The following is a short overview of some of the more significant events of the past year that set the political landscape for the region going into 2013.

Colombia peace talks
One of the biggest and most hopeful happenings in 2012 was the August announcement of peace talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that began on November 19 in Havana, Cuba. Conversations between government and FARC negotiators began in Norway in mid-October, where they gave a joint press conference. (See here for a timeline of the talks)

President Santos has said that if “firm advances” are not made by April-July 2013, “the process will not continue.” As Colombian political analysis website La Silla Vacia has posited, if the talks fail, the country can expect a political swing to the right, as was seen following in the 2002 failed peace talks, however if they are successful, a more leftist agenda that includes guerrilla participation in politics and increased rural development will be implemented. A December Gallup poll last month showed that while 71% of Colombians supported the peace process, only 43% believed they would end in a peace deal. The second round of talks covering land and rural development came to conclusion December 20 before the discussions broke for the holidays. Talks are set to restart January 14.

Paraguay’s golpeachment
Former President Fernando Lugo’s 2008 election marked the end of the Colorado Party’s long-term control of Paraguay politics. However, in June 2012, Paraguay’s Congress (the Colorado party and their allies) hastily voted to impeach Lugo and install Vice President Federico Franco, a move that was triggered by the mishandling of a still un-resolved violent land conflict between police and landless peasants that left 11 campesinos and six police dead. While the impeachment was technically legal, many countries considered Lugo’s rapid removal a coup, resulting in the country’s suspension from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) political bloc and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). The Mercosur suspension allowed Venezuela to finally enter the bloc, comprised of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, after Paraguay’s long opposition to its inclusion.

El Salvador’s gang truce
In March 2012 a government-mediated truce was brokered between El Salvador’s two most violent gangs -- Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13, the first street gang operating in the U.S. to be labeled a transnational criminal organization) and Barrio 18. The deal lead to a 40% drop in the country's homicide rate, making 2012 the least violent year since 2003 for El Salvador, one of the world’s most violent and insecure countries. In 2011, the county’s National Civil Police (PNC) registered 4,371 homicides, putting it right behind Honduras, which holds the world’s highest murder rate. In 2012, the PNC registered 2,576 murders. Despite skeptics’ fears that the deal would be fleeting, nine months later the truce is still holding and the groups are now conducting talks about how to proceed. In December, the MS-13 and Barrio 18, along with other street gangs, agreed to end gang activity in designated “peace zones” throughout the country, however these zones have yet to be identified and the level of government involvement has also yet to be determined. It is still a very much evolving process, but one to watch in 2013. In November, the Congressional Research Service released a report about the country's political and economic conditions and its relations with the U.S.

Fuero militar in Colombia
In mid-December, the Colombian Congress passed a justice reform bill, known as ‘Fuero Militar’ (Military Jurisdiction), that would likely result in human rights violations by military members -- including extrajudicial executions, torture, and rape -- being investigated and tried by the military justice system. Human rights activists say that limiting the civilian court system’s ability to try and convict members of the armed forces will lead to further impunity and worry that the more than 1,700 cases of extrajudicial execution currently in civilian courts will be moved under military jurisdiction. Most recently the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights released a statement voicing its “deep concern over the serious setback in human rights” that the reform would represent.

Mexico’s new president
On December 1st, Enrique Peña Nieto was sworn in as Mexico’s new leader, marking the return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), after a 12-year hiatus following its 71-year stronghold of the Mexican political system. Mexican police struggled to manage the thousands of protesters that took to the streets during the inauguration to denounce the PRI's return to power. Security forces arrested several people unjustly and contributed to the outbreak of violence, which led to Amnesty International setting up a support page for victims of police brutality. Peña Nieto’s security proposal for Mexico continues with a militarized approach, but he has vowed to fight violence and other crimes as opposed to targeting drug traffickers. The new Mexican leader has also reiterated his plans to increase economic ties with the U.S. However, it remains to be seen whether or not a PRI-presidential term with Peña Nieto will mark a significant change for Mexico.

President Hugo Chávez’s cancer
The biggest question mark in the region at the moment is who will be ruling Venezuela in the months to come, as there is the ever-growing possibility of a power vacuum. In October, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez publicly stated he had beaten cancer, only to announce in early December that it had returned and he would be undergoing treatment in Cuba. President Chávez, who won re-election in early October despite a strong opposition and debilitating illness, is currently in Cuba recovering from his fourth round of surgery. He was set to be inaugurated on January 10, however due to the increasing likelihood that he will be too ill to be back from Cuba in time, Vice President Nicolas Maduro announced Friday that President Chávez will retain power and be sworn in after the date. President Chávez called on Venezuelans to vote for Vice President Maduro to be his successor should he step down or die before being sworn in. The constitution requires that power be handed over to Diosdado Cabello, the recently re-elected speaker of Venezuela’s National Assembly, until another election is held within 30 days. While there is growing uncertainty around the county’s future leadership, some analysts say Chávez’s Socialist Party (PSUV) would most likely be re-elected given the presidential election victory and recent wins in 20 out of 23 states in mid-December’s gubernatorial elections.

Obama’s re-election, Immigration and the Latino vote
In addition to changes in U.S. drug policy, many hope immigration reform will top President Obama’s agenda in his second term, given his victory was largely helped by winning just over 70 percent of the Hispanic vote. In his election speech, Obama mentioned immigration reform as a priority just behind reducing the deficit and tax reform. The hope for 2013 is for the administration to make good on this promise for the eleven million immigrants living in the U.S., and that it scales back on increasingly harsh deportation practices.

Honduras and the DEA
The Drug Enforcement Administration's involvement in several killings in Honduras this year highlighted growing U.S. involvement in counternarcotics operations in Central America. In April, the DEA sent special teams to some of the more rural, drug-ridden areas of Honduras as part of a joint counternarcotics operation known as Operation Anvil. Three of the five joint interdiction operations during Anvil included the shootings of Hondurans by either DEA agents, or by Honduran officers trained, equipped and vetted by the U.S., causing the operation to end days ahead of schedule.

About $50 million due to be assigned to antidrug and security efforts -- amounting to about half of all U.S. aid to Honduras for 2012 and including $8.3 million in counternarcotics aid, and $38 million under the Central America Regional Security Initiative -- is being withheld by Democrats in Congress over concerns about American involvement in the killings and over accusations that the director of Honduras' national police had ties to death squads. The aid is still being withheld, but the U.S. has begun to share radar information with the Honduran air force again.

Honduras currently has the highest murder rate in the world with 86 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Since the 2009 coup, drug trafficking, violence and human rights violations have rapidly increased, while impunity for killings, particularly of journalists and human rights defenders, is high and corruption pervades all government institutions. The country is currently undergoing a constitutional crisis, with the executive and congress attempting to overhaul the Supreme Court. Presidential elections are set to take place this year.

