U.S. Southern Command’s 2014 Posture Statement

General John Kelly of U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) and General Charles Jacoby Jr. of U.S. Northern Command (Northcom) released their annual posture statements on February 26th. Both commanders testified before the House and Senate Armed Service Committees on February 26th and March 13th, respectively.

The main concerns echoed last year’s posture statements as both Northcom’s General Jacoby and Southcom’s General Kelly expressed concern with military budget cuts, reiterating that the decrease in funds would limit both homeland defense strategy and constructive engagement with regional allies.

They highlighted a few noteworthy developments regarding joint U.S.-Latin American security cooperation:

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Mexico

Despite media reports citing public officials claiming U.S.-Mexico cooperation has slowed since President Peña Nieto took office in December of 2012, Gen. Jacoby said joint U.S.-Mexico military activities and exercises have increased, noting the United States helped train over 5000 Mexican soldiers this past year.

Drug Trafficking

As multiple media outlets highlighted, Gen. Kelly estimated Southcom failed to intercept 80 percentof the drugs flowing out of Colombia, and around 74 percent of all maritime drug trafficking. He linked the drop in interdictions to a lack of equipment, intelligence resources and overall funding.

Gen. Kelly asserted the goals of Operation Martillo, the United States’ counternarcotics surge operation in Central America’s coastal waters, “might no longer be achievable,” and that Southcom “will seek to employ non-traditional solutions within our current authorities, to partially mitigate detection and monitoring shortfalls” in the year ahead.

Southcom interagency cooperation

As a way to maximize the effectiveness of funding, Southcom deepened its interagency counternarcotic partnerships. General Kelly noted:

 

  • Southcom currently works with both the Department of Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security to map and combat the flow of illicit proceeds and is likely to deepen these partnerships following the success that financial sanctions have had on weakening the Los Cachiros drug cartel in Honduras.
  • Southcom would “rely heavily” on the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (which now provide the majority of the ships and aircraft used for interdiction) and continue to work with DEA Foreign Deployed Advisory and Support Team (FAST), along with nine DEA Special investigative Units (SIUs)
  • In cooperation with the State Department, Southcom is planning to extend its program working with Colombia’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to assist the military “in countering the threat of improvised explosive devices” to the rest of the region.

 

Plans for 2014

Gen. Kelly also pointed to other engagement activities Southcom is planning on continuing or creating this coming year:

 

  • Gen. Kelly said Southcom would continue to support Colombia in its newfound role as a “regional security exporter.”
  • In Peru, Southcom will continue to aid security forces in their fight against the Shining Path, through further assistance and military training.
  • In 2014, Southcom will begin working with Northcom, Guatemala and Belize to support Mexico’s new southern border strategy. Gen. Kelly emphasized that current restrictions on foreign military financing, particularly to Guatemala, limit the extent of this engagement.
  • Although “broader bilateral challenges” have adversely affected U.S.-Brazilian defense relations, Gen. Kelly maintained military-to-military cooperation has remained strong, and said Southcom is planning to cooperate with Brazil and other Latin American on strengthening their cyber security institutions. This includes working with Brazilian security forces in preparation for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics.
  • In 2014, Southcom plans to continue existing multinational exercises and humanitarian assistance to countries across the region. For Kelly, these humanitarian missions help to safeguard national security, reduce perceptions of U.S. “militarization,” and help promote respect for human rights in the region. Kelly noted that last year Southcom canceled over 200 engagements in the region.
  • Gen. Kelly voiced his concern over the tenfold increase in Haitian migrants passing through the Mona Passage and urged Washington to pay closer attention to this and other immigration issues in the Caribbean in 2014. He also underscored his concern about an uptick in narcotrafficking in the Caribbean and mentioned the lack of U.S. funding for engagement in the region.

 

Southcom’s posture statement’s annex details information about operations and trainings that took place in the previous year. These can be useful in identifying trends and Southcom priorities in the region. For example, in 2012, Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) continued to be most active in Colombia and very present in Peru. It also reported on the results of Operation Martillo and various Southcom units like JTF-Bravo, stationed in Honduras.

U.S. Aid to Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014

Grant military and police aid to Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014

