Download:(PDF, 3.78 MB) A Compass for Colombia Policy (PDF, 3.95 MB) Un nuevo rumbo para la política estadounidense hacia Colombia

October 22, 2008

New Report Outlines a Just and Effective Foreign Policy toward Colombia

(English PDF, 3.78 MB) | (PDF en español, 3.95 MB).

During their final presidential debate, Senators Barack Obama and John McCain expressed markedly different opinions on U.S. policy toward Colombia, an important partner in Latin America. Yet the next U.S. president won’t just be debating policy, he will be making it—and in the case of Colombia, he will need more than minor changes along the margins. He will need a new approach.

The Compass for Colombia Policy, written by some of Washington’s top Colombia experts, offers a better way forward for one of the main foreign policy challenges that the next administration will face. This report makes a detailed, persuasive case for a new U.S. strategy that would achieve our current policy goals while ending impunity and strengthening respect for human rights. Instead of risking all by placing too much faith in a single, charismatic leader, the United States must appeal to the aspirations and needs of all Colombians by strengthening democratic institutions, such as the judiciary. In particular, the United States must stand by and empower the human rights advocates, victims, judges, prosecutors, union leaders, journalists and others who are the driving forces towards a more just and peaceful Colombia.

The Compass details seven sensible steps policymakers can take to create a just and effective Colombia policy.

1. Use U.S. Aid and Leverage for Human Rights and the Rule of Law

To address a human rights crisis that continues unabated and a chronic lack of political will to deal with it, the United States must use tougher diplomacy to encourage the Colombian government to strengthen human rights guarantees, protect human rights defenders, and bolster institutions needed to break with a history of impunity for abuses. Colombia’s judicial system is central to the rule of law and must receive strong support.

2. Actively Support Overtures for Peace

The United States cannot continue to bankroll a war without end and, as the civilian population in the countryside continues to endure immense suffering, should make peace a priority.

3. Support Expansion of the Government’s Civilian Presence in the Countryside

Militarily occupying territory is not the solution to Colombia’s problems. The United States should help Colombia strengthen its civilian government presence in rural zones to address lawlessness, poverty and inequality, the roots of the conflict.

4. Protect the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees

The United States can help resolve Colombia’s massive humanitarian crisis by insisting on the dismantlement of paramilitary structures, supporting Colombia’s Constitutional Court rulings on IDPs, and increasing and improving aid to IDPs and refugees.

5. Protect the Rights of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Communities

The United States must pay special attention to promoting ethnic minorities’ land rights and guarantee that U.S. aid projects are not carried out on land obtained by violence.

6. Ensure that Trade Policy Supports, Not Undermines, Policy Goals towards Colombia

The United States should insist upon labor rights advances, especially in reducing and prosecuting violence against trade unionists, prior to further consideration of the trade agreement. The United States must ensure that any trade agreement will not undermine U.S. policy goals, such as reducing farmers’ dependence on coca and ending the conflict.

7. Get Serious—and Smart—about Drug Policy

The United States is overdue for a major course correction in its drug control strategy, which has failed spectacularly in Colombia and the Andean region. The United States should end the inhumane and counterproductive aerial spraying program and invest seriously in rural development, including alternative development designed with affected communities. Drug enforcement should focus higher up on the distribution chain, disrupt money laundering schemes and apprehend violent traffickers. Access to high-quality drug treatment in the United States, which will cut demand, must be the centerpiece of U.S. drug policy.

“The next administration should use diplomatic pressure to hold Colombia to much higher standards on human rights, labor rights, and protection of the rule of law.”–Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group Education Fund

“The United States must recognize the magnitude of the human rights crisis for Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in Colombia, in which hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lands and livelihoods to violence.” –Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, Washington Office on Latin America

“Nine years after the launch of Plan Colombia, the production of cocaine remains virtually unchanged. The United States simply cannot afford to continue to pursue this costly and failed counternarcotics policy. The next President must change course.” –Adam Isacson, Center for International Policy

“In the last decade, Colombia’s conflict has taken 20,000 more lives and displaced more than 2 million citizens. Now is the time to make renewed efforts for peace.” –Kelly Nicholls, U.S. Office on Colombia

For more information:
Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, (202) 546-7010; lisah [at] lawg.org
Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, Washington Office on Latin America, (202) 797-2171; gsanchez [at] wola.org
Adam Isacson, Center for International Policy, (202) 232-3317; isacson [at] ciponline.org
Kelly Nicholls, US Office on Colombia, (202) 232-8090; kelly [at] usofficeoncolombia.org

Over the past month, the U.S. and regional press has been paying closer attention to Russia's relations with such Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba and even Colombia.