Marijuana legalization and regulation
As the death toll in Mexico continues to climb over the 60,000 deaths recorded during previous Mexican President Felipe Calderón's drug war, and drugs continue to flow into the United States from below the border, as well as throughout the Caribbean and Latin America, experts and Latin American presidents are increasingly calling for alternatives to the "War on Drugs." Earlier in 2012, there was a lot of discussion surrounding drug legalization, particularly following Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina’s advocacy for the international legalization of drugs in March. There was more discussion about the issue before the fairly uneventful Summit of the Americas held in Colombia in April, after which it seemed to die down a bit. In September at a UN General Assembly meeting, the presidents of Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala submitted a proposal for drug reform, which Honduras and Costa Rica later backed. The UN then agreed to hold a special session on on drug prohibition by 2015.

Several former leaders, including Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Vicente Fox and Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, had already called for changes in global and U.S. drug policies in 2011, but Latin American presidents and former leaders from all political sides continued to call for reform in 2012. In June, Uruguay’s President José Mujica proposed legislation to legalize marijuana that was moving through the country’s congress until a poll in mid-December indicated that 65% of Uruguayans opposed legalization, while only 26% supported it, causing President Mujica to slow down the initiative.

Drug legalization throughout the region will continue to be widely debated, particularly following Colorado and Washington’s passage of referendums in November for legalizing recreational marijuana use. Now that there are legal markets for marijuana in the U.S., many Latin American leaders are questioning why they should continue to invest financial and human resources into enforcing drug laws. As one Mexican official responded, "we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least in part of the United States, it now has a different status." Mexico is currently exploring its own legalization measures, modeled on Washington State law.

This post was written by LAWG-EF Executive Director Lisa Haugaard. The original version was published in the Huffington Post. It is also cross-posted with the Latin America Working Group Education Fund's LAWGBlog.

U.S. policy towards our Latin American neighbors is, as usual, in need of a few New Year's resolutions. Here goes:

1. Ban assault weapons. Three months before the murders of 20 children and six adults in Newtown, Connecticut, 110 victims of violenceand advocates from Mexico traveled across the United States calling on us to take action to stop the violence that has claimed over 100,000 lives in Mexico in Mexico during the last six years. They asked us to ban the assault weapons that arm Mexico's brutal cartels. Some 70 percent of assault weapons and other firearms used by criminal gangs in Mexico come from the United States. The United States should reinstate and tighten the assault weapon ban and enforce the ban on the import of assault weapons into our country, which are then smuggled into Mexico. Do it for Newtown. Do it for Aurora. Do it for Mexico's mothers and fathers who have lost their children to senseless violence.

2. Deliver comprehensive immigration reform. Democrats and Republicans alike should heed the message delivered by the Latino vote in 2012 and provide a path to citizenship for the eleven million people living in the shadows in the United States and build a flexible, sensible legal immigration system for the future. This historic step would help families and the economy in the United States and Latin America, and would do more to improve U.S.-Latin American relations than any other single action. And right now, the Obama administration should protect the rights of migrants and border communities by stopping deportation practices that send migrants back to dangerous areas to be preyed upon by cartels, and by ensuring U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents are held accountable for abuses.

3. Support peace in Colombia, with justice. In 2013, there's a real chance to end the longest-running conflict in the Americas. The Obama administration sensibly backs Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos' negotiations with the FARC guerrillas. But we should also be listening to the voices of families of the disappeared and kidnapped, and the mothers of children murdered by Colombia's army, who are calling for justice along with peace. There must be accountability and truth for the murder, torture, forced displacement and rape perpetrated by all actors: the paramilitaries, the guerrillas and the country's own armed forces. The sad truth is that the Santos administration is moving backwards in accountability for army abuses. Without full truth and a strong measure of justice, there cannot be a lasting peace.

4. Try this on for size: a rational policy towards Cuba. The United States should launch a serious dialogue that aims at lifting the failed, 50-year embargo. We know this won't happen overnight. For starters, we should end the travel ban that divides us from our neighbors just off the Florida coast. The Obama administration should also take Cuba off the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism; there is no earthly reason it belongs there in 2013. The accusation of giving shelter to Colombia's guerrillas was one of the few rationales for Cuba's inclusion; now Cuba is lauded by Colombia's government for hosting peace negotiations. If we support peace in Colombia, how can we not recognize Cuba's contribution?

5. End the militarized approach to drugs. Latin American presidents of all political persuasions are telling us: we must rethink the "War on Drugs," which has brought suffering without results. For starters, we should stop the tactics that cause the most harm while doing the least good: counternarcotics campaigns that bring Latin American armies into the streets; aerial spraying, which destroys food as well as drug crops. And we should focus on the public health approaches here and abroad that do the most good and the least harm: providing treatment when and where addicts need it; evidence-based prevention campaigns; youth employment and building resilient communities.

6. Focus on aid that helps people, not guns and military aid. As we face another battle on budget cuts, why not put military aid to Latin America on the chopping block. There's no war anywhere in the region, if Colombia's peace talks succeed. Focus on aid that actually helps people: disaster assistance, including reconstruction aid for Haiti; aid for health care, education, micro-loans, improving justice systems, and community development. Ensure that aid programs are consulted with the people they intend to benefit.

7. Speak up for human rights. While the United States isn't perfect, as our Latin American friends readily tell us, our government should speak up for human rights in this hemisphere. But do it fairly. When a left-wing government restricts freedom of the press, the United States should speak against this. When governments the U.S. favors -- like Colombia and Mexico--fail to prosecute human rights abuses committed by their militaries, the United States should press for justice, including by suspending military aid when needed.

8. Decisively support human rights in Honduras. Honduras is in crisis. Since the June 2009 coup in Honduras, human rights protections, never strong, have been severely weakened. Human rights defenders, LGBT community members, leaders in poor farming communities, and opposition activists have been threatened and killed, in crimes for which there is no justice. Military, police and private security guards are unaccountable. The United States should suspend military and police aid to Honduras while using aid and tough diplomacy to help Honduras strengthen the failing justice system.

9. Support the Inter-American human rights system. To its credit, the Obama administration has actively supported the Inter-American human rights system, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which many Latin American governments of left, right and center have recently sought to weaken. 2013 will be an important year to join with civil society groups across the Americas to ensure reforms strengthen, not weaken, this system's role as the last recourse for victims who fail to attain justice in their countries.

10. Finally, clean up our own act. The United States' voice on human rights will be stronger, of course, if our government sticks to human rights principles in its own actions. Drone strikes that kill civilians, rendition, indefinite detention and complete lack of due process for terror suspects weaken U.S. credibility in Latin America as well as in other regions of the world.

Now, if we could keep these resolutions, 2013 would be a banner year for U.S.-Latin American relations.

President Hugo Chávez said that if he can't govern, he wants Vice-President Nicolás Maduro (left) to succeed him. But National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello (right), a former army officer, may have more support from the military. (Photo source: Associated Press)

On January 10, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is supposed to be in Caracas, being sworn in for a new term in office. But Chávez continues to convalesce in Havana, his condition “delicate,” in the words of Vice-President Nicolás Maduro, following another cancer operation.

