This post was written by Senior Fellow George Withers and Fellow Lucila Santos at the Washington Office on Latin America.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm of the U.S. Congress, has just issued a report evaluating the reorganization efforts of the U.S. Southern Command and the U.S. Africa Command, laying out the challenges, successes and lessons learned so far.
On Wednesday, Rep John F. Tierney (D-Massachusetts), Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, convened a hearing to receive testimony about the commands’ reorganization efforts from the GAO, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
In his opening remarks, Chairman Tierney pointed to some important broad policy questions. “As threats have changed, the concept of ‘national security’ has broadened. As a result, the Department of Defense has taken on an expanding role in areas that have traditionally been allocated to the State Department and USAID, as well as others,” he said. “We must ensure that the right agency takes the lead on each effort – that diplomacy is led by diplomats, that development projects are designed and implemented by development experts, and that military operations are planned and coordinated by the military.”
Testifying on behalf of the GAO was John H. Pendleton, Director of the Defense Capabilities and Management Section. Mr. Pendleton, in his written testimony, said that while the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has reorganized its structure to better accommodate interagency coordination, “the 2010 Haiti earthquake response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation.”
During the hearing, Representative Judy Chu (D-California) asked how that weakness may have affected the earthquake’s victims. Mr. Pendleton answered that SOUTHCOM had to quickly revert to its previous joint staff structure in order to handle the core responsibilities of logistics and planning, which had been overlooked in the reorganization process. The GAO report recommends that SOUTHCOM again revise its Organization and Functions Manual “to align structure and manpower to meet approved missions.”
In his testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James A. Schear said that interagency collaboration is very important in facing new transnational threats, that such cooperation needs to be tailored to the region, and that the missions need to be defined in terms of what is needed.
Thomas Countryman, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, stated that his office had never seen such a good level of cooperation between the State and Defense Department. Countryman’s bureau has been largely supportive of the restructuring of SOUTHCOM.
The USAID representative, Susan Reichle, the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator to the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, said that her agency is committed to an integrated approach to crises and disasters. US national security has to be protected and promoted through the “3 Ds”: development, defense and diplomacy. USAID seeks to enhance civilian influence over the commands and has established an office on military affairs.
Chairman Tierney expressed his frustration with the question of agency leadership several times during the hearing. “Everyone seems to agree that the interagency approach is good. But I am troubled that DoD leads as opposed to State,” he said. “Why are we leading with our fists?” He asked several related questions during the hearing, as among them:
· Why is DoD leading in non-contingency operations?
· Why is the United States not building the right capacities we need to perform assistance roles?
· How are we going to build these capacities?
The witnesses tried to address these concerns. The GAO representative said that DoD is not the leading agency, but that it is perceived that way. The DoD official, James Schear, explained that the delivery platform, SOUTHCOM, is a DoD organism and thus it seems that DoD is leading. However, he argued, DoD is only in a supportive capacity, prepared to deal with a contingency situation if it were to arise. Susan Reichle, from USAID, said it was a question of perceptions, because it is perceived that DoD was leading although that was not the case, like in Haiti, where USAID, not SOUTHCOM, was in the lead.
Mr. Countryman had earlier explained that the relationship between the U.S. embassies’ country teams, the regional plan and the Department of Defense, bringing its considerable financial and personnel resources to bear, is a mixed blessing, as it gives the appearance that the operational aspects are DoD-led. Chairman Tierney respectfully disagreed, describing the explanation as “a lot of bureaucratic talk.” “It is what it is,” said the Chairman.
At the close of the hearing, Chairman Tierney again stated his view of what the core problem is: “The current structure sends the message that all the U.S. cares about is counterterrorism because the military is out front and center, and that we don’t care nearly as much about the well-being of the various countries themselves.”
Adam talks about Colombia's charges that Venezuela is helping the FARC guerrillas, the validity of Colombia's appeals to the OAS and UNASUR, and the reasons why Colombia may have brought its complaint now. This podcast was recorded the evening of July 29, while UNASUR foreign ministers were meeting – and ultimately failing - to resolve the crisis.
Subscribe to the "Just the Facts" podcast here and on iTunes. Thank you for listening.
Chile and Peru have agreed to standardize their defense expenditures. This agreement was reached in a meeting that took place in Lima, Peru, where the Chilean Defense Minister accepted an ad hoc model of standardized and transparent measurement of defense expenditures presented by Peru. Peru based its proposed model on the defense agreement that Chile and Argentina have, which includes the standardized measurement of their military expenses in addition to the exchange of information and the eradication of any hypothesis of conflict from either country's defense doctrine.