In September, Russian Vice-Prime Minister Igor Sechin traveled to Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba to meet with his counterparts in each country to discuss the potential increase in economic, military, and political cooperation between each country and Russia. In September, two Russian T-160 strategic bombers visited Venezuela for a joint military exercise and a Russian navy squadron is currently en route to the Caribbean for joint exercises with the Venezuelan navy. Russia also has begun preliminary discussions with Cuba to help the country develop its own space center, has announced it will replace the Nicaraguan army's aging weaponry, and has started talks with Venezuela about developing a peaceful nuclear energy program.

Bolivian President Evo Morales recently announced that he will seek Russia's aid for the country's counternarcotics program, and Colombia's Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos even traveled to Russia to discuss defense and counternarcotics cooperation.

Below are links to media coverage from the past month about Russia's renewed interest in Latin America. With the exception of the Venezuelan-Russian military exercise, U.S. officials have sought to downplay this interest in their public statements. It is apparent, however, that the U.S. government is watching these developments closely.

Analysis:

The Guardian: The cold war comes to the Caribbean

Front Page Magazine: Chávez's dangerous liaisons

Semana (Colombia): Calentando la guerra fria: Heating up the cold war

New Statesman: Cuban missile crisis II?

Venezuela:

El Universal (Venezuela): Presidente Dmitri Medvedev visitará Venezuela en noviembre: President Dimitri Medvedev will visit Venezuela in November

AP: Russia: Arms sales to Venezuela are defensive

AFP: Cooperación nuclear entre Moscu y Caracas desata la pol?©mica: Nuclear cooperation between Moscow and Caracas unleashes controversy

AP: Venezuela to build nuclear technology with Russia

New York Times: Russia loans Venezuela $1 billion for military

Reuters: Putin offers nuclear energy help to Chávez

BBC: Russia and Venezuela boost ties

AP: Putin, Chávez discuss ways to constrain U.S. power

EFE: Hablan Chávez y Medvedev de cooperación economía y militar: Chávez and Medvedev discuss economic and military cooperation

AP: Crece alianza Venezuela-Rusia: Venezuelan-Russian alliance grows

New York Times: Russia and Venezuela confirm joint military exercises

Nicaragua:

AP: Russia to modernize Nicaraguan military's arsenal

El Nuevo Diario (Nicaragua): Condoleezza despectiva con Ortega: Condoleezza derogatory toward Ortega

El Nuevo Diario: Viceprimer ministro de Rusia visitará este miercoles Nicaragua: Russian Vice-Prime Minister to visit Nicaragua on Wednesday

Cuba:

Reuters: Russia to help Cuba build space center

Bolivia:

AP: Ambassador: Russia looking to boost Bolivia ties

BBC Mundo: Bolivia y Rusia, nuevos aliados: Bolivia and Russia, new allies

La Prensa (Panama): Bolivia busca apoyo de Rusia: Bolivia looks for Russian support

Colombia:

El Espectador (Colombia):Moscu propone a Colombia combatir el creciente trafico de cocaína: Moscow makes a proposal to Colombia to combat the rise in narcotrafficking

El Tiempo (Colombia): Fortalecer cooperacion de seguridad, objetivo de viaje del Ministro de Defensa a Rusia: Strengthening security cooperation, objective of the Defense Minister's trip to Russia

Public Security Ministers representing 34 Latin American and Caribbean countries are meeting in Mexico City for the First Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas, a forum convened by the Organization of American States (OAS) to consider joint strategies to tackle "the scourge of crime and violence worldwide."

Upon opening the two-day meeting, OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, said that insecurity in Latin America "is an epidemic or a plague that kills more people than AIDS."

The goal of the meeting is to develop an international strategy against organized crime called, an "Agreement for Public Security in the Americas," that will focus on narcotrafficking and kidnapping in addition to common crimes and violence.