With the country’s political leadership uncertain, and concerns about possible instability growing, eyes are turning to Venezuela’s armed forces. But the military’s current and potential political role is difficult to understand, especially after 14 years of rule by President Chávez.

Some of the most thoughtful analysis of the Venezuelan armed forces in the current crisis is coming from Ewald Scharfenberg, the Caracas correspondent for Spain’s El País newspaper.

Here are some excerpts from Scharfenberg’s recent writing, which I’ve found helpful in trying to understand what is happening. The first two paragraphs are from a January 3 article published in English; the rest are translated excerpts of Spanish pieces published on December 30 and January 2.

Venezuela’s military is constitutionally neutral but Chávez has packed its leadership with loyalists. The military plays an important role in running the country, particularly its oil industry. There are three members of the armed forces in the cabinet, while 11 of the 23 provinces are run by army men. Retired military officers say there are deep divisions within the armed forces. But they believe many of the roughly 8,500 rank-and-file officers who form the core of the 125,000-strong military would accept the voters’ choice.

In the run-up to October’s elections, the chairman of Venezuela’s joint chiefs, General Wilmer Barrientos, said on national television that the military would “heed the constitution and respect the will of the people.”

…

The military’s advantage: not arms, but manpower

In any scenario, the military’s sign-off appears to be indispensable. Not so much because of its firepower, but because of the logistical and administrative control that the armed forces maintain over vital state functions. … Chavismo, as it learned during 14 years of governing, was able to give shape to an institutionality that functions: the misiones [economic assistance projects], the food distribution networks [both of which relied on military participation]. …

If the military sector wants to influence Venezuela’s political drift, it won’t have to do it in a high-profile way, through a classic pronouncement. It would be enough to put that [logistical and administrative] apparatus at the disposal of one of the succession candidates, while denying it to the other. This is the trophy that, along with the mythology of comandante Chávez, [Vice President Nicolás] Maduro and [National Assembly President Diosdado] Cabello are disputing. If at the moment Maduro has an advantage because Chávez specifically named him as his successor, the long term could favor Cabello [a former army officer]. The majority of army officers currently commanding the troops are part of the military academy class of 1987, the same as Cabello.

…

A possible “Egyptian Scenario”

All that is known of the military sector is that it is an archipelago of groups united by criteria of loyalty to specific leaders, of economic convenience, and of professional and ideological principles.

There is a consensus that all those groups will be united in the event that the transition starting January 10, when Hugo Chávez is expected to be unable to present himself for his 2013-2019 swearing-in, overflows institutional capacities, and that the need to establish public order through dissuasion or force thus demands esprit de corps.

But that would be the nightmare scenario. In general, the officer corps prefers to avoid open interventions. Since February 27, 1989 [a day of violent protests and rioting in Caracas], on the occasions in which it has been obligated to carry out repressive functions, the cost for the institution has been high, in terms of cracks in internal discipline and of judicial cases opened against soldiers who then feel abandoned by the civilian politicians who ordered them. In addition, such exposure would place the military under the scrutiny of the international community, which has enough cases of illicit activities and human rights violations at its disposal to pressure some key officers.

So the role that the armed forces would be expected to play would be a type of “Egyptian scenario,” in which the officers, behind the scenes, would define the “red lines” up to which indefinition and disorder can be tolerated. The armed forces’ watchful tutelage, amid a constitutional transition of power, would require it to reorder itself internally to figure out who among them would be the leading voice for its supervisory role.

Factions within the officer corps

Who are the contenders? It is certain that the factions most likely to represent military opinion during the crisis maintain their loyalty to the Bolivarian [pro-Chávez] process, whether because of political conviction or because of a more abstract loyalty to the letter of the constitution. Nonetheless, nuances can be discerned that set apart three groups, which in a very schematic way can be called “ideologues,” “pragmatists,” and “institutionalists.”

Of the first, the current representative is the minister of defense, Adm. Diego Molero. It is meaningful that Chávez, knowing the health situation he was facing, named him to the post last October. Why trust in Molero at such a delicate moment? Maybe because of his declared socialist convictions. According to some sources, Molero’s appointment met with resistance in the barracks. He is an officer with few professional credentials — he ranked 53rd of 56 students in his military academy graduating class — and without support among the troops. … Chávez’s illness leaves him in a position of weakness. In fact, the President only swore him in on December 10, two months after his designation, and minutes before Chávez left for Havana to be operated. Which left the leader without an opportunity to legitimize himself among his peers, above all in the Army, which resents having a naval officer commanding such a key portfolio.

Molero was an authentic surprise. Those who seemed destined to occupy the ministry were Army Gen. Wilmer Barrientos, the current chief of the Strategic Operational Command (CEO), and Gen. Carlos Alcalá Cordones, the commander of the Army. The two belong to the class of 1983 and were tied at the time to the Revolutionary Bolívarian Movement-200 (MBR-200), the internal clique that surfaced in 1992 with the coup attempt led by Chávez and three other officers. But while Alcalá Cordones is seen as an institutionalist officer, firmly attached to the parameters of military professionalism, Barrientos may be a pragmatist, of the faction more willing to wait to know which way the wind is blowing before taking a side. …

It is also expected that the eleven retired officers recently [in December] elected as state governors will play some role. In addition to the personal influence that each one may have over the rank and file, especially the generals (like ex-Ministers of Defense García Carneiro and Rangel Silva, or the Governor of Bolívar State, Rangel Gómez), they are considered connoisseurs of the ins and outs of politics, a bit of baggage that may be crucial in a scenario where bridges must be built between civilians and officers.

Another possibility that can’t be discarded is that, in the darkness of the military “black box,” another unknown leadership may be germinating, as Chávez himself was until the early hours of February 4, 1992 [when he launched his failed coup attempt].

…

January 10 and after

The first test of fire for the military has a date. On January 10, the new president must be sworn in. Despite the official secrecy about the president-elect’s health, it is expected that Chávez won’t be there. In political gossip some expect an agreement to declare the president’s temporary absence, which would open a space of 90 days, renewable once, so that Chávez can assume the post or, if he is ultimately absent, so that new elections can be convened.

Some doubts about this procedure remain. … But all must transpire in peace: if uncertainty gives way to disorder in the streets, the military may see itself as obligated to intervene.

This possibility, feared by all, could cause fractures within the military rank and file, as happened in April 2002 during the brief coup that removed Chávez from power for 47 hours. “Among the officers are different groups who aren’t necessarily in contact with each other, or share the same interests,” warns the expert Rocío San Miguel [of the NGO Control Ciudadano.]

The other great unknown is the Bolivarian Militia. With 120,000 members, light weaponry and poor organization, it is not a rival to any professional security force. But it was constituted by mandate of President Chávez, and it sees itself as a praetorian guard of the [Bolivarian] process. Tied to the most extreme Chavistas, it may be able to prevail in a conflict. But these are questions that nobody wants to see answered: the constitutional order is preferred by both civilians and soldiers.

