This month, three new U.S. ambassadors to Latin American countries were confirmed. On August 5th, the U.S. Senate voted to confirm Rose Likins to be Ambassador to Peru and Peter Michael McKinley to be Ambassador to Colombia. On August 19th, President Obama announced four recess appointments to key administrations posts, including Maria del Carmen Aponte, Obama's nominee to be Ambassador to El Salvador. Aponte's confirmation had been on hold for almost one year after Republican Senators Jim DeMint (South Carolina) and Jim Risch (Idaho) blocked her nomination because of a past relationship with a Cuban-American who allegedly had contact with the interests section in Washington, according to the Los Angeles Times. "At a time when our nation faces so many pressing challenges, I urge members of the Senate to stop playing politics with our highly qualified nominees, and fulfill their responsibilities of advice and consent," President Obama said upon announcing the recess appointments. "Until they do, I reserve the right to act within my authority to do what is best for the American people."

Larry Palmer, nominated by President Obama to be Ambassador to Venezuela, however, must wait to be confirmed until after the U.S. Senate returns from recess on September 7th. Even if the Senate confirms his appointment, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez may not allow him in the country. On August 8th, President Chávez said it was "impossible" to endorse Palmer, due to his responses to a questionnaire from the Committee on Foreign Relations in which Palmer claimed that the FARC maintain camps in Venezuela and that he is concerned about "Cuba's influence within the Venezuelan military."

The United States does not plan to withdraw Palmer's nomination. "We believe that Larry Palmer, if confirmed by the Senate, will in fact be an effective ambassador and an effective interlocutor between our government and Venezuela," said U.S. State Department Spokesman P.J. Crowley at the press briefing yesterday. He also noted that Venezuela had not withdrawn their prior agreement to accept his nomination.

Below are brief biographies of the four ambassadors recently confirmed, or awaiting confirmation, to take up posts in Latin America.

Michael McKinley - Colombia

On August 5th, the U.S. Senate confirmed career Foreign Service Officer Michael McKinley to serve as Ambassador to Colombia. McKinley served as Ambassador to Peru from 2007 to 2010.

McKinley joined the Foreign Service in 1982 and has held various international posts throughout his career. According to his biography on the State Department website, Ambassador McKinley

served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to the European Union in Brussels between 2004 and 2007. From 2001-2004, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Between 1994 and 2001, Ambassador McKinley was Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'Affaires at U.S. Embassies in Mozambique, Uganda, and Belgium. Earlier assignments include U.S. Embassy London (1990-94), three tours in Washington (1985-90), and Bolivia (1983-85).

Ambassador McKinley was born in Venezuela and grew up in Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and the United States. He did his undergraduate and graduate studies in the United Kingdom, and has a doctorate from Oxford University.

McKinley is considered to be an expert on Venezuela. His history of colonial Venezuela was published by Cambridge University Press as part of its Latin America series, and has also appeared in a Spanish edition.

Rose Likins - Peru

Rose Likins' appointment to take Michael McKinley's place as U.S. Ambassador to Peru was also confirmed by the Senate on August 5th. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Likins was deputy director of the Foreign Service Institute prior to taking over McKinley's post. According to the White House press release announcing her nomination, Ambassador Likins

was previously Dean of the Foreign Service Institute's School of Professional and Area Studies. She also served as the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. Washington assignments include Honduras Desk Officer, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State, Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Director of the Department's Operations Center, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs. Overseas posts include Consular Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Monterrey, Mexico, Chief of the political section at the U.S. Embassy in Asuncion, Paraguay and Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria. She received a BA in Spanish and International Affairs from Mary Washington College.

As Ambassador to El Salvador under the George W. Bush administration, Likins was said to have interfered in the 2004 presidential elections in El Salvador by stating that the U.S. would "re-analyze" relations with the country if the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), who during El Salvador's 12 year civil war fought against the U.S. backed government, won the presidency.

Maria del Carmen Aponte - El Salvador

Maria del Carmen Aponte was nominated by President Obama to be Ambassador to El Salvador in late 2009. Aponte is an attorney, former board member of the National Council of La Raza and former president of the Hispanic National Bar Association. As noted above, her confirmation was put on hold in late December, by Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) and other Republicans, over her past relationship with a Cuban-American with an alleged link to the Cuban interests section. Last week, President Obama used a congressional recess appointment to bypass the Senate confirmation process and ended the eight-month long hold on Aponte.

Here is the White House's official bio for Maria del Carmen Aponte:

Maria del Carmen Aponte is currently an attorney and independent consultant with Aponte Consulting and serves on the Board of Directors of Oriental Financial Group. From 2001-2004, Ms. Aponte was the Executive Director of the Puerto Rican Federal Affairs Administration (PRFAA). Prior to that, she practiced law for nearly twenty years with Washington D.C. based law firms. Ms. Aponte also served as a member of the Board of Directors of the National Council of La Raza, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the University of the District of Columbia. She is also a member of the Board of Rosemont College. She served as president of the Hispanic National Bar Association; the Hispanic Bar Association of the District of Columbia; and as a member of the District of Columbia Judicial Nominations Commission. In 1979, as a White House Fellow, Ms. Aponte was Special Assistant to United States Housing and Urban Development Secretary Moon Landrieu. Ms. Aponte has a B.A. in Political Science from Rosemont College, an M.A. in Theatre from Villanova University, and a J.D. from Temple University.