Below you will find links to various articles about the meeting:

In Mexico, OAS' Insulza calls for regular meeting of security ministers and joint action to tackle transnational crime, OAS Press Release (in English)

OAS: Crime is an "epidemic" worse than AIDS, El Nuevo Diario (in Spanish).

Calderón Convenes a Common Front Against Crime before the OAS, El Universal (in Spanish).

The OAS believes insecurity in Latin America is worse than any economic crisis, Hoy (in Spanish)

Last week, both the House and Senate voted to extend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. (ATPDEA is a trade preference system by which these four countries are granted duty-free access to a wide range of exports, with the goal of promoting economic development and providing alternatives to the production of cocaine.) While the House version granted a one-year extension to all four countries, the version of the bill passed by the Senate granted a one-year extension to Colombia and Peru and a six-month extension to Ecuador and Bolivia. A final, reconciled bill awaits approval.

For Bolivia, however, the outcome of Congress' decision on the matter may not make a difference.

On Friday, September 26, President Bush enacted his presidential powers as outlined under the terms of the law, requesting that Bolivia's designation as a beneficiary country under ATPDEA be suspended. Under the terms of the agreement, the President may withdraw or suspend the designation of a country as a beneficiary country if the country is not satisfying the eligibility criteria. According to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the White House's decision is based on the designation of Bolivia, on September 15, 2008, as a country that has failed demonstrably to cooperate with counternarcotics efforts. As outlined in a USTR press release,

the recent expulsion of U.S. Agency for International Development personnel and the removal of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration officials from the main areas of Bolivia's illegal coca production, a marked increase in cocaine production, the government's failure to close illegal coca markets, and publicly stated policies that increase government-sanctioned coca cultivation, have placed in doubt the Bolivian government's commitment to cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking.

President Bush's decision has received criticism from OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, who said that the suspension of trade preferences by the United States "will gravely harm many small Bolivian industries that survive on exportations of their products to the United States, and could leave more than 50,000 Bolivian workers without jobs." Other sources, such as Bolivia's La Razón and Los Tiempos, cite a loss of anywhere between 5,000 - 80,000 jobs.

According to U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab, the United States "regret[s] that the proposed suspension that is prompted by the Bolivian government's actions could affect hard-working Bolivians.... Once imposed, the suspension could be lifted as soon as the Bolivian government improves its performance under the ATPA and ATPDEA criteria" (i.e. proves that it is cooperating with the United States' counternarcotics efforts). However, Bolivian President Evo Morales has said that "dignity is more important and we cannot give in or back down," giving the impression that Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts will not change to fall in line with the policies of the United States, despite warnings by the Bolivian Institute of International Trade (IBCE) that this could be "terrible . . . for the manufacturing sector."

Not only could President Bush's decision to suspend trade preferences with Bolivia lead to the unemployment of 2% of the country's total workforce, but it is also unknown if it will lead to a change in the way Bolivia conducts its counternarcotics strategy. As outlined on this blog before, Bolivia's counternarcotics results have not differed much from that of two governments friendly to the United States, Peru and Colombia, and the U.S. decision to "decertify" Bolivia came at a time of worsening diplomatic relations between Bolivia and the United States.

In accordance with the ATPDEA agreement, a public hearing must be held on the proposed action to suspend trade preferences to Bolivia, which will take place on October 23rd. However, as it looks right now, Bolivia will be removed from the list of ATPDEA designated countries at least through the end of the Bush administration in January 2009.

Yesterday, we outlined the effect Ecuador's new Constitution will have on the Armed Forces and the Police. Today, we move on to the topic of sovereignty.

Not only does the new Constitution prohibit the establishment of foreign military bases or installations with military goals within its territory (think the U.S. military base in Manta), it also sets the stage for Ecuador to push for further regional integration and defense cooperation. Additionally, as laid out in the new Constitution, sovereignty will no longer be viewed solely from the territorial point of view, but it also be viewed in terms of energy, nutrition and policy.

According to El Comercio, these changes in the Constitution demonstrate that Ecuador seeks to distance itself from the United States' policies of the global war against terror and the militarization of the fight against narcotrafficking.