This process was first initiated in May, 2010, at the first bilateral meeting in two years between Chile and Peru in Santiago de Chile. At this meeting, both countries' defense ministers met and agreed to develop a way to standardize their defense expenditures and to carry out joint exercises for humanitarian tasks. Jaime Ravinet, Chilean Defense Minister, said that the idea is to commit countries to a mechanism of transparency that enables the calculation of defense expenditures in a diligent way.
Rafael Rey, Peru's defense minister, said that President Alán Garcia has a special interest in moving forward with this initiative since it would contribute to shifting economic resources towards helping the most disadvantaged people in the region, instead of spending money in acquiring arms, “which does not help, but kills.” Moreover, Rey also manifested that addressing defense expenditures with Chile is not due to Chile’s own military expenditures but rather to a special concern over defense and military build-ups in the region.
The only condition that Chile presented at the meeting was that this initiative be developed under the South American Defense Council (SADC)’s multilateral framework. In fact, the SADC’s Santiago de Chile Declaration (March 2009), among others, introduced an initiative to overcome differences in military expenditure. The 2009-2010 Action Plan established by the Declaration seeks greater sharing of information about defense expenditures and economic indicators of defense. Following up on this, the SADC, in May 2010, approved the Declaration of Guayaquil, which set up a working group, led by Argentina, Chile and Peru, “to develop a methodology to address technical and design elements of the system for measuring defense expenses in our countries … in order to promote the issue of transparency in defense expenses.” Not surprisingly, the three countries were chosen because of their experience and work on this issue.
Bilaterally, a mechanism to standardize defense expenditures between Chile and Peru would be a great step forward in generating trust and cooperation between the two countries. This is especially important considering the unresolved territorial disagreement that both countries still maintain. Peru and Chile maintain a maritime border dispute over sovereignty in the waters near the Peruvian-Chilean frontier. The lack of agreement over these waters’ jurisdiction has led the Peruvian government to submit the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, where it is under consideration.
Regionally, establishing a methodology to measure and standardize military expenditures would be a great success for the SADC and a great incentive to continue working regionally to build confidence and cooperation among countries in the region. The upcoming IX Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, to take place in November in Bolivia, will be a great opportunity to see if the South American countries can act as a bloc and together as a defense multilateral forum.
A big white teddy bear sat on top of one of the little coffin boxes, and red roses on the other three. The remains of the four sisters were finally being returned to their mother, Blanca Nieves Meneses.
“I never thought that this is the way they would be returned to me,” said their surviving sister Nancy. “I always kept hoping that they would be returned alive.”
At this ceremony in the offices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bogotá, Colombia, the Attorney General’s office returned the remains of the four young women, the youngest just thirteen, to their family. A paramilitary leader had confessed, as part of the Justice and Peace process, about where the bodies were buried in common graves. At most, those who carried out the crime can receive five to eight years in jail under this transitional justice framework.
The CTI, Colombia’s forensic team, looked on. They seemed both proud to have helped return the remains and personally shaken by the emotion in the room.
“Their crime was to be young and beautiful in a war zone,” said one of the speakers. They were brutally killed by paramilitaries who operated, according to the human rights group MINGA, “with total impunity” in the region.
Colombia’s Vice President Francisco Santos attended. He spoke of a family who had lost one son to the ELN, one to the FARC, and one to paramilitaries, and called for reconciliation. “Today, one family can begin achieving closure and today, the government is strengthening its presence so that blood will stop flowing in Colombia.” But he did not simply state that in this particular case, these unspeakable crimes had been committed by the paramilitaries.
After the young women were disappeared, their mother and sister waged a years-long struggle, at great risk, to achieve justice for Yenny Patricia, Mónica Liliana, Nelsy Milena and María Nely Galárraga Meneses. Their struggle became a catalyst for many other mothers in the region. “I am just a campesina from Putumayo who sows rice and corn,” Ms. Meneses explained. “But I tell all other mothers of the disappeared to keep searching. Justice should not be delayed,” she said, with bitterness. “Justice should arrive on time.” She spoke of the frustrations of trying to receive reparations or other help from the government.
A human rights activist I know saw me sitting in the back and grabbed my shoulder. “I just have to say, I just have to say, this happened in the context of Plan Colombia.” And indeed, this brutal killing and many others occurred as the United States heavily backed a Colombian army offensive into Putumayo in the early years of Plan Colombia, an offensive which expanded side by side with an increased paramilitary presence in the region.