Larry Palmer - Venezuela

Larry Palmer, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, is awaiting confirmation from the Senate to be Ambassador to Venezuela. As described above, his recent remarks on Venezuela angered Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who said on television that "he can't come here, he has disqualified himself by breaking all the rules of diplomacy, by prejudging all of us, even our armed forces." The United States government, however, does not plan to choose a new nominee for the post, stating that Palmer "is still the best candidate for the job."

According to the White House, Palmer

is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He is currently serving as President and CEO of the Inter-American Foundation. Prior to that he served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Honduras and as Charge D'Affaires in Quito, Ecuador. He also served as President of the 41st Senior Seminar and as Assistant to the President of the University of Texas at El Paso. Overseas posts include the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Paraguay, Korea, and Sierra Leone. Born in Augusta, Georgia, Palmer received a B.A from Emory University, an M.Ed. from Texas Southern University and a Doctorate (Ed.D) in Higher Education Administration and African Studies from Indiana University, Bloomington. Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Palmer served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Liberia.

Yesterday, six non-governmental organizations sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking her to ensure that, with the beginning of Juan Manuel Santos' presidency in Colombia, U.S. policy focuses strongly on the human rights issues facing the nation. "It is a moment to increase – rather than ease – pressure on the Colombian government to make substantial improvements in the protection and promotion of human rights," write the six Latin America and human rights organizations.

The organizations urge Secretary Clinton not to certify that Colombia's human rights performance is improving, as required by law to free up 30 percent of military aid in the foreign aid budget.

The letter points to five key areas on which U.S. policy should focus and press the Colombian government to achieve. They include:

• Ending and effectively prosecuting extrajudicial executions by the army;
• Ending and effectively prosecuting intelligence service abuses;
• Ensuring a safe climate for those working at risk for the rule of law, including human rights defenders, union leaders, judges, prosecutors, journalists and Afro-COlombian and indigenous community leaders;
• Dismantling paramilitary and new illegal armed networks; and
• Protecting the rights of and returning land to internally displace persons and refugees.

The six NGOs that signed the letter are: the Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group, Washington Office on Latin America, U.S. Office on Colombia, Human Rights First and Lutheran World Relief.

The four-page letter includes a summary of concerns and recommendations in the five areas listed above. You can download the full text here.

This Monday marked the beginning of the annual Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2010 training exercise. Co-sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command and the Panamanian government, the 12-day exercise brings together land, air and sea forces from 18 nations in a joint, combined operation focused on ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal.

This year, the exercise will run from August 16-27 and will carry out live and simulated training scenarios in the vicinity of the Panama Canal, Colombia and various U.S. locations (Norfolk, Virginia and Miami and Mayport, Florida). According to the U.S. Department of Defense, PANAMAX is "one of the largest multinational training exercises in the world," involving more than 30 vessels, a dozen aircraft, and 4,500 personnel.

The first PANAMAX was held in 2003 and included only Chile, Panama and the United States. Over the past seven years, the exercise has expanded to include 20 nations at its peak last year. This year, 18 nations are participating, including Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay. Costa Rica, the Netherlands and France participated in PANAMAX 2009, but did not return this year, and Honduras is participating again after withdrawing last year due to controversy surrounding the military's involvement with the coup d'etat, which ousted President Manuel Zelaya in August 2009.

Here are some more details about this year's Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX exercise:

Purpose
The purpose of PANAMAX 2010 is "to enhance regional cooperation and exercise participating nations' ground, naval, air and special operators' ability to respond to threats to the Panama Canal and plan for a major humanitarian assistance and disaster relief event in the region."

This year's exercise simulates the following scenario: A terrorist organization attacks the Panama Canal. In response to a request from Panama, the United Nations Security Council instructs the United States to lead a multinational force to protect the Canal and ensure shipping traffic and free maritime access.

According to Panamanian coordinator for PANAMAX 2010 Jesus Rodriguez, the increase in drug cartel activity in the region and along the Panamanian coastline is "closely connected to terrorism and the weapons trade. Drugs have become synonymous of terrorism."

Skills practiced:
Southcom's factsheet on PANAMAX 2010 explains that the training involved will address the spectrum of maritime operations, including: visit, board, search and seizure; entry control point training; riverine patrols; and open water diving operations.

The factsheet also points out that PANAMAX provides training to "ensure civil, naval, air, and ground security forces can operate as an effective team, coordinating assets and sharing information to respond quickly to crises and protect the security of the region."