Below, like yesterday, is a translation of a description of what these changes in the new Constitution imply and what they mean for Ecuador.
(translated from the article in El Comercio, "Una nueva visión de soberanía")

A new vision of sovereignty

What does this imply?

A new vision of sovereignty and territorial defense will emerge with the new Constitution. Since the Government rose to power, it said that it would not extend the agreement for the use of the base at Manta by the U.S. military. This promise was celebrated by Article 5 of the constitutional project. In addition, the country will enter into a new logic of sovereignty with a strong regional charge.

The intention is to distance Ecuador from the defense doctrine of U.S. policy that consisted of a hemispheric security vision and that in the recent years has consolidated into a global practice for the fight against terrorism and the militarization of the fight against narcotrafficking. This resulted in major repercussions within the countries that make up the Andean region.

Now, the security agenda will be considered along with political and economic aspects. As a result, within a new Magna Carta it will be established that the country adopts the means to push for regional or subregional integration. This is not a process that has been created in Ecuador, but is also being carried out in European and Asian countries that transformed their nationalist vision and unified into a block in order to negotiate in accordance with their weaknesses and strengths.

As a result the new vision of sovereignty will be multidimensional. It no longer will have only one concept, the territory, and it will instead span themes such as policy and economy.

What does this mean?

The project of the new Constitution presents a transversal model of sovereignty, since it is no longer analyzed only from the territorial point of view, but includes the political, energetic, and even, nutritional point of view. From the territorial point of view the Montecristi proposal establishes the expressive prohibition of the establishment of foreign military bases or installations with military goals within the country.

Also, it signals a more extensive concept of Ecuadorian territory than the Magna Carta of 1998. In article 4 it is expressed that territory is a geographic and historical unit of natural, social and cultural dimensions. This territory makes up the continental and maritime space, the adjacent islands, the territorial sea, the Galapagos Archipelago, the soil, the submarine platform, and the overlying continental, insular and maritime space. Its limits are determined by current treaties. In addition, Ecuador's territory is inalienable, irreducible, and inviolable. No one may make an attempt against the national unity and encourage succession. Also, the concept that the Armed Forces are charged with protecting the sovereignty and territorial defense of the nation.

But, within the project of the new Magna Carta, a policy of defense and territorial sovereignty will have a new base that pushes for the union of the countries in the region, which will signify a distancing from the defense doctrine of the United States.

Sovereignty in the Project

Art. 4. The territory is a geographic and historical unit of natural, social and cultural dimensions. It makes up the continental and maritime space, the adjacent islands, the territorial sea, the Galapagos Archipelago, the soil, the submarine platform, the overlying continental, insular and maritime space. Its limits are determined by current treaties.

Art. 5. Ecuador is a territory of peace. The establishment of foreign military bases and installations with military goals are not permitted. National military bases may not be handed over to foreign militaries or security forces.

Art. 57. Various rights for indigenous communities and nationalities are recognized. Among them, the limitation of military activities in their territories, according to the Law.

Art. 158. The Armed Forces and the Police are institutions for the protection of rights, liberties and guarantees for the citizens. The Armed Forces has as its fundamental mission the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Art. 416. In number 5 it is established that Ecuador recognizes the rights of distinct pueblos that coexist within the States, especially in promoting mechanisms that express, preserve and protect the diverse character of their societies and rejects racism, xenophobia, and all other forms of discrimination.

Art. 423. The integration, especially with Latin American and Caribbean countries, will be a strategic objective of the State. Number 6 of this article establishes that there will be a common defense policy that will consolidate a strategic alliance to strengthen the sovereignty of the countries and of the region.

Sovereignty in the 1998 Constitution

Art. 2. The Ecuadorian territory is inalienable and irreducible. It is made of the Real Audiencia de Quito with the modifications introduced in current treaties, the adjacent islands, the Galapagos Archipelago, the territorial sea, the subsoil and the overlying space...

Art. 5. Ecuador may form associations with one or more States for the promotion and defense of its national interests.