Aid Program 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Program Total
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 12,350,000 8,975,000 13,245,000 43,572,000 48,710,000 17,010,000 65,000,000 51,500,000 56,635,000 47,813,000 47,700,000 56,000,000 31,296,000 31,414,000 34,500,000 29,400,000 26,646,597 40,311,519 40,311,519 702,389,635
Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 12,411,000 12,411,000 17,140,000 23,394,000 9,003,000 8,247,000 9,132,000 4,304,000 7,070,000 7,260,000 11,937,000 7,653,000 7,786,000 8,308,000 17,030,000 1,475,858 3,659,000 3,659,000 3,659,000 175,538,858
Excess Defense Articles 1,249,194 1,568,200 2,485,000 42,251,056 299,425 47,852,875
Emergency Drawdowns 13,750,000 2,300,000 5,300,000 4,000,000 25,350,000
Foreign Military Financing 990,000 750,000 2,490,000 3,500,000 1,980,000 1,880,000 1,880,000 13,470,000
Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 331,000 600,000 600,000 1,800,000 7,416,142 612,917 612,917 612,917 12,585,893
ONDCP Discretionary Funds 9,800,000 9,800,000
NADR – Conventional Weapons Destruction 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 8,000,000
International Military Education and Training 400,000 483,000 462,000 478,000 455,000 509,000 518,000 592,000 44,000 169,000 398,000 627,000 619,000 619,000 530,000 530,000 7,433,000
Service Academies 74,237 130,176 93,582 50,085 154,365 152,300 326,904 173,150 274,775 212,155 288,160 287,146 427,080 449,552 449,552 449,552 3,992,771
Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 307,000 233,971 377,387 314,352 199,611 414,308 461,179 134,503 91,422 407,799 407,799 407,799 3,757,130
NADR – Humanitarian Demining 861,000 225,000 2,000,000 3,086,000
Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 576,000 412,999 478,800 13,600 652,146 468,520 2,602,065
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 78,562 95,147 74,070 72,347 139,818 80,204 157,350 92,900 213,427 275,978 311,322 312,600 259,057 18,183 18,183 18,183 2,217,331
NADR – Anti-Terrorism Assistance 205,000 325,000 109,000 639,000
Misc Dept of State / Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance 300,000 300,000
Aviation Leadership Program 25,192 43,821 48,624 1,575 17,069 42,365 42,365 42,365 263,376
Global Peace Operations Initiative 3,000 71,000 71,000 71,000 216,000
Professional Military Exchanges 44,948 44,948
Exchange Training 20 20
TOTAL 40,160,194 33,969,000 36,147,000 73,464,999 58,969,343 27,207,651 75,476,232 58,000,783 64,171,475 55,934,641 61,074,548 65,110,953 43,391,262 84,830,341 59,950,769 45,208,628 36,506,413 49,982,335 49,982,335 1,019,538,902

All amounts in U.S. dollars. Numbers in italics are estimates, usually based on the closest year for which data are available.

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Grant economic and social aid to Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014

Aid Program 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Program Total
Development Assistance 17,045,000 24,526,000 30,677,000 24,388,000 27,904,000 28,488,000 14,969,000 16,440,000 13,790,000 11,246,000 9,369,000 11,000,000 11,611,000 63,293,000 63,334,000 49,789,000 41,280,000 49,140,000 49,140,000 557,429,000
International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 4,350,000 15,165,000 16,755,000 28,875,000 28,600,000 28,300,000 74,500,000 73,552,000 56,155,000 63,985,000 50,460,000 47,165,000 1,450,000 1,786,000 1,500,000 1,800,000 2,603,403 3,938,481 3,938,481 504,878,365
PL 480 `Food for Peace` 56,582,000 53,865,000 58,898,000 52,753,000 39,573,000 40,036,000 37,035,000 26,680,000 23,870,000 6,293,000 8,250,000 5,904,000 409,739,000
Child Survival and Health 9,757,000 7,000,000 9,603,000 23,666,000 19,910,000 17,580,000 14,756,000 14,213,000 12,736,000 12,805,000 12,255,000 11,290,000 9,173,000 5,000,000 179,744,000
Economic Support Fund 3,000,000 4,000,000 2,203,000 14,500,000 10,000,000 7,450,000 4,000,000 2,765,000 3,000,000 29,757,000 2,834,000 2,834,000 86,343,000
Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 3,876,350 1,452,117 7,026,000 467,785 5,873,153 5,873,153 5,873,153 30,441,711
Peace Corps 848,000 1,410,000 1,890,000 2,326,000 2,618,000 2,618,000 2,618,000 2,618,000 16,946,000
TOTAL 80,977,000 93,556,000 106,330,000 115,773,000 107,077,000 108,630,000 165,518,000 147,992,000 120,735,000 102,606,000 87,675,000 82,423,000 62,117,350 81,404,117 83,150,000 61,229,785 54,756,556 61,785,634 61,785,634 1,785,521,076

All amounts in U.S. dollars. Numbers in italics are estimates, usually based on the closest year for which data are available.

All Grant Aid to Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL
TOTAL 121,137,194 127,525,000 142,477,000 189,237,999 166,046,343 135,837,651 240,994,232 205,992,783 184,906,475 158,540,641 148,749,548 147,533,953 105,508,612 166,234,458 143,100,769 106,438,413 91,262,969 111,767,969 111,767,969 2,805,059,978

Military and Police Trainees from Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014

Aid Program 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Program Total
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 11 13 10 18 30 23 58 35 2,010 526 75 240 280 83 3,412
Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 495 175 264 262 137 226 85 221 237 581 221 140 142 3,186
International Military Education and Training 44 55 67 90 190 4 46 110 81 130 92 40 949
Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 55 119 104 95 62 50 93 16 12 294 900
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 5 8 7 5 71 115 83 43 56 82 101 76 81 78 811
Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 182 120 83 34 70 40 529
Misc Dept of State / Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance 425 2 30 1 458
Global Peace Operations Initiative 50 1 388 439
Foreign Military Sales 11 12 45 3 5 76
Service Academies 1 2 2 1 3 3 6 3 6 7 6 6 6 6 58
Emergency Drawdowns 15 30 1 4 1 51
Aviation Leadership Program 3 4 5 1 1 1 15
Foreign Military Financing 1 10 11
Exchange Training 2 5 2 9
Professional Military Exchanges 1 1 1 1 4
TOTAL 983 291 427 507 680 402 481 336 2,405 1,017 1,002 730 614 1,033 10,908

U.S. Institutions that Trained Personnel from Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014 (Max. 20 Shown)