Site of the June 15 confrontation in Curuguaty, Paraguay (source: CODEHUPY).

December 22, 2012 marked six months since Paraguay’s Congress, acting with remarkable haste, voted to impeach the country’s elected president, Fernando Lugo, who was in his last year in office. The incident that triggered the vote was a violent confrontation between campesino land squatters and police in Curuguaty, which left 17 people dead on June 15th.

Six months later, Paraguay’s neighbors continue to question President Lugo’s rapid expulsion. The country remains suspended from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) political bloc, and from the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) economic bloc.

The Curuguaty episode of June 15th, meanwhile, remains unresolved. While both sides — landless peasants and police — acted violently, so far charges have only been filed against the peasants.

In its year-end report, the National Human Rights Coordinator of Paraguay (CODEHUPY), an umbrella group of 26 organizations, discusses what has happened. Here are translated excerpts:

Like a bolt of lightning on a clear day, on the morning of June 15 came the confrontation in Curuguaty — which even today remains confused — that cost the lives of 11 peasants and six policemen. The episode took place on lands in dispute known as Marina Cue. The land had been fraudulently appropriated years before [during the 1954-1989 dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner] by Blas N. Riquelme, a businessman, ex-congressman and ex-president of the [long-ruling, but opposition in June] Colorado Party, and had been occupied for about a month by peasants who requested that the National Institute of Rural Development and Land designate the property for land reform.

…

An independent investigation carried out by CODEHUPY revealed that there was no proportional use of force in the repression. In that investigation, credible eyewitnesses said that at least two peasants, Adolfo Castro and Andrés Avelino Riveros, were executed by police agents when they had surrendered with their hands up. The accounts affirm that Adolfo Castro was holding his young son when police shot him in the head.

Other testimonies contend that several peasants wounded during the repression were executed afterward by police agents, after the shots had already ceased and the security forces already controlled the site.

…

The first accounts of the confrontation caused shock and commotion in public opinion. While there had been a long prior history of violence and repression against peasants fighting for land, never before in recent history had the country seen a situation with so many dead.

The pain was followed by a search for whom to blame. But neither the government — taken by surprise — nor the press had precise information about how and why the Curuguaty massacre had happened, leading to a wide variety of claims about who shot first. At first there were strong rumors about the presence in the zone of snipers from the Army of the Paraguayan People (EPP [a very small group claiming to be leftist guerrillas]), but that version was discarded during initial investigations.

Opposition political parties took advantage of citizens’ confusion and indignation to accuse [then-President] Fernando Lugo, once again, of encouraging violence in the countryside. They were supported in this campaign by much of the written and broadcast media hostile to the government.

…

The possibility of impeachment began to be mentioned. The country was only nine months away from its next general election, and there was no evidence that the government had encouraged peasant violence.

…

On June 21 and 22, 2012, the Paraguayan Congress carried out the impeachment, which was questioned in its impartiality, objectivity, as well as in its respect for the principle of due process. Its result was the removal of President Fernando Lugo Méndez, who was democratically elected on April 20, 2008.

Since then, the criminal investigation of what happened at Curuguaty has developed in a most troubling way. At least 13 campesinos were detained at the site of the incident, and held without charge until December. Several of those arrested went on a hunger strike to protest their long imprisonment.

Prosecutors had six months to put together a case. On December 14th, the government’s prosecutor issued charges of land invasion and murder against fourteen campesinos. A judge will review these charges in February.

No police agents are under investigation, much less facing trial, a situation that Amnesty International calls “shocking,” since “according to reports, during the confrontation there were more than 300 officers, many of them with firearms, as opposed to only around 90 peasants.”

In early December, a key possible witness in the campesinos’ defense was killed. Vidal Vega, a local peasant leader who was not present at the Curuguaty massacre, was shot four times by hitmen on a motorcycle. “Vega was expected to be a witness at the criminal trial,” reported the Associated Press, “since he was among the few leaders who weren’t killed in the clash or jailed afterward.”

On Tuesday, Congress passed a bill making it U.S. policy "to use a comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere."

The "Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act" requires the State Department to present a report to Congress on any Iranian activity in the Western Hemisphere and outline a strategy to counter its presence, allocating $1 million dollars for it to do so. The report is due 180 days after the bill becomes law.

The bill passed with an overwhelming 386-6 vote in the House, after the Senate passed a slightly amended version last Wednesday, with added language that would make the State Department's report classified.

According to the Congressional Research Service's official summary, the report will include:

(1) descriptions of the presence, activities, and operations of Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC's Qods Force, and Hezbollah;

(2) descriptions of the terrain, population, ports, foreign firms, airports, borders, media outlets, financial centers, foreign embassies, charities, religious and cultural centers, and income-generating activities utilized by Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC's Qods Force, and Hezbollah;

(3) descriptions of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC's Qods Force, and Hezbollah with transnational criminal organizations;

(4) descriptions of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC's Qods Force, and Hezbollah that may be present with governments in the Western Hemisphere;

(5) descriptions of federal law enforcement capabilities, military forces, state and local government institutions, and other critical elements, such as nongovernmental
organizations that may organize to counter the Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere;

(6) descriptions of activity by Iran, the IRGC, the IRGC's Qods Force, and Hezbollah that may be present at the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada and at other international borders within the Western Hemisphere; and

(7) a plan to address efforts by foreign persons, entities, and governments in the region to assist Iran in evading sanctions, to protect U.S. interests, assets, and allies in the Western Hemisphere, to support U.S. efforts to designate persons and entities in the Western Hemisphere for proliferation and terrorist activities relating to Iran, and to address vital U.S. interests in ensuring energy supplies from the Western Hemisphere. Expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary should keep Congress informed about Iran's hostile actions in the Western Hemisphere.

The bill's supporters in the House say the legislation is necessary to prevent Iran from building stronger relationships in the hemisphere that allow it to circumvent economic sanctions and "pose a threat to U.S. interests." As Illeana Ros-Lehtinen, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs said, the U.S. must "combat the aggressive actions of Iran and proxies, such as Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere," as "one state sponsor of terrorism after another continues to receive the royal treatment from these tyrants of Latin America."

Another of the bill's supporters, Representative Albio Sires, a Democrat from New Jersey, said it was "important that the U.S. Government continue to closely monitor the nature and effectiveness of these Iranian efforts" given that Iran's leader, Ahmadinejad, "In a show of defiance to the U.S., has made six trips to our hemisphere. Although it is unclear that he has put anything of real value on the table."

The United States government, along with several security experts, has conducted many investigations into Iranian presence in Latin America. With the exception of a November 2012 House Subcommittee report on threats to the Southwest border, which focused heavily on Iran, the overall conclusion seems to be that while the threat of Hezbollah in the hemisphere is there, it is relatively small.

The Center for Economic and Policy Research published an interesting article last Thursday, which argues that the bill will "promote bad relations between the U.S. and Latin America," comparing it to the Monroe Doctrine.