Art. 183. The Armed Forces has as its mission the conservation of the national sovereignty, the defense of the integrity and the independence of the State

On Sunday, Ecuadorians went to the polls to vote on the country's 20th Constitution, which has been one of President Rafael Correa's main projects since he was elected two years ago. With 96.26% of the votes counted, the 'yes' vote has 64.04% of the vote and the 'no' 28.01%.

As has been reported widely in the international press, the new Constitution concentrates power in the hands of the President, gives the President the option of running for reelection - for a total of two consecutive four year terms -, permits civil unions of homosexual couples, puts the powers of the Central Bank into the hands of the executive, and, for the first time in the world of constitutions, grants nature an inalienable right to be protected.

What hasn't been reported is how the new constitution will affect the military, the police, civilian control, and sovereignty - topics that are of main interest to Just the Facts. For the next few days, we will outline on this blog how the new Constitution will affect these aspects of security and defense in Ecuador, courtesy of a series published by Ecuador's El Comercio called "With a microscope on the Constitution."

Today, we will start with the military and the police.

Military and Police have the right to vote
(translated from the article "Los uniformados podrán votar")

What does this imply?

The constitutional reform project eliminates the concept of the "Public Force" and clearly defines the functions of the Armed Forces as an entity in defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, it defines the authority of the Police as an organism in charge of public order and citizen security. The responsibility to guarantee the legal system of the nation is not included in the new functions of the Armed Forces.

Within political rights, the legislative project determines that the members of the Armed Forces and the Police will have the voluntary right to vote. Nevertheless, it does not signal the control mechanism for order during electoral processes.

Military service will no longer be obligatory under the framework of respect for diversity and rights. Additionally, voluntary recruitment will be accompanied by training programs in different occupational areas.

Those who voluntarily enlist for military service will not be designated for zones of high military risk. In regard to members of the Police, they will have a specialized formation in accordance with human rights. In both cases, a system of merit-based promotions will be established, with criteria for equality and gender.

In application of the principle of legal unity, the police and the military will be judged by the citizen justice system if a crime is committed.

What does this mean?

The institutions of the Armed Forces and the Police will be differentiated, with specific and complementary functions under the framework of respect for democracy and human rights. The legislative project will avoid having the high-command of the military decide what circumstances constitute a threat to the legal integrity of the nation.

The members of the Armed Forces and the Police will have the ability to exercise their political right to a voluntary vote within the electoral process; however, there are restrictions with respect to the possibility of becoming a candidate in a popular election.

Any Ecuadorian citizen will be able to voluntarily enlist for military service. The legislative project prohibits any form of forced recruitment and guarantees the security of the volunteer members, although it does not specify what zones are considered to be of high military risk.

Additionally, the project guarantees the enlistment of both men and women to the Armed Forces and the Police without any type of discrimination.

The Police is defined as an institution to service the community with a focus on crime prevention to guarantee the security of citizens.

If a member of the Armed Forces or the Police commits a crime, he or she will be judged in a court specialized in the subject of military and police and integrated into the judicial system.

The project:

Art. 62. The vote will be accessible to people between 16 and 18 years old, over 65 years old, Ecuadorians who live abroad, members of the Armed Forces and the Police.

Art. 113. Members of the Armed Forces and the National Police who are in active service cannot be candidates for popular election.

Art. 147. It is the power and the right of the President of the Republics to exercise maximum authority over the Armed Forces and the National Police and to designate the members of the High Command of the Military and Police.

Art. 152. Active members of the Armed Forces and the National Police cannot be Ministers of the State.

Art. 158. The Armed Forces and the National Police are institutions that protect the rights, liberties and guarantees of the citizens. The Armed Forces have the fundamental mission to defined the sovereignty and integrity of the territory. Internal protection and the maintenance of public order is the responsibility of the National Police.

Art. 159. The Armed Forces and the National Police will be obedient and follow the chain of command, and will comply with their mission with the strict submission to civil power and to the Constitution.

Art. 160. Those aspiring to a military or police career will not be discriminated against for their enlistment. The law establishes the specific requirements for those cases in which special skills, knowledge or capacity is required. The members will be subjected to a system of merit-based promotion, with criteria for gender equality.

Art. 161. Civil-military service is voluntary. This service will be carried out in the framework of respect for diversity and rights, accompanied by an alternative training . . .