She played the lyre, she liked to play mini-soccer, she liked best to eat fried eggs and french fries, she was an artist, were some of the memories as their relatives remembered them. The sisters Galárraga Meneses, Nelsy Milena, Mónica Liliana, Yenny Patricia, and María Nely.
This is cross-posted from the Latin America Working Group's blog, the LAWG Blog. It was written by Lisa Haugaard.
On July 15, Colombia’s Defense Ministry abruptly held a press conference to denounce that high-ranking leaders of the FARC guerrilla group are present in neighboring Venezuela. This announcement, coming just over three weeks before the end of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe’s term in office, immediately reversed what had been a slow warming of relations between both countries’ governments.
Colombian President-elect Juan Manuel Santos had invited Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to attend his inauguration, and Chávez had authorized a meeting between Venezuela’s foreign minister and Santos’ minister-designate. Neither Chávez’s attendance nor the ministerial meeting are now likely.
Yesterday (July 22), Colombia took its case to the OAS, showing satellite photos and videos indicating a presence of FARC and ELN camps within Venezuelan territory. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez responded by giving Colombian diplomats 72 hours to leave Venezuela.
If we have to go to war with Colombia, we’d do it in tears, but we’d do it. I hold responsible President Uribe, who is sick with hatred, because he is headed to the dustbin of history, he’s going directly there, as a token of Yankee imperialism. He ended up isolated in this continent, he didn’t defeat the guerrillas or narcotrafficking, and Venezuela is a victim of all that. I hold him responsible for any aggression against Venezuela.
Added Venezuela’s defense minister, Gen. Carlos Mata Figueroa:
We hold responsible the Colombian oligarchy and its current government … if these brother nations should stain their history with blood.
Tensions between the two countries are dangerously high, though they may subside once Uribe leaves office on August 7, say analysts like Colombian newspaper columnist Laura Gil.
This is above all a breaking of relations with Álvaro Uribe. The political relationship between the two countries is now very deteriorated. The problem for Colombia may come if Chávez concludes that what Uribe did was agreed upon with Santos.
I think the best contribution we can make is to say nothing. President Uribe is the President of the Republic until August 7. Thank you very much.
Vice-President-Elect Angelino Garzón also took a softer tone, saying that the next government will seek
all diplomatic mechanisms to improve and strengthen relations with all countries in the region, including Venezuela. In the end, the message that we have to give, as governments and as peoples, is the message of unity, of friendship, of cooperation and of peace.
In its lead editorial today El Tiempo, Colombia’s most-circulated daily, warned of the risk of armed confrontation.
All along this lively border, good relations are not an alternative but an obligation. If it is otherwise, those who would pay the consequences are the hundreds of thousands of people who live on both sides of the dividing line. This is without even mentioning the risks of an armed confrontation, since under the current circumstances, a simple spark could ignite a conflagration. This, then, is the occasion to ask the Colombian armed forces to exercise maximum prudence and to avoid falling into traps and provocations.
The U.S. government, through State Department spokesman Philip Crowley, has correctly called on both sides to work together to reduce tensions.
It would be good for the region if those tensions were eased, and it’s a matter of dialogue between Colombia, Venezuela, arrive at a common understanding of how to work cooperatively on the challenges that we face, among them, security challenges. But we certainly support greater interaction, cooperation, dialogue between Colombia and Venezuela to reduce those tensions and increase mutual cooperation.
In a written communication to Agénce France Presse, however, the State Department also called on Venezuela to respond to Colombia’s allegations of FARC presence.
Colombia’s allegations need to be taken very seriously. Venezuela has an obligation to Colombia and to the international community to fully investigate this information and move to prevent the use of its sovereign territory by terrorist groups.
OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza called for the two countries to renew dialogue on their own.
We succeeded in overcoming serious crises some years ago. I hope they can make it now as well, but the steps should be taken by Venezuela and Colombia, and I expect they can come to terms over the next months.
But Ecuador’s foreign minister, Ricardo Patiño, had very strong criticisms for the Secretary-General who, he said, ignored Ecuador’s calls to delay yesterday’s OAS discussion, which ended with a heated exchange that increased tensions.