For a lengthier posting on U.S. government and security investigations into Iran and Hezbollah's presence in Latin America, see a previous Just the Facts blog post.

Here is a collection of “long-read” articles I found to be especially noteworthy in 2012. In addition to being engrossing reading, these all met the following criteria.

• They are about Latin America and the Caribbean, and usually about security.
• They are at least 3,000 words, thus qualifying them as “long reads” – often requiring more than one sitting to finish them, but not book length.
• They are written in a clear, journalistic style – not academic prose.
• As of today, all are available for free online.
• They are written by authors other than staff of the three organizations that make up the “Just the Facts” project (CIP, LAWG and WOLA). Our organizations’ 2012 “long reads” are listed separately at the end of this post.

This comes from a scan of my database and my own memory. If I missed anything big, let me know in the comments. Happy reading (although some of these articles are quite grim), and best wishes for the holiday.

– Adam Isacson, WOLA

January 2012, Colombia: “Las FARC: La guerra que el país no quiere ver (Starts on page 36)”
Ariel Ávila
Arcanos (Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, Colombia)
A look at how the FARC have adapted to the Colombian government’s 10-year-long offensive, arguing that they still remain “lethal to the Armed Forces and the civilian population.”

January 2012, Colombia: “Fighting the Last War ”
Elizabeth Dickinson
The Washington Monthly
“As president of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe triumphed over a fierce narco-insurgency. Then the U.S. helped to export his strategy to Mexico and throughout Latin America. Here’s why it’s not working.”

January 12, 2012, Guatemala: “Breaking the wave: critical steps in the fight against crime in Guatemala”
Ivan Briscoe, Marlies Stappers
Clingendael Institute (Netherlands), Impunity Watch
A thorough review and diagnosis of Guatemala’s halting efforts to reform its public security and judicial institutions, including the work of CICIG, the UN anti-impunity body.

January 13, 2012, Ecuador: “Reversal of Fortune”
Patrick Radden Keefe
The New Yorker
A somewhat critical profile of Steven Donziger, the lead U.S. lawyer in a multi-billion-dollar lawsuit against oil giant Chevron brought by Ecuadorian communities affected by severe pollution.

January 25, 2012, Peru: “The Devastating Costs of the Amazon Gold Rush”
Donovan Webster
Smithsonian
A likely future zone of social conflict is Madre de Dios state in Peru’s Amazon basin, where a bonanza of uncontrolled gold mining is devastating the environment.

April 9, 2012, El Salvador: “12 preguntas urgentes acerca del pacto con las pandillas”
El Faro (El Salvador)
The online publication that broke the story about a government-brokered pact between El Salvador’s principal gangs asks twelve questions about the secretive deal. Many remain unanswered months later, even as homicide rates plummet.

April 16, 2012, Brazil: “Special Report: Brazil’s “gringo” problem: its borders”
Brian Winter
Reuters
Reuters looks at Brazil’s changing approach to border security and international drug flows, which increasingly resembles the old-school, military-heavy, U.S. “drug war” model.

April 23, 2012, Mexico: “Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle”
David Barstow, Alejandra Xanic Von Bertrab, James C. McKinley
The New York Times
December 18, 2012, Mexico: “The Bribery Aisle: How Wal-Mart Used Payoffs to Get Its Way in Mexico”
David Barstow and Alejandra Xanic Von Bertrab
The New York Times
A remarkable series on Wal-Mart’s shameless activities in Mexico: “Wal-Mart de Mexico was an aggressive and creative corrupter, offering large payoffs to get what the law otherwise prohibited.”

May 1, 2012, Colombia: ““We are Illegal, but not Illegitimate.” Modes of Policing in Medellin, Colombia”
Aldo Civico
Political and Legal Anthropology Review
Medellín as an example of a place where organized crime isn’t filling the vacuums left by the government’s absence – it actually requires the government’s collusion in order to thrive.

May 1, 2012, Mexico: “The Deadliest Place in Mexico”
Melissa Del Bosque
The Texas Observer
A visit to the Juárez valley, east of Ciudad Juárez, which has been devastated by violent competition between the Juárez and Sinaloa cartels.

May 21, 2012, Cuba: “The Yankee Comandante”
David Grann
The New Yorker
A profile of William Morgan, an American who fought in Fidel Castro’s rebel army in the 1950s, only to be imprisoned and shot by a firing squad in 1961.

May 25, 2012, Guatemala: “Finding Oscar: Massacre, Memory and Justice in Guatemala”
Sebastian Rotella, Ana Arana
ProPublica
A man in Massachusetts finds out that, as a small boy, he survived Guatemala’s notorious Dos Erres massacre, from where he was abducted.

June 1, 2012, Mexico: “Cronica de la cartelizacion”
Natalia Mendoza Rockwell
Nexos (Mexico)
A look at El Altar, Sonora, a staging area for drugs and migrants south of Arizona, where independent smugglers have fallen violently under the control of organized crime.

June 13, 2012, Mexico: “A Drug Family in the Winner’s Circle”
Ginger Thompson
The New York Times
An investigation of how the Treviño family, part of the leadership of Mexico’s Zetas criminal organization, laundered money through horse-breeding in the United States. This episode, some speculate, may have fostered a violent split within the Zetas when the amount of money involved was revealed.

June 15, 2012, Mexico: “Cocaine Incorporated”
Patrick Radden Keefe
The New York Times Magazine
An exploration of what we know about the Sinaloa cartel and how it operates, both in Mexico and the United States.

June 25, 2012, Mexico: “The Kingpins”
William Finnegan
The New Yorker
“‘Heating up the plaza’ is the term of art for what’s happening in Guadalajara, mainly in the poor barrios and in the badlands on the outskirts.”

June 28, 2012, Mexico: “The truth about the Fast and Furious scandal”
Katherine Eban
Fortune
If you want to know what really went wrong with “Fast and Furious,” read this. “The ATF never intentionally allowed guns to fall into the hands of Mexican drug cartels. How the world came to believe just the opposite is a tale of rivalry, murder, and political bloodlust.”

July 17, 2012, Peru: “Sendero Luminoso y el narcotrafico en el VRAE”
Romina Mella
IDL Reporteros (Peru)
First of an eight-part series exploring who the “narcos” are in today’s Peru, which appears to be surpassing Colombia as the world’s largest cocaine producer.

July 17, 2012, Venezuela: “Tightening the Grip”
Human Rights Watch
Documenting the erosion of judicial independence, limits on press freedom, and pressure on human rights defenders in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela.

July 30, 2012, Mexico: “Armed with Impunity: Curbing Military Human Rights Abuses in Mexico”
Catherine Daly, Kimberly Heinle, and David A. Shirk
Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego
The authors dig through the data about human rights complaints against Mexico’s military, which has been called to help fight crime, highlighting trends and calling for more determined action to bring abuses to justice.

