agreement came seven months after Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa kicked U.S. Embassy officials out of the country for "meddling" with counter-drug police units after four officials of the Ecuadorian National Police were accused of turning over classified computers and information to the United States. As a result, Correa immediately suspended any counternarcotics agreements Ecuador had with the United States.

The timing of the new agreements is also viewed as significant since it came only a few days before the UNASUR summit in Argentina, where President Correa criticized the pending U.S.-Colombia military base agreement. President Correa perhaps used the reestablishment of cooperation with the United States' counternarcotics strategy to demonstrate that his dislike of the new U.S.-Colombia military deal was not linked to any sort of support for narcotrafficking or guerrilla groups.

According to Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Fander Falconí, the previous agreements with the United States included "informal agreements" that should have been "transparent and on the table." The new agreement with the United States is an effort to "make the information transparent so the public knows what we are doing."

Below is a translation of an article, "A turn in the counternarcotics agreement with the United States," from Ecuador's El Comercio, which outlines the details of Ecuador's prior counternarcotics agreement with the United States in comparison to the newly signed agreement.

Ecuador and the United States reoriented the goal of its collaboration in the fight against drugs. Prior to August 25th, the goal was the guarantee the annual rate of detained and confiscated drugs in exchange for resources.

This policy became official in an agreement that was signed in 2003 during the government of Lucio Gutierrez and was an update of an agreement signed in 2002. In this document, Ecuador agreed to increase drug seizures by 10% each year; arms, ammunition, and illegal chemical seizures by 15%; and people detained for narcotrafficking and linked crimes by 12%.

The consequences were positive and negative. On the one hand, Ecuador is one of the countries with the best results in counternarcotics control. For example, from 2005 to September of this year 178.9 tons of drugs were confiscated.

However, Ecuadorian prisons were full of people accused of trafficking drugs. According to the Office of the Ombudsman, they made up 60% of people detained in the country. "The police were excessive and captured small dealers and consumers to justify the agreements," said Ernesto Pazmiño, the Ombudsman.

Since his arrival to power, Rafael Correa made announcements that would change the counternarcotics strategy of the United States. For example, he suspended all of the agreements last February, after denouncing CIA interference in the Intelligence and Anti-narcotics units of the police.

This decision brought Ecuadorian and U.S. representatives to the negotiating table. Ecuador went with the mission of not losing the aid, but to make all of the agreements transparent and to reorient them.

Last week, three agreements were signed and they are public: the Program of Anti-contraband Investigation Units, another program of Sensitive Investigations and, the most important, an amendment to the Cooperation Agreement to Control the Production of Illegal Drugs that was signed in 2003.

The new agreement places emphasis in the prevention of the consumption of drugs and in the control of money laundering. Martha Youth, spokeswoman for the U.S. Embassy, assured that money laundering was taken into account because it is a worldwide concern.

Also, they took into account other crimes such as the trafficking and smuggling of persons, which have increased in recent years in the country.

Youth said that the negotiation formed a part of the normal process, because whenever an amendment is carried out, each party proposes reforms and evaluation systems. Therefore in this agreement, although rates are not specifically discussed, the improvement of counterdrug control, money laundering, and trafficking and smuggling of persons is mentioned. This evaluation will occur annually and each party "will define the parameters and methodology used to carry out the projects."

Domingo Paredes, of the National Council on Drugs and Pyschotropic Substances (Consejo Nacional de Sustancias Psicotropicas y Estupefacientes), agrees with the changes. Before these agreements they were given "through frames, under the principle that it had to do with a sensitive subject for security... But this gives attention to the faults in the control of resources and objectives."

Now, adds Paredes, everyone can access the documents and review them. "Although you have to understand that there will be information, like the names of agents, that cannot be revealed in order to not give them away."

Within the new agreements, the United States agrees to offer economic assistance to the police units of the Police and the Armed Forces. Additionally, they will collaborate in the formation and training of personnel with instructors and resources. "This is very important, because the resources that are given to the Ecuadorian police are limited," says Joel Loaiza, the director of the National Police Counternarcotics division.

As the other party, Ecuador has to guarantee that the personnel who make up these units are vetted. In this plan they also agreed to create two new elite teams of the Police: the Anti-contraband and -trafficking unit; and the Sensitive Investigations Unit.

They must be made up of trained personnel. One requirement is a polygraph test that demonstrates the competence and trustworthiness of the candidate for secure management of information.

Also, there will be an analysis of drug consumption and a study and verification of its causes; it will also demand that all applications are voluntary and its candidates sign a legal declaration of their goods and financial situation.

The police will be in charge of identifying and qualifying the candidates that will be a part of the special investigation units. Loaiza believes that these definitions are a good indication for fighting narcotrafficking, since "it proves that both governments want to avoid that bad elements make up the ranks and involve themselves in corrupt acts."

On Wednesday, Mexican President Felipe Calderón gave his third state of the union address to the National Congress. One of the major topics he touched on was security and the fight against drug cartels. President Calderón pledged to continue his "full frontal attack ... in the fight against the powerful drug cartels that threaten the national security of Mexico."