On May 18, 2010, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the Republican minority-party leader of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released a detailed report evaluating U.S. aid to Mexico since the 2007 launch of the Mérida Initiative (download the PDF). This report included a very detailed table of aid that has been delivered, or is pending delivery, through the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program.

We have added the information in these tables to the Just the Facts database (see equipment details for 2009 here and training details for 2009 and 2010 here). Below is a summary of some of the information provided in the report's tables.

Top Ten Most Expensive Equipment to be Delivered to Mexico between 2009 and 2014

• $150,000,000 for 3 CASA Aircraft to assist the Mexican Navy in maritime interdiction efforts (due to be delivered in Summer 2012)
• $110,000,000 for 3 UH-60 Helicopters to assist the Mexican Navy in coastal operations (due to be delivered in 2014)
• $76,500,000 for 3 UH-60 Helicopters for the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) - Federal Police (due to be delivered in 2010)
• $66,000,000 for 5 Bell 412 Helicopters for the Mexican Army (delivered in 2009)
• $50,000,000 for 1 CASA Aircraft to assist the Mexican Navy in maritime interdiction efforts (due to be delivered in Winter 2011)
• $39,000,000 for 2 Bell 412 Helicopters for Mexican Army troop movement in support of counternarcotics operations (due to be delivered in 2010, estimated date of signed contract is August 2010)
• $28,000,000 for Constanza Software for the Procuraduría General de Justicia (delivered in 2010)
• $20,000,000 for Mobile Gamma Radiation Trucks. 18 are for the Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police and 1 for the Mexican Army (due to be delivered in 2010)
• $15,500,000 ISR Aircraft for the Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police (due to be delivered in 2011)
• $10,400,000 for 3 installed X-ray Portal Units for the Customs Agency

Total Dollar Amounts of Pending and Delivered Equipment as of May 2010

• Equipment

• Total dollar amount of equipment pending delivery in 2010: $230,985,322
• Total dollar amount of equipment due to be delivered from 2011-2014: $330,500,000

This table appears in the Committee's report

Total Equipment Pending and Delivered, by Recipient Unit:

• $261,200,000 - Mexican Navy
• $129,044,396 - Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police
• $106,575,711 - Mexican Army
• $39,600,000 - National Migration Institute
• $36,140,271 - Procuraduría General de Justicia
• $26,101,277 - Customs Agency
• $16,100,000 - National Security and Investigations Center
• $6,238,744 - Secretariat of Communications

U.S. Narcotics Affairs Section Capacity Building Events - Top recipient units, 2009 and 2010 combined

• Secretariat of Public Security - Federal Police: 4,957 trainees (corrections, investigations, and policy & procedure courses)
• State officials: 75 trainees (anti-kidnapping courses)
• Customs Agency: 44 trainees (canine courses)

Over the past few years, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been working with the Colombian government on a new security and development strategy. At times called "Integrated Action," the Colombian government refers to it as the National Consolidation Plan--PCN for its acronym in Spanish.

This strategy was designed to be a phased, coordinated process of bringing a functioning government into zones throughout the country that have never known one. As described in the Center for International Policy's recent publication, After Plan Colombia, the plan begins with the military entering a zone, scattering illegal armed groups and creating a security perimeter. Once this perimeter is established, the rest of the government enters, including police, justice, land-titlers, road-builders, health, education and productive projects. Similar to what the United States is attempting in Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, the idea is that the population will support the new government presence and the illegal armed groups that were pushed out will not have the support or influence needed to return.

The United States has been supporting this plan over the past three years in two main zones--the Montes de María zone near the Caribbean coast since 2009, and the La Macarena zone in southern Colombia since 2007. It has tentatively expanded support for the concept in the southwestern port city of Tumaco and the mountains of central Tolima department.

The Center for International Policy's evaluation of this project so far has been mixed. While it recognizes that learning has occurred since "Plan Colombia," the "After Plan Colombia" report notes that armed groups have been resilient, civilian aid has been slow to arrive, and the military is playing a host of non-military roles in the chosen zones.

Now, the United States plans to expand its support into three additional areas, calling the new framework the Colombia Security and Development Initiative (CSDI). These five zones (or corridors) are: 1) Montes de Maria; 2) Nariño/Putumayo (Southern Band); 3) a Central Band (from La Macarena in Meta west through southern Tolima and Valle del Cauca to Buenaventura on the Pacific); 4) a corridor from Bajo Cauca to Catatumbo (Northern Band); and 5) Uraba and Chocó (Pacific Band). The first three corridors mentioned are the current priorities of U.S. aid.

On June 30th, USAID issued its request for proposals (RFP) for a contractor to carry out the next phase of the CSDI. This phase is much larger--both in funds and time frame--than USAID's previous support of the program. This new request will result in a 5-year, $95-115 million contract for the part of CSDI they are calling the "Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative-Central Region" or CELI-Central. This will be one of the largest single USAID contracts in Colombia since "Plan Colombia" began in 2000.