I insisted, in the letter sent by the government of Ecuador to OAS Secretary General, I told him that the issue should not be discussed in such a precipitous manner, but let’s change precipitous for irresponsible. This is the result of not paying attention to what is going on in the region. Unfortunately who was called to avoid the severing of diplomatic relations and who was also warned about what could happen was not up to his duty. And that gentleman is OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza.
In the latest development, the secretary-general of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), former Argentine President Néstor Kirchner, announced that he will meet separately with presidents Uribe and Chávez on August 4 and 5.
The Washington Office on Latin America has posted a statement about the crisis.
While the U.S. has long been a close ally of the Colombian government, we believe that it is most in the interest of the United States - indeed, of all parties involved - to reduce tensions and resolve this crisis through even-handed diplomacy and communication. Our policy over the next several weeks must place the greatest priority on a peaceful resolution of this crisis, and must take great care not to fan the flames.
A recent article in the Boston Globe argues that Mexico is a case of creeping military rule, abetted by the United States. Adam explores that concern, as well as recent efforts to limit the Mexican armed forces' power.
Subscribe to the "Just the Facts" podcast here and on iTunes. Thank you for listening.
This morning I was pleased to have an opportunity to testify before the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives' Oversight and Government Reform Committee. The occasion was a 3-panel hearing entitled, "International Counternarcotics Policies: Do They Reduce Domestic Consumption or Advance Other Foreign Policy Goals?"
My testimony (PDF) focused on the frustrating experience of cocaine supply reduction efforts in Colombia and Mexico. From that experience, I draw the lesson that reducing drug supplies depends on a much larger civilian governance and justice effort -- a big commitment that resembles "nation-building" far more than it resembles a "war on drugs."
Testimonies from all panelists, including "Drug Czar" Gil Kerlikowske and the senior counternarcotics officials at the State and Defense departments, are on the committee's website.
The Honduran military today have a great amount of power and a growing role in the public sphere, a direct consequence of the June 28, 2009 coup. This is an alarming development, especially considering Honduras’ history of military coups and targeted atrocities committed by the armed forces, especially during the 1980s. According to Leticia Salomón, an expert in military affairs, Honduras now has "highly politicized security forces, and in the case of the military, the leadership has become a decision-making body, which is simply not right." Honduras today has all-encompassing, multipurpose armed forces that are used for:
Operation and protection of the electoral process: The Honduran Armed Forces are mandated by the Constitution to protect the balloting process during elections. This was done because in 1982, when the Constitution was approved, the country began a process of democratization and the state was weak. Since this is no longer the case, some in the legislature have moved to modify this rule. However, the military effectively made use of its veto power. After a meeting between the heads of the Armed Forces, the Defense Minister and the Supreme Electoral Court, it was ascertained that the reform was in reality meant to give members of the military the right to vote – not to reduce its role as the guarantor of elections.
Law enforcement activities: Honduras's increasing crime and violence rates have pushed the military into law enforcement activities, blurring the line separating military and non-military roles. This law-enforcement role had been carried out before the coup, and is even contemplated in the Constitution. The latter allows for military assistance to public security institutions to fight terrorism, arms trafficking and organized crime. Even before the coup, the military had expressed its desire to fight drug trafficking. Most recently, newly elected Honduran President Porfirio Lobo, with U.S. support, agreed with the heads of the Armed Forces to increase the fight against narcotrafficking in Honduras.
More worrisome are executive and congressional decrees issued in May and June of 2010, respectively, ordering the Army to assist police forces. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IACHR) raised alarm over the instructions established by the Executive decree: the military will provide police forces with military personnel and equipment to help them carry out their functions. The congressional decree goes even further by ordering the Army to assist the police in stopping the violence in the country. This is a clear indication that a militarization of policing is taking place in Honduras, reasserting the role of the military as a superior force relied upon to solve any type of problem.
Social order repression: The recent coup signaled how the Armed Forces are being used as a praetorian force that responds to the interest of a powerful political and economic sector of Honduras. As such, they are being used as a tool of social order, particularly to repress demonstrations and people opposed to the Micheletti regime and to the current Lobo government.
It is no surprise then that since the coup, accusations of human rights violations have emerged, which have been documented by national and international organizations. According to Honduran human rights groups, between 36 and 46 social activists were assassinated since the coup and the inauguration of Porfirio Lobo on January 27, 2010. The military is implicated in at least ten of these assassinations according to the Honduran Human Rights Committee (CODEH). The Micheletti regime militarized Honduran society and, in the IAHCR’s words, criminalized dissent “by creating a climate of insecurity and terror.”