In his address, Calderón recited the following statistics on successes against the drug cartels:

We have seized nearly 50,000 weapons and nearly 22,000 vehicles while the amount of drugs we have confiscated would suffice to provide all Mexicans between the ages of 15 and 30 with over 80 doses.

In the past 12 months alone, 1,400 kidnappers have been arrested, over 200 gangs have been dismantled and over a thousand kidnap victims have been released.

Yet, President Calderón also noted that "I am the first one to recognize that what has been done is insufficient when we look at the view of the Mexico we aspire to."

The Mexican press cited Calderón's speech as "old demagogy" and "recycled campaign promises."

The news coverage of the speech is accompanied by coverage of more violence throughout Mexico. Yesterday, 17 patients at a Mexican clinic in Ciudad Juarez were killed by hooded gunmen and the No. 2 security official and three others were shot dead in Mexico's Michoacan state.

The United States recently released $214 million to aid Mexico in its fight against drug trafficking, which includes funds for five helicopters for the military. In mid-August, the State Department also released a favorable report on human rights in Mexico, allowing for the release of an additional $100 million in aid - an act that human rights organizations in Mexico and the United States have condemned.

Over the past month, the United States Southern Command, in collaboration with the Salvadoran military and civil aviation officials, has been evaluating the suitability of using unmanned aircraft, or drones, for counternarcotics operations throughout Latin America. As drug traffickers increasingly use semi-submersible submarines to transport cocaine from ports like Colombia to the United States, it has become increasingly difficult for manned aircraft to remain in the air long enough (due to fuel and pilot safety issues) to confirm the identity and location of the semi-submersibles and other drug-running boats. The use of drones, such as the Heron, appears to be how SOUTHCOM proposes to respond to this problem.

The Heron is "an unmanned air vehicle (UAV) designed for medium altitude, long endurance air operations and capable of sustained flight for up to 20 hours without the need for aerial refueling when configured for counter illicit trafficking detection missions," according to SOUTHCOM. The Heron carries a sophisticated sensor package that includes "advanced flight, navigation and communications systems and a mix of multi-mode radar, infrared and electro-optical surveillance capabilities."

In addition to being a potential option for improving maritime interdiction, Time Magazine also suggests that the United States' increasing interest in using drones for its fight against drugs could be a result of the sentiment that after Ecuador did not renew the lease on the United States' Forward Operating Location (FOL) at the Manta air base, SOUTHCOM "can no longer take Latin America roosts like Manta for granted - and that long-range drones are one of the best ways of making up for their loss." Thereby suggesting that the instead of relying on remaining FOLs for its counternarcotics missions in the future, such as the FOL in Comalapa, El Salvador, the United States may begin to use drones capable of flying long distances for its counterdrug missions.

The United States is increasing the use of drones in its military strategy throughout the world, in an effort to lower the cost of war - even though some critics would argue that the use of drones is ineffective and counterproductive and therefore a waste of money. This is taking place most notably in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where drones are used to identify and take out top al-Qaeda leaders, an operation which has received much criticism. Pakistani officials claim, according to Time Magazine, that the majority of strikes miss their targets and kill innocent civilians. And the Time article continues, citing a Pakistani daily report which quantifies that of the 60 strikes since 2006, only 14 al-Qaeda leaders have been killed, in comparison to 687 civilian deaths.

While the use of drones in counternarcotics operations will not result in the bombing of innocent civilians, as they are equipped for surveillance and not bombing or direct interdiction, it does seem that their use is not free of problems - and complaints about the Heron have included being unresponsive at times to their human operators on the ground, and crashes due to human error or other technical problems. If SOUTHCOM uses the Heron primarily for maritime surveillance at the onset of the program, crashes will not be of major concern - other than large amounts of money wasted on a drone now at the bottom of the ocean. However, the future could include using drones for surveillance over populated areas - such as the regions in Colombia where coca is grown - which could result in the loss of innocent lives if these unmanned drones do crash or decide not to listen to their "human commanders."

The U.S. Congress would have to authorize the use of a larger drug-drone fleet for this program to become a major part of SOUTHCOM's counternarcotics mission. However, the Time article notes that the money saved by not having to use as many manned vessels "will be hard to "the cost savings Washington has found with drones in real war will be hard to resist in the drug war." Perhaps the money saved in interdiction could be redirected to more economic and social aid to the region, as part of an effort to reorient the United States' counternarcotics program toward better civilian governance and development rather than military action.

While last week we speculated about what would happen if the drug cartels in Mexico actually reached a truce, this week's news coverage on Mexico remains grim. According to El Universal, 508 people were killed in drug-related violence in January 2009 alone - more than double the amount of deaths in January 2008.

An article in Sunday's Washington Post cites the increasing difficulty lawyers face in Ciudad Juarez as a result of the increase in drug-related violence and threats against their families. The article alludes to a breakdown in the justice system and the military's takeover of law enforcement as major obstacles to trying drug offenders. As law enforcement and the justice system lose hold in the region, other institutions, such as schools and hospitals, become undermined by increased violence.

