Here is a trend that's at least of modest interest. (Click on the image to enlarge it.)

The X axis is U.S. military and police aid to all of Latin America and the Caribbean, according to the government figures in our database. The Y axis is economic, social and institutional aid to the hemisphere, after removing two big natural-disaster aid packages that make 1999 (Hurricane Mitch) and 2010 (Haiti) look like outliers.

Note that years in which a Democratic administration held office (the blue dots) tend to be north of the trendline — that is, slightly favoring economic aid over military aid. Republican years (the red dots) are below the trendline, favoring a more military aid-heavy approach.

The main exceptions to the trend are 2000 — the year that Bill Clinton worked with the Republican Congress to pass Plan Colombia — and 2008, the first year for which the Democratic-majority Congress, inaugurated in January 2007, could pass a budget.

A 3-D radar built by Argentina's INVAP (source).

This post was authored by WOLA Fellow Lucila Santos.

In mid-July, Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner launched Operation Escudo Norte (Northern Shield), a major border-security effort. Among other items, the operation includes the installation of 20 Army land radars, patrols conducted with Pucara aircraft and the installation, in Santiago del Estero, of the first 3D radar built by INVAP (an Argentine high-technology company).

Escudo Norte is to support Plan Fortin II, a government strategy to protect Argentina’s borders. At the launch event, the President stated that this was an intelligent articulation of the Defense Ministry and armed forces with the new Security Ministry and its forces in the fight against drug trafficking. At least 6,000 officers from the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard and 800 men from Army Special Forces will be assigned to the Plan. Therefore, almost 7,000 members of the security forces will be working to improve controls at Argentina’s ports of entry, maritime ports and airports, and within the country, as well as to investigate crimes related to drug trafficking and organized crime.

The 3D radar is part of a prototype that has already been tried in military exercises; it is also part of a request for 6 military radars assigned to INVAP by Argentina’s Planning Ministry. The cost of the first radar was 165 million pesos (around 39 million U.S. dollars) and the contract for the total of 6 radars amounts to 460 million pesos (around 111 million dollars). The radar has an estimated reach of 400 km (248 miles). It is expected that the rest of the military radars built by INVAP will be established in the north of the country over the course of the next two years. In September of this year, another radar, a FPS113 donated by Spain, might become operative and will be located in Posadas, the capital of a province bordering Brazil. A similar radar is already in activity in Resistencia, capital of a province bordering Paraguay. These surveillance systems are replacing all mobile radars from the 1970s, which could not be employed for more than 6 hours a day. Moreover, two other TPS44 radar devices from the Army will be installed in Tartagal, Salta (over the border with Bolivia) and Las Lomitas (close to the border with Paraguay). The 20 Rasit radars from the Army won’t be used to detect illegal flights since their reach only allows them to observe an aircraft for less than four minutes; instead, they will be placed in areas used by traffickers to introduced drugs by land. These will be used by 180 military officers.

Even though the Air Force and the Army were already exercising control of air space, the use of military radars to control ports of entry is a novelty for Argentina. Different opinions have been voiced since the announcement of Operation Escudo Norte. On one hand, some debate has been ignited regarding the role of the armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking, and whether this is a proper and legal role for them to carry out. The Argentine Defense Law establishes that the military’s mission is solely the defense of the national territory against another country’s armed forces. Complementing this, the Internal Security Law mandates that internal security is the police forces’ responsibility. However, the government has argued that article 27 of the Internal Security Law allows the armed forces to provide logistical support to the police. The radars would fall under this provision. Yet for this to happen, their use should be requested by an internal security crisis committee.

In this regard, Defense Minister Arturo Puricelli explained that the Armed Forces won’t have “any role” in the fight against drug trafficking, but instead will just provide logistical support in the control and surveillance of the national aerial space to intercept potential irregular planes carrying drugs. The security scheme devised by Operation Escudo Norte establishes that the radar signals observed by Air Force specialists that could indicate potential illegal flights have to be communicated to the Gendarmerie, the police force responsible for border security. The procedure would only require the military to detect any irregular flight, register the plane’s license or plate number and type of aircraft, its route and the landing procedure, and automatically transmit this information to the security forces, either Gendarmerie or Coast Guard, so that they may act. Military aircraft can only perform tracking tasks since they are not authorized to bring down planes.