This new program, therefore, focuses on the Central Band that stretches across Colombia from La Macarena in Meta west through southern Tolima and Valle del Cauca to Buenaventura. This new, much larger phase will build on the previously existing program in the La Macarena zone, and coincides with the departure at the end of this fiscal year of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID-OTI), a part of USAID that usually stays in a country for a few years carrying out rapid, short-term projects. The new project, however, is much more ambitious, as it covers a very large and diverse area of Colombia and aims to achieve "consolidation" in five years.

According to USAID, this proposed contract will work alongside the Government of Colombia to carry out its National Consolidation Plan. The work the contractor carries out will depend on the level of security in the different zones. The RFP reads:

In transition zones where the GOC has only recently established minimum security, the contractor will emphasize immediate, short-term activities to meet urgent economic and social needs with the goal of demonstrating presence of the state and to help the target areas recover quickly from the effects of the conflict and eradication. Small, quick-impact projects will help to create confidence in the GOC, provide the opportunity to build relations between communities and local government, and respond to local dynamics and urgent needs. In areas where security is better established, the contractor will support longer-term interventions in coordination with the government, private sector and civil society with a particular emphasis on accompaniment and the provision of technical assistance to permanently consolidate state presence.

The goals of this program are to achieve a sustainable end-state where "peace and security are permanent, civilian state entities are providing the services expected of any legitimate and democratically-elected government, legal livelihoods supplant illegal economic activities, and active citizen participation demands accountable and transparent governance."

This new program will be awarded as a contract, and not a grant. This means the contractor will have less flexibility in how it carries out the work, and may not be easily able to adjust its work in response to a change in conditions on the ground. According to the RFP, USAID and the contractor "function as an integrated, operational team with shared program vision for achieving program success. The Contractor shall be responsible for implementation of the program strategy that is set and adjusted through an iterative, coordinated process between the Contractor, USAID, and the GOC to achieve the goal of strengthening the consolidation of state presence in critical conflict zones within the Central Region."

Twenty-seven members of the U.S. House of Representatives signed and sent to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton a letter (PDF) expressing their concern regarding the human rights violations and violations to the democratic order in Honduras that continue one year after the June 28, 2009 coup ousted President Manuel Zelaya.

The letter asks Secretary Clinton to send Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Posner to Honduras "to make a prompt assessment of what is occurring there with regard to human and political rights" in order to justify continuing U.S. support for Honduras without "significant restrictions."

Below is the full-text of the letter. You can download the PDF here.

Dear Secretary Clinton:

Next Monday, June 28th , marks the first anniversary of the coup in Honduras. We write to express our continuing concern regarding the grievous violations of human rights and the democratic order which commenced with the coup and continue to this day. We recognize the challenges facing President Lobo and welcome efforts to reconcile the country and strengthen the rule of law that are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law.

It is our belief that the State Department should rise to this occasion and assign Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Posner to visit Honduras and make a prompt assessment of what is occurring there with regards to human and political rights. Without an early and accurate report, we would be reluctant to see U.S. support for Honduras continue without significant restrictions.

During your recent visit to Latin America, you asserted that Honduras has made progress since President Lobo took office in January 2010. However, it is our view that political violence continues to wrack Honduras, and insecurity grips much of the population. Reports indicate that many Hondurans fear for their safety, lack confidence in the rule of law, and remain subject to the whims of those in power, including architects and holdovers from last year's coup that are protected by a climate of impunity.

In this year alone, nine journalists in Honduras have been murdered, and several more have been tortured, kidnapped and suffered death threats, including threats against their families. Also, there are cases of reporters who have been forced to leave the country due to these threats, some of them looking for asylum here in the U.S. and Canada. Members of social movements who oppose or criticize the government have been victims of violence and subject to ongoing intimidation. Several judges have been summarily dismissed for raising principled questions about the legality of the coup. Against this backdrop, a number of Army officials suspected of being involved in the coup have been appointed to executive positions in the Lobo government. Most notably, General Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time of the coup, is now the head of Hondutel, the national telecommunications company. The appointment of Velásquez, a primary actor in the coup, is troubling because in his new position he controls the country's telephone, Internet and fax lines at a time when human rights advocates and political opposition leaders fear they are being persecuted for their activism.

President Lobo is eager, in his words, to bury the past. But these violations of human rights and democratic order persist in Honduras on his watch. At the same time, Honduras has failed to live up to its commitments regarding the Truth Commission and establishing a government of national unity, which the U.S. last year deemed as prerequisites for Honduras being treated again with the legitimacy of a democratic government.