Lawyers in Ciudad Juarez describe a chaotic legal landscape in which they are threatened by their clients, opposed by biased judges and harassed by the Mexican military, which has sent 2,500 troops to the city and has taken over law enforcement duties here, mostly by running heavily armored patrols and setting up roadblocks, but also by pursuing its own investigations, interrogations and detentions.

"In this environment, it is almost impossible to do your job," said Héctor González Mocken, a criminal defense attorney and a leader of an association of Juarez lawyers, whose own office wall features a large portrait of the Virgin of Guadalupe.

González said that one by one, the institutions and professions in Ciudad Juarez are being undermined. Teachers have been victims of extortion rackets shaking them down for their Christmas bonuses. Doctors stage protests, asking for more protection when they work on gunshot victims in the emergency room. Business leaders are kidnapped. More than 60 police officers in Juarez have been killed, and some officials are assumed to be working for or alongside the cartels. Journalists are also routinely threatened -- or worse. In November, one of the city's most experienced crime reporters, Armando Rodríguez, was assassinated in his front yard as he got ready to drive his daughter to class.

The majority of the aid allocated to Mexico through the Mérida Initiative is in the form of equipment and training for the security forces. Less resources are going to elements necessary to make a true dent in Mexico's drug violence, such as strengthening institutions like the judicial system, erasing corruption from and strengthening the police force and removing the military from civilian law enforcement roles.

Even more pressing is the need to reduce the demand for drugs in the United States and stop the flow of weapons from the United States to Mexico. At a George Washington University event last week on Transnational Criminal Organizations, Manuel Suárez-Mier, from the Embassy of Mexico, used the basic argument that any student of Econ 101 learns (as long as there is demand, supply will continue) to explain that Mexico sees the Mérida Initiative not as a way to end the "war on drugs," but instead as a way to increase the cost and liability of "doing the drug business" in Mexico so that it merely goes somewhere else. In essence, pushing the cartels out of Mexico and into some other country with weak institutions and law enforcement. It is not clear whether Mexico can actually make the business of trafficking drugs too expensive or dangerous within their borders, especially as long as drug traffickers can make a larger profit as the street price of drugs increases, but the argument does make the need to address the demand side more apparent.

An article in yesterday's Washington Times reports on a recent resolution passed by the El Paso City Council that asks the U.S. federal government to begin an "open, honest national dialogue on ending the prohibition of narcotics." El Paso, Texas is a U.S. border city that not only fears the spillover of the violence in Mexico to their town, but also is home to many Mexicans that have fled from nearby Mexican cities such as Ciudad Juarez. While there is much room for debate on the prescription they recommend, El Paso's citizens and City Council are at least acknowledging the need to address the United States' role in Mexico's drug-related violence: not just U.S. addicts' voracious demand, but the weapons-smuggling and money-laundering that occur on our side of the border.

The Mérida Initiative does not address these important aspects of the drug trade. Nonetheless, doing so is going to be extremely important in finding an end to the drug-related violence and drug-trafficking currently plaguing Mexico.

The Los Angeles Times reports this morning that warring drug-trafficking gangs in the northern Mexican state of Sinaloa may have declared a truce in December. The result is a sudden drop in the narco-fueled violence that claimed more than 5,000 lives across Mexico last year.

After a record year of bloodshed, killings have dropped by two-thirds from the December level in the state of Sinaloa, the historic center of Mexican drug trafficking, according to tallies kept by local and national news media.

This follows a report on National Public Radio last week that a year-old truce appears to be holding to the east, in the border town of Nuevo Laredo, in Tamaulipas.

No one suggests that the cartels have gone away. The city has reverted to an earlier model: The traffickers smuggle cocaine and marijuana across the river, mostly mind their own business, and Mexican authorities — some of whom are on the take — look the other way.

This is good news for citizens of these regions who have been living in fear of finding themselves caught in the crossfire. By no means, however, can a truce between organized-crime syndicates be considered a triumph of the rule of law or the Mexican government's U.S.-supported security policies.

In fact, if the peace holds between Mexico's drug-trafficking organizations, the United States can expect to see an increase in cocaine availability on its streets.

In December, the U.S. Justice Department's National Drug Intelligence Center noted a decrease in cocaine supplies, and an increase in cocaine prices, on U.S. streets in 2008. Its annual National Drug Threat Assessment noted no change in the amount of cocaine leaving Andean source countries. Instead, it gave the credit to other factors in the zone where Andean cocaine is transshipped to the United States, among them constant fighting between the Mexican cartels.

The likely factors include several exceptionally large cocaine seizures made while the drug was in transit toward the United States, counterdrug efforts by the Mexican Government, U.S. law enforcement operations along the Southwest Border, a high level of intercartel violence in Mexico, and expanding cocaine markets in Europe and South America.

If a gang truce reduces that "high level of intercartel violence," Mexican violence rates may decline. But if this factor explaining recent cocaine scarcity is reduced, the drug's availability in the United States could increase.