The other debate or criticism ignited by Operation Escudo Norte regards the fight against drug trafficking in Argentina. Congressmen from center-right opposition parties have stated that the Plan is just hiding the government’s passivity in terms of security, that it is just a mere patch to a very porous border, and that the fight against drug trafficking should be centralized in a federal agency with operational capacity.

These debates aside, there have been no criticisms of the use of the radars, or their importance as tools of surveillance and monitoring over the borders. Even though the mission seems benign in terms of the military participating in a related-internal security issue, it would be good for this support mission to be regulated by existing laws and overseen by the Congress. With the right transparency, accountability and legislative devices, making use of military radars to have more control over borders would seem to be an appropriate step in the fight against drug trafficking.

ELN guerrilla leaders pose in an area near the Venezuelan border, in a photo from a captured guerrilla computer revealed last week.

Colombia’s armed-forces chief and defense minister contradicted each other yesterday on the question of FARC guerrilla activity in Venezuela.

Admiral Édgar Cely, head of Colombia’s armed forces, told Colombia’s Caracol radio:

“The truth is that what was shown at the end of the government of President Uribe holds.”

The Admiral referred to former President Álvaro Uribe’s government’s denunciations of Venezuela before the OAS [PDF] in July 2010, made just before Uribe left office. The outgoing president accused Venezuela’s government of harboring FARC leaders and guerrilla encampments in its territory.

Since taking office a year ago, Uribe’s successor, President Juan Manuel Santos, has sought to patch things up with Venezuela. Hugo Chávez’s government has extradited, or may soon extradite, some mid-ranking guerrillas to Colombia, and President Santos has said that the FARC rebel camps in Venezuela no longer exist.

Admiral Cely clearly disagrees. He was quickly contradicted, though, by Colombia’s civilian defense minister, Rodrigo Rivera. According to Rivera, who before taking his current job was an ardent Uribe supporter and critic of Venezuela:

“The relationship with Venezuela has changed substantially and positively during the past year with regard to security and cooperation to confront all transnational crime phenomena at the border. … We have received repeated public and private expressions from the highest levels of the Venezuelan government, in the sense that they don’t tolerate the presence of criminals from Colombia in their territory.”

Possible new revelations of guerrilla presence in Venezuela, like the ELN photos released by Colombia’s police last week, are the greatest threat to President Santos’s attempted rapprochement with Caracas. The Santos government is thus determined to downplay concerns about guerrilla activity on the Venezuelan side of the border. Admiral Cely apparently didn’t get that memo.

Adam discusses challenges facing newly inaugurated President Ollanta Humala in Peru; Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa's lawsuit against a newspaper; cuts in U.S. aid to Mexico and other ways that the U.S. Congress is affecting Latin America policy.

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Update July 26th: Late yesterday, President-Elect Humala named the final two cabinet members, and both are women. Patricia Salas will be education minister. The new culture minister will be celebrated afro-Peruvian musician Susana Baca (subject of this July 10 Los Angeles Times piece).

Naming a surprisingly moderate cabinet with a famous musician as culture minister recalls Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, whose first minister of culture in 2003 was Tropicália pioneer Gilberto Gil.

Businessman Salomón Lerner will head Ollanta Humala's cabinet (photo from Peru's daily El Comercio).

Peruvian President-Elect Ollanta Humala will be inaugurated on Thursday. Though Humala ran as a leftist firebrand in 2006, his cabinet selections are a very moderate, establishment group. They are also nearly all male.