Between June 28, 2009 and October 10, 2009 alone, the Honduran security forces were responsible for 3,033 detentions according to the Honduran Committee of Relatives of the Detained Disappeared (COFADEH). The IAHCR added:
“The materiel and tactics that the Army, the Police and the Cobra Command Strike Force deployed revealed a disproportionate use of force. This, combined with the conditions in which detainees were incarcerated, meant that thousands of persons endured inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment. In this context, the aggressive tactics used took a particularly heavy toll on women, who in many cases were victims of sexual violence. Other minority groups like the Garifuna, members of the gay community and foreign nationals were the target of discriminatory practices.”
More recently, the military have been deployed in rural areas to evict and capture peasants accused of illegally occupying lands. Army and police personnel have been active in the Guadalupe, Carney and Carbonales communities, commonly referred to as the Bajo Aguán, in order to prevent more illegal land takeovers. Despite an agreement between President Lobo and the peasant movement (MUCA), the Honduran government granted the military the ability to provide support and even replace the police in the region. In April, WOLA published a statement raising an alarm on the militarization of Bajo Aguán.
Another example of the participation of the military in social order tasks is the closure of a community radio station by a military contingent of 300 men in the community of Puerto Grande and other towns in the south of Honduras, where they were sent with the order to apprehend five leaders from the Movimiento de Recuperación y Titulación de Tierras de Zacate Grande.
Lack of civilian control and military subordination: The growing, multipurpose role of the military in Honduras demonstrates a lack of civilian control and military subordination to the democratically elected authorities. The Armed Forces have always had a strong presence in politics and Honduran presidents in general have had a hard time imposing their policies on the military. They end up negotiating with the armed forces in order to be able to govern without obstacles. There seems to be an unofficial “rite of passage” in which elected presidents need to pact with the military to be able to rule with their consent. According to Salomón, "the forms that this [takes] have ranged from paying for favors to salary hikes and other mechanisms to keep them happy."
Another aspect signaling the armed forces’ power is the lack of legal proceedings initiated against the military, in spite of numerous accusations of human rights violations. This is part of a larger problem of impunity in Honduras. Only one person has been convicted for human rights abuses so far and 12 have been indicted, even though IACHR and the UNHCHR have reported on dozens of clear cases of violations.
In addition, there are growing indicators of military presence in traditionally civilian sections of the Lobo government. Two high-ranking military leaders at the time of the coup now hold important positions in the administration: Gen. Romeo Vásquez Velásquez manages Hondutel, the government-owned telecommunications company, and Gen. Venancio Cervantes is the head of Honduras’ Directorate of Migration. Both Vásquez and Cervantes are still actively serving generals in the Honduran Armed Forces. This means they are under a hierarchy of command, and are thus not independent to exercise their functions.
All of this points out the lack of civilian control, oversight and leadership over the military, and in contrast, the autonomy and power that the Armed Forces hold. This is aggravated by a lack of strong civilian institutions and civilian authorities with knowledge and expertise on military and defense issues. In a Latin American Security Network (RESDAL) publication from before the coup, Leticia Salomón already stressed that the Defense Secretariat had not exhibited strong civilian leadership over defense and military matters in Honduras. The legislature’s Defense Committee had a general unawareness of the issue and exercised barely any control over any defense issues. This has not changed since, but these mechanisms of civilian control are more urgently needed now.
U.S.-Honduran military relations: Immediately after the coup d’état, the United States suspended military relations with Honduras. Once Pepe Lobo was inaugurated on January 27, the Southern Command reinitiated military to military cooperation with the Central American country by delivering 25 trucks for the army and providing military education to Honduran soldiers.
The U.S. government should be sensitive to the role the Honduran Armed Forces is playing in Honduras since the coup, and do more to encourage stronger civilian control of the military, the demilitarization of Honduran society and a thorough investigation and prosecution of human rights violations that have occurred in the last year. Of all the urgent needs Honduras has right now, military aid is one of the least important. Instead, the United States should provide aid for social and economic needs, as well as assisting Honduras to develop civilian capacity and leadership over the military.
On July 13, 2000 – 10 years ago yesterday – President Bill Clinton signed into law a special $1.3 billion appropriation of mostly military aid to Colombia. Known as “Plan Colombia,” it became the framework for U.S. assistance to the hemisphere’s largest aid recipient for the following decade.
The Washington Office on Latin America commemorates this anniversary with a new online publication, “Don’t Call it a Model,” a copy of which is hosted here at the Just the Facts website.