Institution 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 8 11 13 10 15 30 25 58 34 2,450 696 43 2 3,365
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 56 64 66 25 21 33 35 2 49 52 140 162 151 856
Inter-American Air Forces Academy 112 37 30 8 16 43 37 38 10 33 85 96 54 599
Security Assistance Training Management OFC 3 197 42 242
Army Aviation Center 30 2 20 14 20 37 21 9 6 15 21 24 219
Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) 43 8 25 15 8 9 13 17 10 22 12 182
Army Aviation Logistics School 6 7 27 1 13 14 8 7 7 13 24 14 141
Coast Guard Training Center 34 52 30 116
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 15 12 2 29
National Defense University 1 1 2 9 2 2 1 1 19
Air Force Air University 3 4 5 1 2 3 1 19
Joint Forces Staff College 2 4 4 6 16
Army Intelligence Center and School 8 1 1 1 1 12
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 2 1 4 2 7 6 11
Air Force Special Operations School 3 3 3 1 10
Naval Post-Graduate School 1 1 1 8 46 2 10
Naval Operational Support Center 5 5 10
Defense Language Institute English Language Center 1 2 3 3 9
Air Force Academy 1 1 2 2 2 1 9
Army Command and General Staff College 2 3 1 6
TOTAL 274 132 172 75 117 217 211 113 131 2,587 997 584 320 5,930

Arms and Equipment Sold to Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014

Program 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Program Total
Direct Commercial Sales 31,293,666 5,507,126 19,284,136 11,204,948 4,102,220 22,490,639 2,462,366 8,770,609 3,335,438 7,801,012 63,667,564 80,934,250 49,904,166 26,072,768 29,741,163 404,324,833 770,896,904
Foreign Military Sales 1,007,500 1,169,000 1,925,000 2,253,000 852,000 801,500 304,000 191,000 195,000 245,000 327,000 250,000 226,000 646,000 1,150,000 5,068,000 16,610,000
Excess Defense Articles Sales 172,000 172,000
TOTAL 32,301,166 6,676,126 21,381,136 13,457,948 4,954,220 23,292,139 2,766,366 8,961,609 3,530,438 8,046,012 63,994,564 81,184,250 50,130,166 26,718,768 30,891,163 409,392,833 787,678,904

All amounts in U.S. dollars.

Deployments and Operations in Peru, All Programs, 1996-2014

Program 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Program Total
Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 9,397,000 2,600,000 1,554,000 2,138,000 1,929,000 1,996,000 500,000 1,157,000 1,000,000 22,271,000
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 92,045 82,451 229,659 126,747 246,021 256,392 213,007 243,293 147,591 147,591 553,444 2,362,369 902,034 135,000 5,737,644
TOTAL 92,045 82,451 9,626,659 2,726,747 1,800,021 2,394,392 2,142,007 2,239,293 647,591 147,591 1,710,444 3,362,369 902,034 135,000 28,008,644

All amounts in U.S. dollars.

Official Descriptions of Aid to Peru

U.S. Southern Command, 2012

Document: New Horizons Humanitarian Exercise Underway in Peru

Program: Exercises

New Horizons Peru 2012 officially started with an opening ceremony featuring senior leaders from both the Peruvian and United States governments at the Tambo de Mora construction site June 5.

The Peruvian and U.S governments are working together to bring New Horizons to the Ica and Huancavelica regions of Peru. About 500 U.S. military doctors, engineers and support staff will take part in this exercise.

Service members participating in New Horizons 2012 will be giving free medical care to more than 30,000 patients in 12 different locations, perform approximately 200 surgeries and building three new structures for community use, in addition to enhancing international disaster response capabilities and cooperation.

New Horizons began in the mid-1980’s and since then, Airmen and members of other services working under U.S. Southern Command have built schools, community centers, provided medical care and much more in efforts to form everlasting friendships between the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean nations.

U.S. Department of Defense, 2012U.S. Department of Defense, 2012U.S. Department of State, 2012Department of State, 2011U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, 2009U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, 2008U.S. Department of State, 2011U.S. Department of State, 2009U.S. Department of State, 2008

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Grant Aid Table Sources:

  • Peru Emergency Drawdowns 1996; – United States, Department of State, `Memorandum of Justification for use of Section 506(a)(2) special authority to draw down articles, services, and military education and training,` September 1996.
    Federal Register, November 4, 1996: 56865.
  • Peru Excess Defense Articles 1996; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1998 (Washington: March 1997): 667.
    United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Excess Defense Articles online database (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 1996; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1998 (Washington: March 1997): 125-6.
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 1996; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 1998 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State, March 1997): 3.
  • Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 1996; Peru NADR – Conventional Weapons Destruction 2012; Peru NADR – Conventional Weapons Destruction 2013; Peru NADR – Conventional Weapons Destruction 2014; – Estimate based on closest available year.
  • Peru Emergency Drawdowns 1997; – United States, Department of State, `Summary Sheet,` fax document, September 16, 1997.
    Federal Register, October 10, 1997: 53221.
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 1997; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1999 (Washington: March 1998): 1013.
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 1997; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State, March 1998): 11.
  • Peru ONDCP Discretionary Funds 1997; – United States, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, `Drug Czar McCaffrey Announces New $9.8 million To Fight Drug Traffickers in Peru,` press release, June 26, 1997
  • Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 1997; – H. Allen Holmes, coordinator for drug enforcement policy and support, United States Department of Defense, letter in response to congressional inquiry, Jan. 23, 1998.
    United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, correspondence with authors, September 21, 2000.
  • Peru Emergency Drawdowns 1998; – United States, Department of State, `Memorandum of Justification for use of Section 506(a)(2) special authority to draw down articles, services, and military education and training,` September 15, 1998.
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 1998; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000 (Washington: March 1999): 1106-9.
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 1998; – Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 7.
  • Peru Emergency Drawdowns 1999; – United States, White House, `Draft Working Document: FY99 506(a)(2) Drawdown List — Requested Items,` Memorandum, September 30, 1999.
  • Peru Excess Defense Articles 1999; – United States, Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 (Washington: March 2000) (Link to source).
    United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Excess Defense Articles online database (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 1999; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 (Washington: March 2000). (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 1999; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2001 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State, March 2000): 13 (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 1999; Peru Misc Dept of State / Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance 1999; Peru Service Academies 1999; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000: A Report to Congress (Washington: March 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2000; Peru Exchange Training 2000; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2000; Peru Service Academies 2000; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001: A Report to Congress (Washington: January 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2000; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2002 (Washington: April 2001) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2000; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2002 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington: Department of State, May 2001) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2001; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2001; Peru Service Academies 2001; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002: A Report to Congress (Washington: March 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2001; – United States, Department of State, FY 2003 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, April 15, 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2001; Peru NADR – Humanitarian Demining 2001; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2003 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington: Department of State, May 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2002; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, June 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2002; Peru NADR – Humanitarian Demining 2002; – United States, Department of State, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2002; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2002; Peru Service Academies 2002; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003: A Report to Congress (Washington: June 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2003; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2004; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2005; – U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Freedom of Information, Response to FOIA request from the Center for Public Integrity (Washington: July 13, 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Financing 2003; Peru Foreign Military Financing 2009; Peru Foreign Military Financing 2010; – U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts As of September 30, 2010 (Washington: DSCA, 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2003; – United States, Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2003; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, April 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2003; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2003; Peru Service Academies 2003; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004: A Report to Congress (Washington: June 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 1998; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 1999; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2000; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2001; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2002; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2003; – United States, Department of Defense, Office of Freedom of Information, Freedom of Information Act Request by Marina Walker Guevara, Ref: 06-F-0839 (Washington: September 26, 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2004; Peru Service Academies 2004; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005: A Report to Congress (Washington: April 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2004; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, April 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2005; Peru Service Academies 2005; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006: A Report to Congress (Washington: September 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2005; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, April 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2006; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2008 Program and Budget Guide (Washington: U.S. Department of State, September 2007) (Link to source).
  • Peru NADR – Anti-Terrorism Assistance 2006; – United States, Department of State, FY 2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2007) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2006; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2006; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2006; Peru Service Academies 2006; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007: A Report to Congress (Washington: August 2007) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2007; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2007; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2007; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2007; Peru Service Academies 2007; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 (Washington: January 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2007; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2007; – United States, Department of State, FY 2009 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request–Summary and Highlights (Washington: Department of State: February 4, 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru NADR – Anti-Terrorism Assistance 2007; – United States, Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2007; – United States, Department of Defense, Section 1209 Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs Carried out by the Department of Defense (Washington: August 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2008; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2008; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2008; Peru Service Academies 2008; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 (Washington: January 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru Excess Defense Articles 2008; – United States, Department of State, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 2010 (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2008; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide 2010 (Washington: Department of State). (Peru International Military Education and Training 2008; Peru NADR – Anti-Terrorism Assistance 2008; – United States, Department of State, FY 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, May 2009) (Link to source).
  • Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2008; Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2009; Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2010; – U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress On Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Years 2008, 2009, and 2010 (Washington: Department of Defense, April 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2009; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2009; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2009; Peru Service Academies 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 (Washington: February 2011) (Peru Excess Defense Articles 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, FY 2009 Excess Defense Article authorized and furnished to foreign countries under Part II, Chapter 2, Section 516 of the FAA (Washington 2009) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, International Military Education and Training (IMET) authorized for foreign countries under Part II, Chapter 5, Arms Export Control Act (Washington: January 26, 2010) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2009; – United States, Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget (Washington: Department of State: 2010) (Link to source).
  • Peru Excess Defense Articles 2010; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Excess Defense Articles online database (Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2010; – United States, Department of State, FY 2012 Executive Budget Summary Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: Department of State, February 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2010; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide 2012 (Washington: Department of State, 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru ; – Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, Mark P. Sullivan, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs’ (Washington: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 12, 2011): 33-4 (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2010; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2010; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2010; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2010; Peru Service Academies 2010; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (Washington: February 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Financing 2011; Peru International Military Education and Training 2011; – United States, Department of State, FY 2013 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: February 13, 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2011; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide 2013 (Washington: Department of State, 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru NADR – Humanitarian Demining 2010; Peru NADR – Conventional Weapons Destruction 2011; – United States, Department of State, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 2010) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2011; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2011; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2011; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2011; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2011; Peru Service Academies 2011; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012 (Washington: December 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2011; Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2011; – U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress On Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington: Department of Defense, October 2012): (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Financing 2012; Peru International Military Education and Training 2012; – United States, Department of State, FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: April 10, 2013) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2012; – Estimate derived using totals from: United States, Department of State, FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: April 10, 2013) (Link to source).
  • Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2012; Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2012; – U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 of the NDAA for FY2008 (Public Law 110-181) Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington: Department of Defense, May 2013): (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Financing 2013; – United States, Department of State, FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 4, 2014) <(Link to source).
  • Peru International Military Education and Training 2013; – United States, Department of State, FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 4, 2014) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2013; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2014; – Estimate derived using totals from: United States, Department of State, FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 4, 2014) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2012; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2012; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2012; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2012; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2012; Peru Service Academies 2012; Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2013; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2013; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2013; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2013; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2013; Peru Service Academies 2013; Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2014; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2014; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2014; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2014; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2014; Peru Service Academies 2014; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 (Washington: October 2013) (Link to source).
  • Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2013; Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2013; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2014; Peru Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance 2014; 
  • Peru Foreign Military Financing 2014; Peru International Military Education and Training 2014; – Based on 2013 actual figures due to 2014 continuing resolution. United States, Department of State, FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 4, 2014) (Link to source).