• Prime Minister: Salomón Lerner Ghitis - businessman, former deputy trade minister, opposed Alberto Fujimori’s government in the 1990s, and ran Humala’s presidential campaign.
• Agriculture: Miguel Caillaux Zazzali - Peru’s daily La República describes him as “a cattle ranching businessman.”
• Culture: (not named yet)
• Defense: Daniel Mora - Retired army officer, congressman in former President Alejandro Toledo’s Perú Posible party.
• Economy: Miguel Castilla - deputy finance minister in outgoing President Alán García’s government.
• Education: (not named yet)
• Energy and Mines: Carlos Herrera Descalzi - held the same post in the brief post-Fujimori government of President Valentín Paniagua.
• Environment: Ricardo Giesecke - head of the National Food Assistance Program in Alejandro Toledo’s government.
• Foreign Relations: Rafael Roncagliolo - career academic and head of the NGO Transparencia.
• Health: Alberto Tejada - a former mayor of San Borja, a district of Lima, and a close associate of Humala’s.
• Housing: René Cornejo - head of Peru’s investment promotion agency (ProInversión) in the Toledo and part of the García governments.
• Interior: Óscar Valdés Dancuart - businessman and military officer who retired in 1991.
• Justice: Francisco Eguiguren Praelli - La Republica describes him as a “recognized constitutionalist” lawyer.
• Labor: Rudecindo Vega - another member of Toledo’s Perú Posible party.
• Production: Kurt Burneo - former head of ex-President Toledo’s economic team, former chairman of Peru’s Central Bank.
• Trade and Tourism: José Luis Silva - former president of Peru’s Association of Exporters (ADEX).
• Transportation and Communication: Carlos Paredes - businessman from Arequipa.
• Women and Social Development: Aída García Naranjo - women’s rights activist with Peru’s Center for Rights and Development (CEDAL). Peru’s daily El Comercio calls her “the left’s representative in the cabinet so far.” She is also the only woman.

Customs and Border Protection Deputy Commissioner David Aguilar.

This post was written by WOLA Fellow Lucila Santos.

On July 16, at the National Governors Association 2011 Annual Meeting, Governors Jan Brewer (R-Arizona) and Martin O'Malley (D-Maryland) co-chaired the National Governors’ Association Special Committee on Homeland Security and Public Safety. The meeting included, among others, guest speaker David Aguilar, deputy commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). To see video of the discussion, click here.

Despite compelling evidence to the contrary, the widespread perception is that U.S. border states are suffering from drug-related violence spilling over from Mexico. Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum, called it “the politics of fear.” [This dynamic resembles current debates on insecurity in the Southern Cone, like Argentina, where the perception of insecurity far outstrips the real rates of crime and homicide.)

Deputy Commissioner Aguilar’s presentation offered a general look at the size of CBP and its work in protecting the 7,000 mile-US border. He also addressed southwest border security in light of Mexico’s increasing violence and the fears of spillover into bordering states. Following are some of the most important points Aguilar made:

· Aguilar stressed that violence rates have fallen dramatically in border states in the last 10 years and thus, border communities are today safer than ever. He gave some figures: violent crime rates decreased 17% in San Diego, 22% in Tucson, 11% in McAllen (Texas) and 36% in El Paso.

· El Paso is next door to the most violent city in the world, Ciudad Juárez, which saw over 3,000 murders last year. Contrastingly, in El Paso, last fiscal year, there were only 10 murders, none of which were drug or cartel related.

· Aguilar mentioned that in border states’ law enforcement and border security communities, there is a lot of frustration regarding the common perception that bordering states are insecure and risk a violent spill-over from Mexico. Yet, the truth is that the border has never been as safe and strong as today. He cited USA Today’s investigation published July 15^th, which found that “rates of violent crime along the U.S.-Mexico border have been falling for years.” Aguilar mentions that he knows and works with those interviewed in the article, and confirmed their view of border security and the non-existence of spillover violence.

· Aguilar said that 2000 was the year in which apprehensions of illegal migrants peaked. Since then, there has been an 80% decline in illegal crossing apprehensions at all US borders and coast lines. So far, in FY 2011, 257,000 apprehensions have been carried out. From these, 106,000 were apprehended in Arizona, 42% of the total.

· In the last year, there was a 44% reduction in illegal crossings apprehensions in Arizona alone, and 31% in total in the southwest border zone.

· Aguilar pointed out that, beyond the fact that eradicating illegal immigration is impossible, there will always be a “baseline flow” of illegal immigrants as long as the draw to migrate to the United States continues to exist, especially since Americans continue to hire undocumented migrants as cheap labor. Likewise, Aguilar mentioned that the same is true for drug trafficking: as long as people continue to consume drugs, these will continue to flow into the United States.

· Because illegal crossings have decreased, evidenced by the decline in apprehensions, Aguilar explained that CBP has now more time and resources to concentrate on drug trafficking.

Governor Brewer commented on Aguilar’s presentation, stating that her administration is advocating for a law that penalizes those that hire undocumented workers. However, she seemed adamantly opposed to Aguilar’s argument about the safety of border states, arguing that “operational control” over the border is only at 44 percent. She called for more forces, troops, and technology. She used as evidence her ‘eyes and ears” in Arizona, what the citizens tell her, what she sees in the streets.