U.S. and Colombian officials frequently portray Plan Colombia, combined with the Colombian government’s hardline security policies, as a major success. Some even cite Colombia’s experience as a model the United States should replicate in other troubled countries receiving U.S. assistance, like Mexico or Afghanistan. “Don’t Call it a Model” takes issue with that.
While the policy made important security gains, it argues, the downside has been great.
They [security successes] have carried a great cost in lives and resources. Progress on security has been stagnating, and even reversing. Scandals show that the government carrying out these security policies has harmed human rights and democratic institutions. Progress against illegal drug supplies has been disappointing. And wealth is being concentrated in ever fewer hands.
“Don’t Call it a Model” supports these claims with thorough documentation, and finishes by pointing out some of the principles that should guide a new policy. It’s worth a read.
On May 18, 2010, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the Republican minority-party leader of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released a detailed report evaluating U.S. aid to Mexico since the 2007 launch of the Mérida Initiative (download the PDF). This report included a very detailed table of aid that has been delivered, or is pending delivery, through the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program.
We have added the information in these tables to the Just the Facts database (see equipment details for 2009 here and training details for 2009 and 2010 here). Below is a summary of some of the information provided in the report's tables.
Top Ten Most Expensive Equipment to be Delivered to Mexico between 2009 and 2014
$150,000,000 for 3 CASA Aircraft to assist the Mexican Navy in maritime interdiction efforts (due to be delivered in Summer 2012)
$110,000,000 for 3 UH-60 Helicopters to assist the Mexican Navy in coastal operations (due to be delivered in 2014)
$76,500,000 for 3 UH-60 Helicopters for the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) - Federal Police (due to be delivered in 2010)
$66,000,000 for 5 Bell 412 Helicopters for the Mexican Army (delivered in 2009)
$50,000,000 for 1 CASA Aircraft to assist the Mexican Navy in maritime interdiction efforts (due to be delivered in Winter 2011)
$39,000,000 for 2 Bell 412 Helicopters for Mexican Army troop movement in support of counternarcotics operations (due to be delivered in 2010, estimated date of signed contract is August 2010)
$28,000,000 for Constanza Software for the Procuraduría General de Justicia (delivered in 2010)
$20,000,000 for Mobile Gamma Radiation Trucks. 18 are for the Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police and 1 for the Mexican Army (due to be delivered in 2010)
$15,500,000 ISR Aircraft for the Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police (due to be delivered in 2011)
$10,400,000 for 3 installed X-ray Portal Units for the Customs Agency
Total Dollar Amounts of Pending and Delivered Equipment as of May 2010
Total dollar amount of equipment pending delivery in 2010: $230,985,322
Total dollar amount of equipment due to be delivered from 2011-2014: $330,500,000
This table appears in the Committee's report
Total Equipment Pending and Delivered, by Recipient Unit:
$261,200,000 - Mexican Navy
$129,044,396 - Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police
$106,575,711 - Mexican Army
$39,600,000 - National Migration Institute
$36,140,271 - Procuraduría General de Justicia
$26,101,277 - Customs Agency
$16,100,000 - National Security and Investigations Center
$6,238,744 - Secretariat of Communications
U.S. Narcotics Affairs Section Capacity Building Events - Top recipient units, 2009 and 2010 combined
Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police: 4,957 trainees (corrections, investigations, and policy & procedure courses)
State officials: 75 trainees (anti-kidnapping courses)
Shifts in Cultivation, Usage Put Bolivia's Coca Policy at the Crossroads Coletta A. Youngers, World Politics Review
Caribbean Regional -
Deputy Secretary of State William Burns To Deliver Remarks at the Fourth Annual Caribbean-United States Security Cooperation Dialogue
Office Of The Spokesperson, U.S. State Department
Libre, segunda fuerza parlamentaria de Honduras, Confidencial
Deteriorating democracy, The Economist
Venezuela Municipal Elections Cheat Sheet Hugo Perez Hernaiz, Washington Office On Latin America
A project of the Latin America Working Group Education Fund in cooperation with the Center for International Policy and the Washington Office on Latin America
Project Staff: Adam Isacson (Senior Associate WOLA aisacson[at]wola.org) / Abigail Poe (Deputy Director CIP abigail[at]ciponline.org) / Lisa Haugaard (LAWGEF Executive Director lisah[at]lawg.org) / Joy Olson (WOLA Executive Director jolson[at]wola.org)