August 1, 2012, Entire Region: “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty-First Century”
Bruce Bagley
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Taking the pulse of anti-drug policies, and their latest unintended consequences, throughout the hemisphere.

August 21, 2012, Colombia: “Impunity: Has implementation of the accusatory legal system been an effective response to the fight against impunity in Colombia?”
U.S. Office on Colombia
A highly critical view of Colombia’s U.S.-aided shift to an oral, accusatorial justice system, contending that it has harmed “due process and access to justice, particularly for grave human rights violations.”

August 29, 2012, Venezuela: “Venezuela’s private media wither under Chavez assault”
Monica Campbell
Committee To Protect Journalists
“The Chavez administration has used an array of legislation, threats, and regulatory measures to gradually break down Venezuela’s independent press while building up a state media empire.”

September 25, 2012, Colombia: “Colombia: Peace at Last?”
International Crisis Group
A thorough overview of why moderate optimism about Colombia’s FARC peace talks is warranted, and what the main actors need to do.

September 30, 2012, Entire Region: “The Mafia’s Shadow in the Americas: Modern Slavery and Refugees”
InsightCrime.org, Animal Político (Mexico), Plaza Pública (Guatemala), El Faro (El Salvador), Verdad Abierta (Colombia)
A remarkable series about how organized crime groups are, for all intents and purposes, enslaving people throughout the region, whether through forced child recruits, sex trafficking, forced labor and other means.

October 9, 2012, Mexico: “Deadly crossing: Death toll rises among those desperate for the American Dream”
Hannah Rappleye, Lisa Riordan Seville
NBC News
A report about the alarmingly sharp rise in deaths of migrants passing through rural south Texas.

October 11, 2012, Mexico: “El nuevo mapa del narcotrafico en Mexico”
BBC Mundo
Animal Político
An overview of “who is who” in Mexico’s principal organized crime groups.

October 12, 2012, Honduras: “U.S. Rethinks a Drug War After Deaths in Honduras”
Damien Cave and Ginger Thompson
The New York Times
A “series of fatal enforcement actions … quickly turned the antidrug cooperation, often promoted as a model of international teamwork, into a case study of what can go wrong.”

October 22, 2012, Chile: “El dominio del narco en las poblaciones más vulnerables de Santiago”
Tabatha Guerra y Juan Pablo Figueroa
CIPER Chile
A surprising 83 urban neighborhoods in Chile are beset by gang violence. “Without basic services or police presence, they are at the mercy of small gangs of traffickers.”

October 25, 2012, Colombia: “Colombia: Letter to President Santos Criticizing the Expansion of Military Jurisdiction”
Jose Miguel Vivanco
Human Rights Watch
Lays out the arguments against the Colombian government’s controversial weakening of its civilian court system’s ability to investigate and punish military human rights abuses. “Colombia’s military justice system is an example of impunity—not accountability—for atrocities.”

November 1, 2012, Mexico, Central America: “Transnational Crime in Mexico and Central America: its Evolution and Role in International Migration”
Steven Dudley
Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and Migration Policy Institute
“The rise of organized crime in Mexico and the Northern Triangle has dramatically increased the risks that migrants face as they attempt to cross the region.”

November 2, 2012, Brazil: “Rio: the fight for the favelas”
Misha Glenny
The Financial Times (UK)
A balanced look at the present state of Rio de Janeiro’s ambitious “favela pacification program.”

November 14, 2012, Mexico: “Mexico: Risking Life for Truth”
Alma Guillermoprieto
The New York Review Of Books
Mexican journalists facing threats – and worse – from organized crime, and getting no help from ineffective government institutions.

December 3, 2012, Colombia: “Delincuencia en Colombia: bandas desbandadas”
Semana (Colombia)
A region-by-region overview of the new landscape of organized crime and narcotrafficking in Colombia, following the demobilization of paramilitaries and the takedowns of many successor groups’ leaders. A hint of what awaits Colombia even if talks with the FARC succeed.

December 3, 2012, Mexico: “La estrategia fallida”
Eduardo Guerrero Gutierrez
Nexos (Mexico)
The security specialist digs through Mexico’s crime statistics and finds four strategic errors committed by the Calderón government (2006-2012).

December 7, 2012, Mexico: “The New Border: Illegal Immigration’s Shifting Frontier”
Sebastian Rotella
ProPublica
“Although Mexicans remain the largest group, U.S.-bound migrants today are increasingly likely to be young Central Americans fleeing violence as well as poverty, or migrants from remote locales such as India and Africa.”

December 11, 2012, Guatemala: “Los huesos que buscan su nombre”
Sebastian Escalon
Plaza Pública (Guatemala)
Forensic anthropologists continue to uncover the horrors of Guatemala’s 1960-1996 civil war, in order to provide evidence for the first prosecutions of military personnel.

December 14, 2012, Nicaragua: “Security in Nicaragua: Central America’s Exception?”
Roberto Cajina
Inter-American Dialogue
A look at why Nicaragua has largely avoided the violent crime wave that has swept over northern Central America. The country’s police force is a big reason, but politicization and Caribbean narco activity pose big threats.

December 16, 2012, Mexico: “The Zetas and Monterrey”
Steven Dudley
InsightCrime.org
A 3-part series about the bloody battle for Mexico’s third-largest, and wealthiest, city. “How and why the Zetas settled in Monterrey goes a long way toward explaining who they are and how they operate.”

“Long reads” from Just the Facts project participant organizations

Center for International Policy:

• January 2012, Mexico: “Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy”
  Dev Kar
• January 16, 2012, Mexico: “The Numbers Game: Government Agencies Falsely Report Meaningless Deportations and Drug Seizures as Victories”
  Tom Barry
  AlterNet
• February 1, 2012, Colombia: “Waiting for Consolidation: Monitoring Colombiaʼs U.S.-aided Counterinsurgency and Development Program”
  Abigail Poe, Adam Isacson, Yamile Salinas, Nancy Sánchez
• March 12, 2012, Mexico: Who Is Securing the Texas Border? How Private Contractors Mislead the Public, Then Get Rich Off Taxpayer Money
  Tom Barry
  AlterNet
• July 9, 2012, Cuba: “Disaster Medicine: U.S. Doctors Examine Cuba’s Approach”
  Elizabeth Newhouse
• October 17, 2012, Cuba: “Election 2012: What Cuban Americans Stand to Lose”
  Elizabeth Newhouse
• December 3, 2012, Mexico: “The Border Patrol’s Strategic Muddle”
  Tom Barry

Latin America Working Group Education Fund:

• July 9, 2012, Colombia: “International Verification Mission on the Situation of Human Rights Protection in Colombia”
  US Office on Colombia (USOC) and the Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWGEF)
• September 2012, Colombia: “Still a Dream: Land Restitution on Colombia’s Caribbean Coast”

Washington Office on Latin America:

• January 30, 2012, Colombia: “‘Consolidation,’ land restitution, and rising tensions in Montes de María”
  Adam Isacson
• April 2012, Entire Region: “Los de atrás vienen conmigo: El problema de las drogas en América Latina,
  Derecho al desarrollo y regulación de mercados”
  Amb. Milton Romani Gerner, Uruguay
• April 19, 2012, Mexico: “Beyond the Border Buildup: Security and Migrants Along the U.S.-Mexico Border”
  Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer
• April 27, 2012, Colombia: “Hostages in Our Own Territories: Afro-Colombian Rights under Siege in Chocó”
  Gimena Sánchez Garzoli and Anthony Dest

Here are the countries of origin of U.S. military and police trainees from Latin America and the Caribbean since 1999, according to the past 13 years’ State-Defense Department Foreign Military Training Reports.