Aguilar responded that the largest number of agents is stationed in Arizona. In addition, he also mentioned that last year, 42% of illegal aliens apprehended in Phoenix by local law enforcement had crossed the border in the last 3 to 30 days, while the rest had been in the country for more than a year. This year that figure dropped to less than 20%.

Aguilar’s testimony matches recent reporting by Damien Cave of the New York Times about a decline in illegal immigration due to better economic, demographic and social conditions in Mexico, along with the poor economy or legal crackdowns in the United States. In his piece, Cave explains that the decrease in birth rates in Mexico is reducing “the pool of likely migrants.”

In the 1990s, Mexico had around one million new potential job seekers each year, while by 2007 that number had dropped to 800,000. Education and employment opportunities have expanded: “per capita gross domestic product and family income have each jumped more than 45 percent since 2000.” Politically, “Democracy is better established, incomes have generally risen and poverty has declined.” Meanwhile the cost and risks of crossing the border have sharply increased. The possibility of being kidnapped by the Zetas or caught by U.S. agents is higher, as are the fees for being crossed over by coyotes.

These are examples of the pull and push factors that affect migration. As a result, illegal immigration is not only an exclusive security issue or an entirely American problem. It is a multidimensional problem cross-cut by economic, social, political and security concerns in both countries. These factors need to be taken into account when analyzing and designing migration and border policies.

The aftermath of the explosion in Toribío, Cauca. (Courtesy Asociación Minga)

This is a guest post from WOLA Program Assistant Anthony Dest.

A bus filled with explosives was detonated on the morning of July 9 at 10:30 a.m. in front of a police station in Toribío, Cauca. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s oldest and largest guerrilla group, were responsible for the attack.

Instead of destroying the police station, the explosion wiped out the homes surrounding it and injured several bystanders. The Toribío explosion was the first of a series of attacks in at least five municipalities of northern Cauca, including Corinto, Caldono, Santander de Quilichao and Jambaló. In Toribío alone over 124 people were injured, 3 killed, and 474 homes destroyed as a result of the armed combat between the FARC and the military (see video). The FARC’s indiscriminate attacks clearly violate international humanitarian law and are emblematic of the constant targeting of northern Cauca’s mostly indigenous civilian population.

As armed combat between the Colombian military and the FARC continued throughout the week, local indigenous and human rights organizations reported that both sides utilized civilians’ homes as shields. This blatant disregard for international humanitarian law put many families at serious risk. At one point, the Colombian government considered the possibility of tearing down the homes where FARC attacks allegedly originated. The human rights group Asociación Minga reported that the government decided not to destroy the homes due to heavy criticism from Colombia’s Human Rights Ombudsman and local organizations. Nevertheless, Asociación Minga said that the military might use ‘eminent domain’ to take over these homes “which is absolutely illegal.”

The Nasa indigenous people have been disproportionately affected by this wave of violence. A statement by the Association of Northern Cauca’s Indigenous Cabildos (ACIN), Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC), and the Association of Indigenous Cabildos of Caldono–NASA CXHAB (ICC-NC) rejects the recent violence as an “attack on our life plans (planes de vida), our autonomy, our peaceful existence in the territory, and our survival as indigenous peoples.” Despite indigenous peoples’ legal right to hold collective titles to more than 31 million hectares of land, 66 of Colombia’s 102 indigenous peoples are at risk of extinction. Official Colombian government statistics show that murders of indigenous people between January and May of 2011 have increased 38% compared to the same timeframe in 2010. The situation in northern Cauca is replicated in many other regions of the country where indigenous peoples have lived for hundreds of years.

Many families in Toribío and nearby municipalities are at risk of displacement. Reports from WOLA’s partners in larger towns and cities reveal that many of the transition homes (casas de paso) run by the ACIN are filling up. These transition homes are available for indigenous people who arrive in cities seeking medical attention or fleeing violence. However, in Cali and Santander de Quilichao these transition homes are filled beyond capacity. As of Wednesday evening, no humanitarian aid was available for the affected civilians in Toribío. Colombia’s internally displaced population of over five million people is likely to grow as the attacks continue.