We strongly believe U.S. policymakers need an accurate assessment of the current human rights situation in Honduras in order to formulate policies that can support the Lobo administration's efforts to strengthen the rule of law and return the democratic order to the country. We strongly and respectfully recommend that you direct Assistant Secretary Posner to visit Honduras for the purpose of collecting the facts on the current human and political rights situation and reporting back to you and to us as promptly as possible, including but not limited to, the following issues:

1. The murders, assaults, threats and exiling of journalists.
2. The murders, assaults, threats and exiling of members of the Resistance Movement, labor unions and the Afro, Indigenous and LGBT communities.
3. The dismissal by the Supreme Court of judges who opposed the coup.
4. The resources and mandate available to Ana Pineda, special advisor to President Lobo on human rights, to carry out her work.
5. The potential for the Truth Commission to lead to justice and reconciliation.

The Congress needs a clear and candid assessment by the U.S. Department of State concerning conditions on the ground in Honduras as they are - not as we might wish or imagine them to be. Our country cannot claim to uphold the democratic values at stake in Honduras or the region more broadly, and we in Congress cannot countenance additional support for the government of Honduras, without a reliable report about the status of political and human rights as they prevail under President Lobo and a plan for addressing these conditions effectively.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released its annual reports on coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador yesterday.

The main headline surrounding this year's release of the three main reports is Peru's significant increase and Colombia's decrease in coca cultivation in 2009--making Peru a contender for taking Colombia's title as the region's--and world's--top coca cultivator. "If the current trend continues, Peru will soon overtake Colombia as the world's biggest coca producer - a notorious status that it has not had since the mid-1990s," warned UNODC executive director Antonio Maria Costa.

Coca cultivation in Peru increased 6.8% in 2009--from 56,100 hectares in 2008 to 59,900. Cultivation of coca in Colombia, however, decreased in 2009 by 16%--from 81,000 hectares in 2008 to 68,000 hectares in 2009. Despite Colombia's sharp decline, total coca cultivation in the Andean region only decreased 5.2% in 2009.

According to the UNODC data, cultivation of coca in Bolivia barely changed between 2008 to 2009, increasing only by 400 hectares (about 1%--from 30,500 hectares in 2008 to 30,900 in 2009). This contradicts the United States' estimate for Bolivia, which shows a 9.4% increase in cultivation between 2008 and 2009 (and a 2009 cultivation estimate that is 4,100 hectares higher than the UNODC's estimate).

Click to see a larger graph

Click to see a larger graph

The above coca cultivation estimate reflects what the UNODC believes to be left over after all eradication takes place. Below is a chart that shows the total attempted number of hectares of coca under cultivation in the region, which is calculated by adding the cultivation data to the eradication data. This graph shows that even before eradication, Colombian coca growers were planting less of the crop in 2009. Colombia's attempted coca growing decreased 25% from 2008 to 2009, while the actual amount of uneradicated coca decreased by only 16%.

Click to see a larger graph

Below are more country-specific details from the 2009 UNODC reports:

COLOMBIA (PDF)

Colombia registered its second consecutive annual decrease in coca cultivation, dropping from 81,000 to 68,000 hectares. This is the lowest figure UNODC has detected in Colombia since it began measurements in the late 1990s.

Curiously, the drop occurred during a year in which coca eradication - both aerial and manual - fell sharply. U.S.-funded aircraft sprayed 104,771 hectares in Colombia in 2009, a 39 percent drop from the 172,026 hectares sprayed in 2006. Meanwhile manual eradication – teams of eradicators pulling plants out of the ground — dropped 37 percent from 2008 to 2009 (from 96,115 to 60,544 hectares).

Click to see a larger graph

The UNODC data seem to indicate that increased forced eradication does not correlate closely with reduced coca-growing. The same phenomenon was evident in past years, when increased coca cultivation came at the same time as increased eradication.

UNODC's explanation of Colombia's 2009 drop does, though, give some credit to forced eradication. It notes, however, that the reduction also owes to an increase in Colombian government presence in many remote coca-growing areas — part of an effort to "consolidate" control of territories dominated by illegal armed groups. It also notes an increase in investment in alternative development programs. "Dry weather conditions in 2009," UNODC adds, "also played a role."

The Colombia report notes a sharp (17 percent) drop in the estimated annual income of a coca-growing household, from US$10,508 in 2008 to US$8,710 last year. That adds up to a per capita income of only US$2,120 per year - far less than half the national average. Coca is not offering growers the attractive economic option that it once did. The UNODC found no significant variation last year in the farm-gate price of coca or coca paste, nor did it find any change in the price of cocaine in Colombia's internal market.

Colombia's largest coca-growing department continued to be Nariño in the far southwest. Colombia's entire Pacific coastal plain — from Nariño north through Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Chocó — now accounts for 37 percent of all the country's coca and may be the most violent part of the country. Though the Pacific zone decreased, a sharp increase was detected in Guaviare, the south-central department where the U.S.-funded aerial spray program began in the mid-1990s.

After a few years' growth, coca cultivation declined sharply again in the department of Putumayo along the Ecuador border, where massive eradication operations under "Plan Colombia" first began in late 2000. Putumayo's 45 percent one-year decline was surprising because the department not only saw a sharp decrease in eradication from 2008 to 2009, but it was experiencing severe economic hardship. The population was hard hit in late 2008 by the collapse of pyramid schemes that had thousands of investors. Meanwhile, efforts to "consolidate" or build state presence in Putumayo are incipient at best. The report is unable to explain the drop.