The table for this data is here.

As is evident, Colombia continues to contribute the most trainees. Training appears to have declined somewhat lately; this may be due to reduced U.S. resources, but it may just be the result of incomplete reporting of the training that occurs. The recently released 2011 Foreign Military Training Report, for instance, comprises three volumes, two of which are classified.

This post is cross-posted with the Latin America Working Group Education Fund's LAWGBlog. It was written by LAWG-EF Executive Director Lisa Haugaard

On December 11th, the day after International Human Rights Day, the Colombian Congress approved a justice “reform” bill that will likely result in many gross human rights violations by members of the military being tried in military courts—and remaining in impunity. The bill, along with a separate ruling by the Council of State, unravels the reforms put in place after the “false positives” scandal in which over 3,000 civilians were killed by soldiers.

In 2007, I participated with a dozen lawyers, human rights activists, a forensic scientist and a judge in an International Verification Mission on Extrajudicial Executions and Impunity in Colombia. We heard from witnesses, family members and lawyers about 130 cases of extrajudicial executions committed in seven different regions of the country. These were not about civilians killed in crossfire or with excessive use of force. The stories we heard were chillingly similar: young men who were seen being taken from their homes, farms and streets by groups of soldiers. When their families came looking for them on a military base, these mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers were shown a dead body, now dressed up as a guerrilla. There was their loved one, dead, and called a guerrilla killed in combat.

Now we know that the scandal was far, far worse than we knew then. In 2008 when the Soacha scandal broke, we learned that members of the army were paying criminal “recruiters” to pick up young men whom they thought would not be missed, and delivering them to soldiers to kill in staged battles. When the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, Philip Alston, came to investigate in June 2009, he not only documented the enormous scope of the problem, but also noted that soldiers were carrying out these killings for to win incentives such as bonuses or days off. Murder to up their body counts.

The Attorney General’s office is investigating more than 3,000 civilians murdered by soldiers, most between 2004 and 2008. The coalition of human rights groups in Colombia known as the Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos (CCEEUU) has documented 3,512 extrajudicial executions between 2002 and 2010 committed in 31 out of 32 provinces. Of the 80 percent of these cases for which a presumed perpetrator could be identified, 89.2 percent involved members of the armed forces, 8.6 percent the police, and the remainder were from the air force, navy and the prison system. At least 21 territorial brigades and 19 mobile brigades were identified as perpetrators. More than 44 percent of extrajudicial executions were in the zones where the First and Seventh divisions of the army operated.

Under international pressure, the Colombian government put in place some reforms that helped bring the numbers of new extrajudicial executions down dramatically. It established an accord that allowed the Attorney General’s office to investigate the scene of the crime where extrajudicial executions were alleged and make the determination of whether cases should go to civilian or military courts. It began to enforce the Constitutional provision that stated that grave human rights abuses committed by soldiers should be tried in civilian, not military courts, and hundreds of cases were transferred to civilian jurisdiction. But while Colombia did make progress in investigating and prosecuting extrajudicial executions, prosecutions were slow, and higher-level officials under whose command multiple extrajudicial executions took place escaped justice. Indeed, some were promoted.These still limited advances are at risk with the new law. What are the problems with the law?

Which human rights crimes are excluded from military jurisdiction.
The initial version excluded very few crimes from military jurisdiction. After much pressure from Colombian and International human rights groups, the UN, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the U.S. government, the draft law excludes from military justice what sounds like an appropriate list of grave abuses: genocide, crimes against humanity, forced displacement, sexual violence, forced disappearance, torture and extrajudicial execution. That does sound like an improvement. According to the government, the changes will not "generate impunity."

But, as always, the devil is in the details: For example, in Colombian jurisprudence, there’s no official crime listed as “extrajudicial executions.” Most of the “false positive” cases have been tried as “homicides of protected persons,” a crime that is considered a violation of international humanitarian law rather than a human rights violation. Under the new law, violations of international humanitarian law routinely go to military courts. So, not only may new extrajudicial executions be tried in military courts, but many of the false positive cases could be transferred out of the civilian court system into the black hole of military justice. “Sexual violence” is also not a crime, using that phrasing, in the Colombian legal system. Moreover, other gross violations committed by members of the military will now go automatically to military courts, including cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and arbitrary detention.

Who is the first on the scene to investigate potential extrajudicial executions.
It is our understanding that the law gives the military justice system control over the initial investigations. If initial investigations are not handled well, the trail goes cold. Beyond what was established in this law, Council of State just declared void the important agreement between the Attorney General’s office and the Defense Ministry that ensured that the Attorney General would investigate alleged crime scenes for extrajudicial executions and make the initial determination of whether the case would go to military or civilian courts. With these changes, it is much more likely that extrajudicial executions and other crimes committed before execution, including torture, will go uninvestigated.

Who decides where cases go.
The new law sets up a new council (“Tribunal de Garant?as”) that will determine which cases go to military courts, and which to civilian courts, when there is a dispute. Half of the council members must be ex-military. Even if you had the perfect list of human rights crimes that should be excluded from military courts, if the decisions are made by a biased council, wrong decisions will be made.

Where soldiers and officers serve their time.
The new law makes official what has been happening in practice: soldiers and officers accused of the most heinous crimes will serve their pre-trial detention not in prison but in “centros de reclusión,” and those convicted can serve their time either in prison or special military detention centers. Semana magazine uncovered the luxurious conditions at the Tolemaida center, where convicted officials were able to leave for vacations, run businesses and even teach courses for current military members.

A special fund to defend soldiers.
Soldiers accused of grave human rights violations will have a taxpayer-funded defense.

Why the change?
Members of the military have been clamoring for “judicial security,” claiming that they are being unfairly prosecuted and that they need protection in order to carry out their combat duties. The Santos Administration, under pressure from the military, has shepherded this bill through the Congress. In the final debate, 54 senators voted in favor, 5 against. Senator Juan Manuel Galán, the bill’s sponsor, sounded a nationalistic and defiant note: “This bill isn’t a bill for impunity, but here we are not legislating because some international human rights organizations have come to Colombia during the final debate to tell us Colombians, us legislators what we have to legislate.”