The current law

Art. 27. Popular vote is universal, equal, direct and secret; it is obligatory for those who can read and write, optional for those who are illiterate and for those over 65 years old. Active members of the "Public Force" will not be able to use this right.

Art. 101. Active members of the public force may not be candidates in the popular election.

Art. It is the power and the right of the President of the Republic to exercise the maximum authority over the public force, designate the members of the Miltary High Command . . .

This week, many Latin American leaders had the opportunity to speak at the United Nation's 63rd General Assembly in New York. While the remarks of each president varied, a common thread among the speeches was the success of UNASUR and the future of regional cooperation.

Below you can find the link to a summary of each president's remarks in English. The linked pages also contain a .pdf of the full speech in Spanish.

Argentina: President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner

Bolivia: President Evo Morales Ayma

Brazil: President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

Chile: President Michelle Bachelet Jeria

Colombia: President Álvaro Uribe Vélez

Costa Rica: President Óscar Arias Sánchez

Cuba: José Ramón Machado Ventura, First Vice-President of the Council of State and Ministers

Dominican Republic: President Leonel Fernández Reyna

El Salvador: President Elías Antonio Saca González

Guatemala: President Álvaro Colom Caballeros

Honduras: President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales

Mexico: President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa

Panama: President Martin Torrijos Espino

Paraguay: President Fernando Lugo Méndez

Last week, we speculated about whether Bolivia would be placed on the United States' list of countries who have "failed demonstrably" to cooperate with U.S. anti-narcotics policy and the implications this might have, especially when comparing coca production and eradication and seizure levels of Bolivia with those of Peru and Colombia - top U.S. allies in the region. This week, the White House issued the "Majors List" of narcotics source and transfer countries for 2008, and Bolivia had been added to the "non-cooperating" list, which last year only included Venezuela and Burma.

Below are two charts that lay out both coca cultivation and cocaine production levels in Bolivia since 1994. The U.N data used to create these charts show a 5% increase in coca cultivation and an increase in cocaine production from 94 to 104 tons in 2007. These numbers differ from those cited by Assistant Secretary of State David Johnson at a press conference this week, held upon the release of the 2008 list. In criticizing Bolivian President Evo Morales' drug policies, Assistant Secretary Johnson said "The expansion of cultivation and lack of controls on coca leaf resulted in a 14% increase in the area of coca under cultivation, and an increase in potential cocaine production from 115 to 120 metric tons." Regardless, while these numbers do show a rise in the amount of coca and cocaine in Bolivia, the increases are not outstanding, especially in comparison to Colombia and Peru's cultivation and production numbers.

The addition of Bolivia to the "non-cooperating" list, however, comes at a time of tense relations between the governments of the United States and Bolivia. Just last week, Bolivia expelled the U.S. ambassador, claiming that he was conspiring with the opposition. The United States retaliated by expelling the Bolivian ambassador the next day.

At the press conference, Assistant Secretary Johnson noted that the addition of Bolivia to the list was not "a hasty decision" in retaliation for the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador, but instead cited "the [drug] policies that they are pursuing, capped off by the expulsion, if you will, of the USAID program in Chapare [a coca-growing region in central Bolivia] for alternative development, as well as the assistance program provided by our Drug Enforcement Administration, made the conclusion rather clear."

Here is a timeline of the deterioration of U.S.-Bolivia relations since last fall.

August 2007: Bolivian Minister Juan Ramon Quintana accuses the United States of using USAID funds to finance opposition groups.

November 2007: The Bolivian government passes around a photograph of U.S. Ambassador Goldberg with John Jairo Venegas, a Colombian accused by Bolivia of being a member of the Colombian right-wing paramilitary squads.

October 2007: In reaction to a campaign supported by President Morales to relocate the UN headquarters, Ambassador Goldberg publicly announced that he wouldn't also be surprised if Evo Morales asked for Disney Land to be moved.

February 2008: U.S. embassy official Vincent Cooper was accused of asking an American student and Peace Corps volunteer to spy on Venezuelans and Cubans in Bolivia.

June 9, 2008: Thousands of Bolivian protesters marched on the U.S. Embassy to demand that Washington extradite a former Bolivian defense minister who directed a military crackdown on riots that killed at least 60 people in 2003.