Economic Aid Table Sources:

  • Peru Development Assistance 1996; Peru Economic Support Fund 1996; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 1996; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1998 (Washington: March 1997) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 1996; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 1998 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State, March 1997).
  • Peru Development Assistance 1997; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 1997; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1999 (Washington: March 1998) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 1997; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State, March 1998).
  • Peru Development Assistance 1998; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 1998; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000 (Washington: March 1999) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 1998; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1999).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 1999; Peru Development Assistance 1999; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 1999;– United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 (Washington: March 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 1999; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 2000): 25 (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2000; Peru Development Assistance 2000; Peru Economic Support Fund 2000; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2000; – United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2002 (Washington: April 2001) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2000; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington: Department of State: May 2001) (Link to source).
    U.S. Congress, Conference Report 106-701 on Public Law 106-246 (Washington: June 29, 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2001; Peru Development Assistance 2001; Peru Economic Support Fund 2001; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2001; – United States, Department of State, FY 2003 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, April 15, 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2001; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2003 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington: Department of State, May 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2002; Peru Development Assistance 2002; Peru Economic Support Fund 2002; Peru Peace Corps 2002; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2002; – United States, Department of State, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2002; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, June 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2003; Peru Development Assistance 2003; Peru Economic Support Fund 2003; Peru Peace Corps 2003; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2003; – United States, Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2003; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, April 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2004; Peru Development Assistance 2004; Peru Economic Support Fund 2004; Peru Peace Corps 2004; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2004; – United States, Department of State, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2004; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, April 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2005; Peru Development Assistance 2005; Peru Economic Support Fund 2005; Peru Peace Corps 2005; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2005; – United States, Department of State, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2005; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington: Department of State, April 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2006; Peru Development Assistance 2006; Peru Economic Support Fund 2006; Peru Peace Corps 2006; Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2006; – United States, Department of State, FY 2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2007) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2006; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY 2008 Program and Budget Guide (Washington: U.S. Department of State, September 2007) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2007; Peru Development Assistance 2007; Peru Economic Support Fund 2007; Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2007; – United States, Department of State, FY 2009 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request–Summary and Highlights (Washington: Department of State: February 4, 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Peace Corps 2007; Peru Peace Corps 2008; Peru Peace Corps 2009; – Estimate based on closest available year.
  • Peru PL 480 `Food for Peace` 2007; – United States, Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, February 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 2008; Peru Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 2009; Peru Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 2010; – U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 and Section 1203b Report to Congress On Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Years 2008, 2009, and 2010 Washington: Department of Defense, April 2012 (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2008; Peru Development Assistance 2008; Peru Economic Support Fund 2008;– United States, Department of State, FY 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, May 2009) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2008; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide 2010 (Washington: Department of State). (Peru Child Survival and Health 2009; Peru Development Assistance 2009; – United States, Department of State, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 2010) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2009; – United States, Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget (Washington: Department of State: 2010) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2010; Peru Development Assistance 2010; – United States, Department of State, FY 2012 Executive Budget Summary Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: Department of State, February 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2010; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide 2012 (Washington: Department of State, 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 2011; Peru Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 2012; – U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress On Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington: Department of Defense, October 2012): (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2011; Peru Development Assistance 2011; – United States, Department of State, FY 2013 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: February 13, 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2011; – United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide 2013 (Washington: Department of State, 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru Child Survival and Health 2012; Peru Development Assistance 2012; – United States, Department of State, FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: April 10, 2013) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2012; – Estimate derived using totals from: United States, Department of State, FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: April 10, 2013) (Link to source).
  • Peru Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 2013; Peru Defense Department Humanitarian Assistance 2014; 
  • Peru Development Assistance 2013; Peru Economic Support Fund 2013; – United States, Department of State, FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 4, 2014) (Link to source).
  • Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2013; Peru International Narcotics Control Economic Aid 2014; – Estimate derived using totals from: United States, Department of State, FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 4, 2014) (Link to source).
  • Peru Development Assistance 2014; Peru Economic Support Fund 2014; – Based on 2013 actual figures due to 2014 continuing resolution. United States, Department of State, FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington: Department of State, March 4, 2014) (Link to source).

Trainees Table Sources:

  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 1999; Peru Exchange Training 1999; Peru International Military Education and Training 1999; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 1999; Peru Misc Dept of State / Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance 1999; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 1999; Peru Service Academies 1999; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000: A Report to Congress (Washington: March 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2000; Peru Emergency Drawdowns 2000; Peru Exchange Training 2000; Peru Foreign Military Sales 2000; Peru International Military Education and Training 2000; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2000; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2000; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2000; Peru Service Academies 2000; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001: A Report to Congress (Washington: January 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2001; Peru Emergency Drawdowns 2001; Peru Exchange Training 2001; Peru Foreign Military Sales 2001; Peru International Military Education and Training 2001; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2001; Peru Misc Dept of State / Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance 2001; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2001; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2001; Peru Service Academies 2001; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002: A Report to Congress (Washington: March 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2002; Peru Emergency Drawdowns 2002; Peru Foreign Military Sales 2002; Peru International Military Education and Training 2002; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2002; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2002; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2002; Peru Service Academies 2002; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003: A Report to Congress (Washington: June 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2003; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2003; Peru Emergency Drawdowns 2003; Peru Foreign Military Financing 2003; Peru International Military Education and Training 2003; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2003; Peru Misc Dept of State / Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance 2003; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2003; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2003; Peru Service Academies 2003; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004: A Report to Congress (Washington: June 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2004; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2004; Peru International Military Education and Training 2004; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2004; Peru Misc Dept of State / Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance 2004; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2004; Peru Service Academies 2004; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005: A Report to Congress (Washington: April 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2005; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2005; Peru Emergency Drawdowns 2005; Peru Foreign Military Sales 2005; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2005; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2005; Peru Service Academies 2005; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006: A Report to Congress (Washington: September 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2006; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2006; Peru Foreign Military Sales 2006; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2006; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2006; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2006; Peru Service Academies 2006; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007: A Report to Congress (Washington: August 2007) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2007; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2007; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2007; Peru International Military Education and Training 2007; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2007; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2007; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2007; Peru Service Academies 2007; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 (Washington: January 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2008; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2008; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2008; Peru International Military Education and Training 2008; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2008; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2008; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2008; Peru Service Academies 2008; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 (Washington: January 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2009; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2009; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2009; Peru Foreign Military Financing 2009; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2009; Peru International Military Education and Training 2009; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2009; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2009; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2009; Peru Service Academies 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 (Washington: February 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2010; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2010; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2010; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2010; Peru International Military Education and Training 2010; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2010; Peru Non-Security Assistance – Unified Command 2010; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2010; Peru Service Academies 2010; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (Washington: February 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2011; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2011; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2011; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2011; Peru International Military Education and Training 2011; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2011; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2011; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2011; Peru Service Academies 2011; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012 (Washington: December 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru Aviation Leadership Program 2012; Peru Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 2012; Peru Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program 2012; Peru Foreign Military Sales 2012; Peru Global Peace Operations Initiative 2012; Peru International Military Education and Training 2012; Peru International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 2012; Peru Professional Military Exchanges 2012; Peru Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance 2012; Peru Service Academies 2012; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 (Washington: October 2013) (Link to source).

Sales Table Sources:

  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 1996; Peru Foreign Military Sales 1996; – United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Military Assistance Act Report To Congress, Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington: September 1997).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 1997; – United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Arms Exports: Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 97 (Washington: August 1998).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 1997; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: August 1998).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 1998; – United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, FY98 Authorizations Under Section 38 AECA (Washington: 1999) (Link to source).
  • Peru Excess Defense Articles Sales 1998; – United States, Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington: February 1999): 1265.
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 1998; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: July 1999) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 1999; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 1999; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: September 2000) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2000; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2001) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2000; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: April 2001) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2001; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2001; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: August 2002) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2002; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2002; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: March 2003) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2003; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2003; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: September 2004) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2004; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2004; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: July 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2005; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2005; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: February 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2006; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2007) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2006; – United States, Department of Defense, Response to Freedom of Information Act request from Federation of American Scientists (Washington: Department of Defense, January 30, 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2007; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: May 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2007; – United States, Department of Defense, Response to Freedom of Information Act request from Federation of American Scientists (Washington: Department of Defense, January 30, 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2008; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2009) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2008; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles and Services authorized and furnished to foreign countries and international organizations under Foreign Military Sales, Chapter 2, Arms Export Control Act (Washington: January 15, 2009) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2009; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: 2010) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles and Services authorized and furnished to foreign countries and international organizations under Foreign Military Sales, Chapter 2, Arms Export Control Act (Washington: January 26, 2010) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2010; – United States, Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington:2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2010; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency,Excess Defense Articles authorized and furnished to foreign countries under Part II, Chapter 2, Section 516 of the FAA [22 U.S.C.? 2321(j)](Washington: 2011) (Link to source).
  • Peru Direct Commercial Sales 2011; – U.S. Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended (Washington: Department of State, June 2012) (Link to source).
  • Peru Foreign Military Sales 2011; – Department of Defense, DSCA Security Assistance Sales: Detailed Deliveries for Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington: DSCA, 2012) (Link to source).

Deployments Table Sources:

  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 1996; – United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1996, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 1997).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 1997; – United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1997, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 1998).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 1998; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1998, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 1999).
  • Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 1998; Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 1999; Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 2000; Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 2001; Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 2002; Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 2003; Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 2004; Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 2006; – United States, Department of Defense, Office of Freedom of Information, Freedom of Information Act Request by Marina Walker Guevara, Ref: 06-F-0839 (Washington: September 26, 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 1999; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1999, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 2000).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2000; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2000, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 2001).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2001; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2001, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 2002).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2002; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2002, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 2003).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2003; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2003, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 2004).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2004; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2004, (Washington: Department of Defense, February, 2005) (Link to source).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2005; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2005, (Washington: Department of Defense, February, 2006) (Link to source).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2006; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2006, (Washington: Department of Defense, February 2007).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2007; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2007, (Washington: Department of Defense, February 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2007; – United States, Department of Defense, Section 1209 Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs Carried out by the Department of Defense (Washington: August 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Section 124 Counter-Drug Operations 2007; – (1) U.S. Department of Defense, Response to Freedom of Information Act Request submitted by the Fellowship of Reconciliation (Washington: Department of Defense, April 2008). (2) United States, Department of Defense, Section 1209 Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs Carried out by the Department of Defense (Washington: August 2008) (Link to source).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2008; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2008, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 2009) (Link to source).
  • Peru Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs of the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009, (Washington: Department of Defense, March 1, 2010) (Link to source).