Click to see a larger graph

BOLIVIA (PDF in Spanish)

Chewing coca leaf is a centuries-old tradition among Bolivia's large indigenous population, and Bolivian President Evo Morales, a former coca-grower, has tolerated "rational" amounts of coca cultivation. The United States has harshly criticized Morales for refusing to eradicate coca leaf more aggressively, arguing that much of the crop is being turned into cocaine and exported. U.S. officials have cited three years of increased coca-growing in Bolivia as evidence that Morales' "legal cocaine, zero coca" policy isn't working.

In its latest report, UNODC detected increased Bolivian coca-growing for a fourth consecutive year--but this time the growth is insignificant, from 30,500 to 30,900 hectares (about 1 percent). The stagnation in coca-growing, UNODC finds, owes in part to the relative success that the Morales approach is enjoying in the President's home region, the Chapare region of Cochabamba department. Most recent growth instead has occurred in a difficult to access zone near La Paz, the Yungas, which now accounts for 68 percent of all coca in Bolivia.

UNODC also notes that the value of Bolivia's coca market fell by 10 percent in 2009, which may have offered a disincentive to new planting. It is not clear why this drop occurred after several years of increases.

PERU (PDF in Spanish)

The biggest headline from the UNODC findings was the continued increase in Peru's coca cultivation. UNODC found 59,900 hectares in Peru in 2009, 3,800 more than in 2008 and the highest figure detected since UNODC began monitoring in Peru in 2001. (This is far lower, however, than levels of Peruvian coca the United States detected between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, when Peru was the region's main coca producer.)

Even though Peru grew about 8,000 hectares fewer than Colombia last year, UNODC estimates that Peruvian growers harvested more coca leaf from these hectares than did their Colombian counterparts. This is the first time in nearly 15 years that Colombia — which still has the highest coca acreage — is not the Andes' largest coca-leaf producer.

This appears to be a classic, textbook example of the "balloon effect" — a much-used metaphor to describe U.S. drug-supply efforts in Latin America. Like squeezing a half-inflated balloon, pressure applied in one area causes the problem to emerge in another area. With the "balloon" being squeezed in Colombia, the "air" is rushing into Peru, where the remnants of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group encourage production and Colombian and Mexican cartels are battling for control of the trade.

Most of Peru's increase occurred in jungle zones that had little or no coca as recently as five years ago. Two of these zones are near the Colombian and Bolivian borders. However, over 80 percent of Peru's coca continues to be grown in three "traditional" zones: the Alto Huallaga river zone in north-central Peru, the Apurímac and Ene valleys (VRAE) in central Peru, and the La Convención-Lares zone just to the east of the VRAE.

This post was written by Abigail Poe and Adam Isacson

Last week, the Board of Visitors for the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) held its mid-year session in Washington, DC. WHINSEC, located at Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia, is the Defense Department's principal Spanish-language training facility for Latin American military and law-enforcement personnel. WHINSEC took over the School of the Americas, which was legally closed in 2001. Its Board of Visitors, a "federally chartered oversight committee that reports to the Department of Defense and to the U.S. Congress," is charged with reviewing the operations of the institute annually. The Board of Visitors includes "members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, representatives from the State Department, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Northern Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and six members designated by the Secretary of Defense."

The members of the Board of Visitors are:

• Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)
• Ranking member of the SASC, Senator John McCain (R-AZ), or his designee. McCain designated Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-GA)
• Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO), or his designee. Skelton designated Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA)
• Ranking member of the HASC, Rep. Howard McKeon (R-CA) or his designee. McKeon designated Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA)
• Secretary of State Hillary Clinton designated Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher McMullen
• Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Douglas Fraser or his designee
• Commander, U.S. Northern Command, Adm. James Winnefeld, Jr., or his designee
• Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey
• Rev. Dr. Joan Brown Campbell, Director, Dept. of Religion, Chautauqua Institution
• Dr. Johanna Mendelson Forman, Senior Associate, CSIS Americas program
• Amb. Lino Gutierrez, CEO of Gutierrez Global, LLC
• Amb. Donna Hrinak, Sr. Director for Latin American Govt Affairs, PepsiCo
• Dr. Joseph Palacios, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, School of Foreign Service, Latin American Studies program, Georgetown University
• Amb. Charles A. Ford

WOLA fellow Lucila Santos and I attended the meeting on Thursday, which was open to the public. A few topics that were discussed at the meeting include:

• The similarities between transnational criminal organizations in Mexico and insurgencies;
• Concerns about civilian police receiving training at WHINSEC, a military institution;
• The problems that would result from releasing the names of WHINSEC students;
• U.S. cooperation with Cuba and Venezuela in Haiti;
• The role of WHINSEC in teaching the importance of imagination and critical thinking.