The United States recalled Ambassador Goldberg in reaction to the protests.

June 26 2008: The Chapare coca growers unions announced that they will no longer sign new aid agreements with USAID, as a result of the repeated accusations against USAID made by President Morales.

In reaction, the United States removes USAID personnel from the Chapare region, while President Morales praises the coca growers for kicking out the U.S. agency.

August 2008: Due to frustration with the way the U.S. spends money to fight cocaine production in Bolivia, drug czar Felipe Caceres announces that the Bolivia government will "nationalize the war against drug trafficking." And adds that "we will still welcome cooperation in the future, but the Bolivian government will decide how that money will be spent."

September 11, 2008: President Morales again accuses Ambassador Goldberg of working with the opposition, and orders the U.S. Ambassador to leave Bolivia. In 'solidarity' with Bolivia, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez also orders the U.S. Ambassador to leave his country.

The United States reacts by expelling the Bolivian Ambassador.

September 16, 2008: The United States adds Bolivia to the list of countries who have "failed demonstrably" to cooperate with U.S. anti-narcotics policy.

Drug related violence in Mexico has killed over 2,700 people this year. Just this week, over 30 people have been found dead: 24 of whom were found in a mass grave, bound and shot execution style, and 7 of whom were killed yesterday when a grenade exploded at an Independence Day celebration in Michoacán.

While Mexican press is filled everyday with accounts of violence, kidnappings and murders, the U.S. press, which for multiple reasons should be closely following the increasing violence so near its borders, has only recently begun to report on the topic.

Last week, a Washington Post editorial sought to draw attention to this, comparing Mexico's violence and death toll to that of the war in Afghanistan:

More Mexican soldiers and police officers have died fighting the country's drug gangs in the past two years than the number of U.S. and NATO troops killed battling the Taliban. Civilian casualties have been just as numerous, and as gruesome: There have been scores of beheadings, massacres of entire families and assassinations of senior officials. By the official count, kidnappings in Mexico now average 65 a month, ranking it well ahead of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Post continues, claiming that the violence

gets relatively little attention here because Americans are only rarely among the casualties. But U.S. money and weapons are fueling this war. Billions of dollars from American drug users flow to the syndicates, along with thousands of weapons smuggled across the border.

Not only do we need to pay attention because of the role U.S. money and arms trafficking plays in the violence, but we should also be following this closely because of the $400 million in aid, known as the 'Merida Initiative,' destined for the Mexican government that Congress approved in June (here is a a breakdown of aid for the Merida Initiative from 2007). A large percentage of this money will arm and equip the Mexican military in its fight against narcotrafficking. Critics like the CIP Americas Program, Amnesty International, LAWG and WOLA have argued that strengthening Mexico's institutions, especially the police force and the judicial system, and addressing the military's human rights violations should be the top priorities for Mexico and any aid from the United States.

Yesterday, the Los Angeles Times published an article on Mexico's various police forces, citing that a reform has begun, but that there are still inherent problems that make the police a very corrupt institution trusted by few Mexicans.

The weaknesses of Mexican police are vast. Most officers have at most a grade school education. They often have to buy their own guns on wages equal to those of a supermarket cashier. Many times, the average cop has his hand out for a bribe, in part to pay off bosses for the privilege of a job he probably will not hold for more than a few years. Problems are worst at the local levels.

In a video that goes along with this article, the Mexican citizens interviewed all cited lack of education, low wages and corruption as the main problems that must be addressed within the police force before violence will diminish.

The corruption of the police force has translated into many state and local officers working with the drug cartels instead of fighting against them. Last week, the Mexican government confirmed that an active Mexican federal agent had been involved in a highly publicized kidnapping and murder of a 14 year old boy. And the L.A. Times highlighted a shoot off that occurred last week between federal police transporting seven drug suspects and police officers from the city of Torreón intent on freeing the arrestees. "In the trenches of the drug war, cops were fighting cops."

With 25,000 federal police and over 350,000 state and local officers, it will be difficult for Mexican President Felipe Calderón to overhaul the entire police system. However, until corruption can be rooted out of the local and state police forces, it may prove difficult for U.S. aid to have a significant impact on the increasingly violent drug war next door.