Five points on President Obama’s meeting with Colombia’s President Santos

Today, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with President Obama for two and a half hours at the White House. This was the fourth meeting between the two leaders since President Santos took office in August of 2010.

There was a fair amount of media coverage ahead of the meeting, not only about what the discussion would cover, but also about the meeting’s political context.

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Here are five points various articles and analyses have discussed and what the White House overview of the meeting said about them:

1. This visit was different. Both Colombia and the United States stressed the meeting was more about their economic ties than their security relationship

Much of the media attention ahead of the visit focused on the fact that this visit marked a turning point in U.S.-Colombian relations away from centering on security and towards economic partnership. President Santos told Caracol Radio Monday morning this meeting would be “totally different” as Colombia is no longer “coming with the hat out, asking for money.” Now Colombia wants to be seen as a different kind of partner to the United States. “The relations of our two countries find themselves at their best moment ever,” President Santos said in his remarks after the meeting.

For the past 20 years, the U.S.-Colombia relationship has been defined by Washington’s support for Colombia’s fight against guerillas, paramilitaries and narcotrafficking. In recent years, there was also the added push to get Congress to approve the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The FTA went into effect last year, increasing trade between the countries by 20 percent. While Colombia is still the top recipient of U.S. assistance to the region, aid is at the lowest levels since before 2000, at less than $300 million per year.

Moreover, EFE and Colombian newspaper El Tiempo noted this meeting was important for President Obama’s image in the region as President Santos was the first (and really only) leader in Latin America “who offered President Obama a hand to recover,” following revelations of the National Security Archive’s extensive surveillance of citizens, companies and leaders throughout the hemisphere. President Obama’s former Latin America advisor, Dan Restrepo said, “this is an important meeting for the United States as it allows it to focus on a positive agenda… it’s a relationship that has turned the page.”

2. President Obama supports the peace talks

The peace talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were expected to be one of the central topics of the private meeting. Also on the agenda: trade, opportunities for energy, education, technology, and Colombia’s role in training security forces in Central America and the Caribbean.

As expected, President Obama emphasized his “strong support” for the peace process and praised President Santos’ “bold and brazen efforts” in engaging in discussions with the FARC. The administration has expressed support for the peace talks over the past year, but the backing of the United States is crucial in the negotiations.

So far the negotiating teams have reached agreements on agrarian development and the FARC’s political participation, but as the talks progress and both sides tackle contentious issues such as drug policy, demobilization and reintegration, transitional justice and extradition, international cooperation will be key. As Colombia is the United States’ main security partner in the region, U.S. support, financial and otherwise, will be needed to ensure a successful post-conflict transition.

Colombian magazine Semana reported President Santos was expected to request support from the U.S. as Colombia moves towards this transition. A statement released today by Latin American Working Group, the Center for International Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America and U.S. Office on Colombia emphasized this:

U.S. policymakers should also consider how best to support a peace accord financially once negotiations are finalized, including by reorienting aid away from military assistance and towards peace accord implementation, such as demobilization and reintegration programs, support for victims of violence, and mechanisms for truth, justice and reparations.

3. The United States’ security relationship with Colombia is changing

The United States is planning to decrease its role in security operations in Colombia and shift its assistance into economic arenas, according to reports from a phone call between journalists and a White House senior official. The official said U.S. security assistance was “designed to be phased out over time” and because “conditions have been improving on the ground” security assistance is likely to be scaled back.

As an article in Foreign Policy noted, elite forces from U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force have deployed to Colombia since 2000 to work closely with the Colombians and that U.S. Special Forces will continue to train Colombian security forces. (See here for information of U.S. military training of Colombian forces)

Speaking at an event yesterday in Washington, Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón said the Colombian military would continue to train military and police forces in Central America and the Caribbean with U.S. funding. As expected, President Obama and President Santos covered this topic and agreed to triple joint U.S.- Colombian trainings throughout the hemisphere:

In 2013, this security assistance included 39 capacity-building activities in four Central American countries focused on areas such as asset forfeiture, investigations, polygraphs, and interdiction. The United States and Colombia announced the Action Plan for 2014, which aims to increase assistance through 152 capacity-building activities in six countries in Central America and the Caribbean.

4. Human rights and Labor issues exist that must be addressed

The statement mentioned above from the four Washington-baed NGOs called for the meeting to highlight serious labor and human rights problems that persist in the country. Some of the issues discussed during the meeting:

  • Land Restitution and Afro-Colombians
    Colombia passed the historic Victim’s Law in 2011, which aimed to offer reparations to victims and return land to some of the more than five million Colombians displaced because of violence. This process has been extremely slow, and those that have received restitution from the government often cannot return to the land for fear of being threatened or killed by armed actors, particularly paramilitary successor groups. Land titling for Afro-Colombians and indigenous groups in Colombia, who also continue to be marginalized and targeted, has been particularly slow.The White House underscored the $68 million slated by USAID in support of this effort and said it intended to “expand the coverage of legal protection of land rights, especially those of small farmers, by strengthening the Colombian government’s land titling efforts.”
  • Labor rights
    Labor rights continue to be a huge issue in Colombia. Since January at least 11 trade unionists have been killed and hundreds more threatened. Impunity for murder cases of unionists runs at about 90% and workers who try to form unions are fired en mass. When the Colombian government signed the FTA, it also signed a “Labor Action Plan,” which obligated lawmakers to take specific steps to protect unionists and increase respect for labor rights. The majority of these steps have yet to be taken.Regarding the Labor Action Plan, the White House said the two countries planned to “hold formal meetings through at least 2014 on Action Plan commitments and recognize advances under the Action Plan ad areas where challenges remain.”