Here is an overview of the meeting.

Opening Remarks: Ambassador Charles Ford

Ambassador Ford opened the meeting with two reflections about where WHINSEC and the Latin American region fit into the world. First, he noted that it is hard to talk about the Latin American region because all of the countries that make it up are different. And second, he observed that the new threats in the region relate to "rules:" the rule of law, transparency, institutions, etc. According to Ambassador Ford, the struggle today is that some people prefer the "chaos and the darkness" instead of the rules.

Colonel Felix Santiago, Commandant of WHINSEC

Colonel Felix Santiago was the first to present at the meeting. His presentation emphasized that "change is constant," and therefore WHINSEC "transforms in line with the Department of Defense's strategic vision to build partner capabilities."

During the question and answer period, Colonel Santiago was asked about the challenges of and opportunities for having more interagency operations that would include not only DoD, but the Department of State, USAID and the DEA, among others. Colonel Santiago responded that it would be a "very unique and powerful opportunity" for different agencies to come together at the training level, and it would be something to "pursue aggressively."

Dr. Palacios, a professor at Georgetown University, asked Colonel Santiago about the relationship between civilian police and the military at WHINSEC and concerns that emerge from the human rights community about whether distinctions between military and police are made during trainings. Palacios continued to suggest that it would be helpful if WHINSEC issued a statement on the distinct role the institution plays in training both military and police. Colonel Santiago noted that the education provided at WHINSEC is useful to different institutions, and that civilian police understand that their responsibilities and roles are different than those of the military students.

Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command, Lt. General Ken Keen

Lt. General Keen focused the majority of his presentation on the U.S. military's response to the disaster in Haiti after the January earthquake and stressed the importance of collaboration among all actors--government, military, NGOs, United Nations, etc--in emergency situations.

Lt. General Keen did note that 25 Latin American countries contributed directly or indirectly to Haiti, and the United States worked with "most" of those countries. For instance, he used Venezuela as an example of a country that approached the United States for help unloading supplies from one of their ships. He said they agreed to help and "sent a photographer down to capture the image."

Lt. General Keen also mentioned that Cuba was very helpful in Haiti, especially by giving the United States overflight rights. One member of the Board of Visitors expressed that it is unfortunate that those doors only open during disasters, and asked Lt. General Keen how the United States can maximize this collaboration not just during emergencies. Keen deferred the question to the State Department representative, Kevin Whitaker, who said disasters are both opportunities for changes and for the new policies of a new administration to be exposed. While he noted that relations are not quite "there yet," he said that "the hand is open."

Commander of U.S. Northern Command, Adm. James Winnefeld, Jr.

Admiral Winnefeld began his remarks by explaining Northcom's two highest priorities: a potential terrorist attack and Mexico. According to the head of Northcom, Mexico is on a "downward slope" in terms of security and prosperity, primarily due to the corrosive influence of criminal institutions in the country. Adm. Winnefeld explained that cartels in Mexico do not only traffic drugs, and these transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) can be compared to insurgencies--they intimidate, buy off, and take care of the population in the areas they control. As a result of these similarities, Adm. Winnefeld said that many of the techniques used to counter an insurgency will be used to combat TCOs in Mexico.

Admiral Winnefeld also compared Mexico to Colombia, which he described as a country that has dealt with its existential threat, and now is merely engaged in a "criminal fight that law enforcement can largely handle." He continued to explain that this is a critical point for Mexico’s future: the situation must change from an existential threat to a criminal problem. This goal requires effective interagency effort, according to Admiral Winnefeld, where governments, non-governmental actors, Northcom and Southcom must work as partners. In this scenario, he believes that WHINSEC provides legitimacy to Mexico’s military to carry out their missions.

In response to Dr. Palacios' question about the need to factor in Mexico's "cultural reality" to the way in which we respond to the violence in Mexico, Adm. Winnefeld said: Certain principles apply that have to be mapped onto the country: people do not like or want what is happening to them, but they are stuck with it until something better comes around. The key is to treat the population as a center of gravity and to provide security so they feel comfortable to come down off the fence, but also they need economic opportunities to come down off that fence.

Adm. Winnefeld was then asked whether the new requirement to release the names of WHINSEC students would have a negative effect on attendance. Adm. Winnefeld answered that he understands the need for transparency, but WHINSEC students trust the United States to protect them. If their names are released, according to Adm. Winnefeld, we are putting them at risk, and if the names are released, there "might not be a course at all." He concluded that if we are going to be transparent, we "should be transparent about the curriculum itself and show people what we are teaching and show that we are doing the right thing."

Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey

General Dempsey spoke briefly; highlighting the role WHINSEC plays to avoid a "failure of imagination" in dealing with security problems in the region. Colonel Santiago agreed with Gen. Dempsey, noting that imagination can be defined as "mental agility" and the "ability to confront unexpected things." Those present agreed that the education provided at WHINSEC should aim to promote critical thinking and creativity to be able to respond to unexpected and new challenges or threats.