Now that the Colombian Congress has taken this huge step backward, what recourse is available? First, the Colombian government has indicated that it could take steps to ensure that “extrajudicial executions” and “sexual violence” be defined in Colombian law, making it thus more likely that those crimes would go to civilian courts. The international community should hold the Colombian government accountable for this. And all eyes should be on the review of alleged extrajudicial execution cases in civilian courts—as we fear that many such killings will get transferred back to military courts.

But major damage to Colombia’s commitment to human rights has been done. The U.S. State Department should withhold military aid, as the new law violates conditions that require that gross human rights violations allegedly committed by the military be tried in civilian courts. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which just removed Colombia from its watch list, could reconsider. And the International Criminal Court, which has been watching Colombia, is another potential point of pressure.

I keep thinking about the mother of a young man who was offered a job as a bricklayer, but who was taken by soldiers and killed. Just in her area of the Caribbean coast, several dozen young men were similarly offered bricklaying jobs, disappeared and killed, presumed victims of soldiers seeking to increase their body counts. These mothers want the bodies of their sons returned to them, with dignity. And they want justice for their sons. The passage of this justice “reform” bill has just made that just demand harder to achieve.

The following is a translation of an interview with the director of Colombia's national police force, General José Roberto León Riaño, in Colombian newspaper El Tiempo. He discusses U.S. security assistance to Colombia, U.S. sentencing of extradited drug traffickers, and responds to the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington.

"In the U.S. they legalize and here people are still dying": Police

Amid the debate over the legalization of marijuana in two U.S. states, General José Roberto León Riaño, director of Colombia's national police, said that although this is a matter for U.S. authorities, it is striking that there they are exploring these options while many in Colombia continue to die in the fight against drug trafficking.

In a conversation with El Tiempo, General León Riaño also spoke about the peace process and warned, as it has happened with other negotiations, that the country should be prepared for the FARC to eventually dissent and step away from the table and decide to continue the violence.

Q:
The world is witnessing the debate over the effectiveness of the fight against drug trafficking. Would we have done better if Colombia had been more tolerant?

A:
Colombia is regarded internationally as a success story in the fight against drug trafficking, given that more than 15 years ago the country was considered almost a failed state, almost a narco-democracy. Colombia has dismantled large cartels, extradited the big bosses, reduced illicit crops, and decreased cocaine production. In that vein, it would not be advisable for us to slow down. But, as the president said, you have to look at other alternatives to make the fight more effective.

Q:
What alternatives?

A:
We will continue with [crop] spraying, manual eradication, seizing drugs, and destroying labs, because the problem still continues. It has declined, but is still present. Also, what has to be looked at, since the dismantling of the cartels, is that there has been a transition to a criminal economy of micro-trafficking. Today, this is what is causing violence in many cities.

Q:
Have you raised the issue to the United States that while two states in its country have legalized marijuana, in Colombia, like the president says, we continue to convict farmers who grow it?

A:
The topic was addressed during U.S. Security Advisor Denis McDonough's visit a week ago, when an explanation of some sort was requested for why these two particular states had legalized while here people continue to die in the fight against drug trafficking. This ought to be an issue that they review.

Q:
Does extradition work or is this perception that drug traffickers are not afraid of extradition true?

A:
On several occasions the we have inquired and have asked the United States for harsher convictions for drug traffickers, because we have noticed very short sentences. But extradition, independent of the convictions, has served [Colombia] because it breaks communication between the leader and the organization. And secondly, because it sends a message to the new generation of drug traffickers.

Q:
But aren't these the same bosses that prefer express extradition? Should we refine that process?

A:
This is already part of a discussion between the Colombian government and the U.S. government. We hope that more attention is paid to what the Colombian government has been asking for, to be more forceful in sentencing drug traffickers.

Q:
The U.S. has continued to reduce the aid in Plan Colombia on the basis that the country is now able to continue alone in the fight against drug trafficking. Can the country take on this fight autonomously?

A:
In the case of the police, in various meetings with U.S. authorities, we have indicated that, although we have come a long way in the fight against drug trafficking, the most difficult part is yet to come and it will require more support. Therefore, we have said that the resources coming from United States must address this need, so that we are able to get past this last stretch with good marks and so that we can avoid any setbacks.

Q:
What have you asked for?

A:
That they at least not decrease resources or that they stabilize them, because that allows us to continue a strong fight against drug trafficking.

Q:
In what ways should they continue to support us?

A:
On issues like spraying, for example. We have also talked about extending the deadline for nationalizing the plan, with the goal of generating the resources that would allow us to be more effective and continue calmly in this last stretch.

Q:
When do you think the country will be ready for nationalization?

A:
We have to proceed and be mindful. The results will tell us when the most prudent time would be.

Q:
Another topic that the country is focused on is peace. In what sort of timeframe can you imagine a Colombia without conflict?

A:
The first thing to say is that the national police supports the president's initiative to offer a response to Colombians that want a peaceful country. Secondly, we continue to carry out all types of operations with the goal of neutralizing or capturing FARC leaders who continue to sow violence and terror. We hope that peace comes soon, because new generations have the right to live in a country at peace, to have more progress than we have today.

Q:
Do you see all FARC members reintegrated into society?

A:
This should be one result of the negotiation table. But I would say that we must also be prepared for a possible dissent. This is what experiences in other countries have shown us; even if they are minimal, all processes have had dissidence.

Q:
What would this dissidence be about?

A: Analysis indicates that this dissidence could be a new'BARCIM,'or, possibly, it could link to already existing gangs. But it would be completely dedicated to drug trafficking. (For more information on BACRIM, see here)

Given the cases of the possible use of excessive police force, like what happened with a young man in La Buitrera and a journalist in Sincelejo, what is the director's response? (See Colombian news agency RCN for more information about the young man killed by police in Cali and newspaper El Heraldo about the journalist killed by officers in Sucre.)

A:
The police rejects these acts. They are not institutional policy. Each one of these cases will be dealt with disciplinarily and in cases where there is a place for it, decisions will be made without any hesitation.

Q:
What is being done?

A:
Police have been working in a preventative manner. We have a national directive that outlines the protocol for acting while responding to journalists.

The interview came out on December 8, as former Colombian President César Gaviria championed for Colombia to make an independent move towards regulating soft drugs, without waiting for the United States.

"How are we going to demand that the United States changes their anti-drug policies if here we do not change ours? If we want the United States to change their (anti-drug) policy, we have to begin to change our policy. We should change our policy on soft drugs like marijuana. Guidelines for regulated marijuana should be passed and going forward the problem of cocaine should be confronted. Regulated systems function better."

In June, Colombia decriminalized cocaine and marijuana, ruling that anyone caught with less 20 grams (0.705 ounces) of marijuana or one gram (0.035 ounces) of cocaine for personal use will not be prosecuted or detained. On the topic of legalization, Santos has said several times that Colombia would welcome the policy change, should other countries join the initiative.

For more information on U.S. assistance to Colombia, visit the Just the Facts Colombia homepage.

For more information about Colombia's U.S.-aided counterinsurgency and development program, check out the report "Waiting for Consolidation," put out by the Center for International Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America, Indepaz and Minga.