The attacks in Cauca by the FARC’s 6^th Front and “Jacobo Arenas” column come as a response to the Colombian military’s dogged pursuit of the FARC’s leader, ‘Alfonso Cano,’ in a mountainous region about 20 miles east of Toribío. The FARC is eager to demonstrate its strength after losing several of its leaders in the last three years. These attacks are reminiscent of the FARC’s traditional strategy of guerilla warfare (guerra de guerrillas), a far cry from its ability to control towns and sub-regions when its strength was at its late 1990s peak. Nevertheless, the FARC’s continual adaptation to the nature of the conflict continues to threaten and alienate the civilian population while eliciting a strong-handed response from the Colombian government.

The indigenous people of northern Cauca demand their right to autonomy so that they may live peacefully in their collective territories. However, armed combat continuously undermines this right. The continuation of Colombia’s internal armed conflict threatens the survival of Colombia’s indigenous peoples, and their experience is shared by the millions of other Colombians affected by the conflict. According to the ACIN, CRIC, and ICC-NC, “there will not be peace for Colombians, if there is not peace for the indigenous peoples; there will not be peace for the indigenous peoples, if there is not peace in Colombia.”

(Video from Mexican Presidency: “Myth 5: That the federal government favors Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and the Pacific criminal group [a.k.a. the Sinaloa cartel]”)

There’s still a lot of debate about whether Mexican authorities are pursuing the Sinaloa cartel, probably the country’s largest, with the same energy that they devote to other criminal groups. Doubts were bolstered by a May 2010 National Public Radio investigation, which found Sinaloa members accounting for only 12% of cartel arrests since December 2006.

While that’s up for debate, what is becoming clearer is whom the Mexican government is targeting most: the fast-growing, hyper-violent Zetas, who operate throughout Mexico but principally in the eastern half of the country.

In a piece by Alfredo Corchado published in Monday’s Dallas Morning News, government officials confirmed that Mexico is shifting its strategy to focus on the Zetas above other groups.

Targeting the Zetas is appropriate, Eric Olson of the Woodrow Wilson Center tells Corchado, because the Zetas are the most violent of all Mexico’s criminal groups right now.

“Given the extreme levels of violence attributed to the Zetas, it would make sense for the government to focus its attention and resources on this particular group. … The truth is, it’s an important tactic to address the violence that is most pressing first. The longer-term needs for judicial and prosecutorial reform, police professionalization, and better educational and economic opportunities for youth are also critical, but in the short run a more focused and strategic approach is probably needed.”

This “target the most violent group first” idea is not new. It recalls the much-copied “Ceasefire” program that Boston used in the 1990s to reduce youth homicides by more than 70 percent. An evaluation by Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government described how Boston police went after the most violent youth gangs first.

“The working group wanted youth to realize that this zero tolerance message was not a bluff, but a serious interagency effort. True to its word, when its message was ignored and gang violence erupted, YVSF [the Boston Police Youth Violence Strike Force] used intensive order maintenance and enforcement tactics to quickly suppress flareups of firearm violence in emerging gang hotspots. YVSF targeted noncomplying gangs with aggressive enforcement of public drinking and motor vehicle violations, outstanding warrants, and probation surrenders and made numerous arrests. Street enforcement resulted in two dozen Federal indictments and arrests in August 1996. News of these activities quickly spread to other gangs in Boston whose members saw what could happen if they did not comply.”

This is not a perfect strategy. Mexican organized-crime groups that are less violent than the Zetas might find themselves at greater liberty to deal drugs, smuggle paying migrants and commit other crimes that aren’t inherently violent. Beneficiaries could include the Sinaloa cartel, which the government’s security spokesman just once again denied, on the Mexican Presidency’s blog, that the government favors.

Still, a strategy that clearly discourages the most brutal and barbarous behavior is a good step if, by reducing violence, it gives political and economic breathing room to badly needed, but slower-moving, policies like community policing, justice reform, and attention to at-risk youth.

Mexico's Alianza Cívica is asking people worldwide to sign this electronic petition, which asks President Obama to take three steps to limit the torrent of U.S.-purchased weapons illegally entering Mexico.

1. Immediately detain and prohibit the importation of assault weapons to the United States, because many of them are sent as contraband to Mexico.
2. Order dealers to report to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) the sale of multiple assault rifles to the same person over a period of five days.
3. Increase the regulatory capacity of the ATF in those regions of the United States that supply the weapons contraband to Mexico, especially in border states.

The ease with which criminals obtain high-powered weapons at U.S. gun shops and gun shows is increasing the death toll in Mexico. If you agree that the United States needs to do more, please take a minute and add your name to the petition.