Kevin Whitaker, Director, Office of Andean Affairs, U.S. Department of State

After the lunch break, Kevin Whitaker, Director of the Office of Andean Affairs at the U.S. State Department, gave his presentation. He began by mentioning Secretary of States’ four baskets of priorities for the Western Hemisphere: citizen safety, strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, climate change and the environment, and economic development.

Whitaker first mentioned the United States’ role in Bolivia, where the United States has a framework agreement with Bolivia to work in assistance, counternarcotics and trade. He continued to note that U.S.-Bolivia relations are watched by the rest of the region to see how the United States deals with difficult countries.

On Venezuela, Whitaker affirmed that the United States has been working to improve relations with the Bolivarian country, but that the Venezuelan government is not interested in having a better relationship with the United States. Instead, they are satisfied with the current level at which the relationship is right now. The United States, however, continues to promote a dialogue with them about counternarcotics, trade, oil and terrorism. Whitaker mentioned that the United States imports 10% of their oil from Venezuela; even though it is not a crucial amount, it is a significant quantity.

Whitaker then turned to Colombia, with whom the United States has a positive, strategic relation. The relationship will be recalibrated, however. He then mentioned the need to look at the human rights agenda, emphasizing the current scandals surrounding the president’s intelligence agency, DAS, and the false positives.

Frank Mora, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs

Frank Mora, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, presented next. According to Mora, WHINSEC is important as it builds partnerships in military and law enforcement agencies. It also promotes regional cooperation by bringing together students from different countries. He emphasized that democratic governance and human rights are the cornerstone of WHINSEC.

Mora was asked about the nexus and appropriateness of using the military in public security missions. He replied that the military should not be used in law enforcement. However, as in the case of Mexico, police forces have not been up to the challenge to combat drug trafficking groups, a situation that also exists in Central American countries, such as Honduras and El Salvador. Therefore, the military are often asked to be involved in these issues. As a result, Mora explained, the United States is sensitive to the need to use the military in law enforcement because they are the last line of defense available.

In relation to Honduras, Deputy Assistant Secretary Mora confirmed that military-to-military relations have restarted between the United States and Honduras. Members of the Honduran military are traveling to the United States to participate in certain courses, and some members of the military are receiving in-country training from the United States.

This post was written by Abigail Poe and Lucila Santos

The Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, U.S. Office on Colombia, and the Washington Office on Latin America released a new report today. Far Worse than Watergate details how the Colombian intelligence agency's Watergate-like scandal went well beyond illegally spying on key players in the country's democracy. The authors of the report write:

A still-unfolding scandal in Colombia is revealing that the government’s intelligence agency not only spied upon major players in Colombia’s democracy—from Supreme Court and Constitutional Court judges to presidential candidates, from journalists and publishers to human rights defenders, from international organizations to U.S. and European human rights groups—but also carried out dirty tricks, and even death threats, to undermine their legitimate, democratic activities. And it may have carried out its illegal surveillance with orders from top presidential advisors. The next Colombian administration must be challenged to fully reform the nation’s intelligence services to put an end to these authoritarian practices.

Read the report in English here or download a printer-friendly PDF version of the report in English or Spanish.

The press release is below:

A new report released in the United States today reveals that the Watergate-like scandal in Colombia is even more shocking than initially reported, with the presidential intelligence agency, DAS, not only spying, but also carrying out dirty tricks and even death threats on major players in Colombia’s democracy.

“The new Colombian president, who will be elected on Sunday, will have a major clean up on his hands and must ensure that Colombia’s intelligence agencies can never again be used to spy on, harass and undermine the legitimate activities of key democratic actors,” said Lisa Haugaard, executive director, Latin America Working Group Education Fund.

Far Worse than Watergate also details new evidence that shows that this illegal activity may have been carried out with orders from top presidential advisors.

“This scandal is far more outrageous that we initially imagined. It includes spying in international territory, sending grotesque death threats, using blackmail, framing a journalist in a fabricated guerrilla video and conducting sabotage against Constitutional Court judges,” Kelly Nicholls, executive director, the U.S. Office on Colombia said. “The U.S. government must take this into consideration when deciding whether to certify Colombia’s compliance with the human rights conditions.”

These operations did not target alleged terrorists, but rather people carrying out legitimate, democratic activities. The targets included: Supreme Court and Constitutional Court judges, presidential candidates, journalists, publishers, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations and human rights defenders in Colombia, the United States and Europe.

“Last week U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised the Colombian Government’s commitment to building strong democratic institutions,” said Abigail Poe, deputy director, Center for International Policy. “However, this scandal puts that assertion into question. Moving forward, the United States must take this new evidence seriously and urge the investigation to include those outside the DAS who ordered and were consumers of illegal intelligence.”

The report, Far Worse than Watergate, was produced by the U.S. Office on Colombia, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, the Center for International Policy and the Washington Office on Latin America.