The organizations’ statement also called for greater progress to be made in dismantling paramilitary successor groups, responsible for much of the violence and drug trafficking taking place today. It highlighted the need to investigate and prosecute the politicians, military and police members and large landowners that collude with these groups as well as the need to bring the over 3,000 military members accused of extrajudicial killings to justice.

5. U.S. political divisions and the peace process

This point was not discussed at all in English media, but touched on in Colombia. So far support for the peace process has been bipartisan, although some anti-Castro lawmakers have voiced their opposition to Havana hosting the talks. As Restrepo and Georgetown Professor Erick Langer noted, the U.S Congress has elections coming up next November and Colombia must be ready to ensure this bipartisan support continues in light of the uncertain makeup of next year’s Congress.

“Santos has to ensure that the Republicans feel that they are part of this process and it is not just an Obama issue. Traditionally the United States has maintained strong support for Colombia. But with the degree of polarization that exists currently in Washington creates the worry that this could change,” Langer said.

During his visit Santos also spoke to the Organization of American States, met with Democratic House minority leader Nancy Pelosi, with Republican Speaker of the House, John Boehner and former Secretary of State Colin Powell, among others. On Wednesday morning, he will appear on Morning Joe followed by a breakfast with the Washington Post’s editorial board and a lunch at the Chamber of Commerce.

U.S. Aid from International Military Education and Training, Entire Region, 2009-2014

Grant military and police aid from International Military Education and Training, Entire Region, 2009-2014

Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Country Total
Colombia 1,400,000 1,694,000 1,695,000 1,656,000 1,656,000 1,417,000 9,518,000
El Salvador 1,594,000 1,708,000 1,521,000 1,029,000 1,029,000 1,000,000 7,881,000
Mexico 1,084,000 989,000 1,006,000 1,190,000 1,190,000 1,449,000 6,908,000
Chile 525,000 899,000 821,000 855,000 855,000 810,000 4,765,000
Dominican Republic 722,024 844,000 600,000 829,000 829,000 765,000 4,589,024
Jamaica 823,003 752,000 739,000 700,000 700,000 700,000 4,414,003
Eastern Caribbean 783,000 806,000 845,000 845,000 800,000 4,079,000
Honduras 329,346 777,000 765,000 774,000 774,000 650,000 4,069,346
Panama 253,000 750,000 738,000 762,000 762,000 720,000 3,985,000
Argentina 915,494 900,000 297,000 738,000 738,000 350,000 3,938,494
Guatemala 253,837 797,000 192,000 840,000 840,000 720,000 3,642,837
Peru 398,000 627,000 619,000 619,000 619,000 585,000 3,467,000
Brazil 251,952 610,000 631,000 638,000 638,000 625,000 3,393,952
Uruguay 428,321 523,000 590,000 539,000 539,000 450,000 3,069,321
Nicaragua 409,000 894,000 538,000 1,000 1,000 700,000 2,543,000
Paraguay 348,000 394,000 407,000 423,000 423,000 460,000 2,455,000
Costa Rica 364,469 366,000 394,000 297,000 297,000 350,000 2,068,469
Ecuador 308,168 375,000 400,000 281,000 281,000 360,000 2,005,168
Guyana 282,670 300,000 386,000 339,000 339,000 300,000 1,946,670
Bolivia 224,950 366,000 198,000 227,000 227,000 200,000 1,442,950
Suriname 152,882 250,000 251,000 239,000 239,000 225,000 1,356,882
Belize 267,095 258,000 190,000 187,000 187,000 180,000 1,269,095
Haiti 234,919 92,000 220,000 224,000 224,000 220,000 1,214,919
Bahamas 136,784 200,000 201,000 190,000 190,000 180,000 1,097,784
Trinidad and Tobago 104,000 167,000 253,000 175,000 175,000 180,000 1,054,000
Barbados 151,000 151,000
Antigua and Barbuda 127,582 127,582
St. Kitts and Nevis 92,857 92,857
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 88,000 88,000
St. Lucia 85,000 85,000
Grenada 74,142 74,142
Dominica 42,008 42,008
TOTAL 12,471,503 16,315,000 14,458,000 14,597,000 14,597,000 14,396,000 86,834,503

All amounts in U.S. dollars.

All Grant Aid from International Military Education and Training, Entire Region, 2009-2014

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL
TOTAL 12,471,503 16,315,000 14,458,000 14,597,000 14,597,000 14,396,000 86,834,503

Military and police trainees from International Military Education and Training, Entire Region, 2009-2014

Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 Country Total
Colombia 336 716 672 364 2,088
Chile 182 325 259 276 1,042
Argentina 380 447 24 103 954
El Salvador 299 323 175 125 922
Honduras 170 94 193 172 629
Peru 81 130 92 40 343
Panama 62 48 157 62 329
Jamaica 162 57 48 49 316
Mexico 139 62 47 47 295
Guatemala 82 110 25 61 278
Dominican Republic 59 91 55 65 270
Brazil 72 63 68 62 265
Uruguay 116 45 37 42 240
Costa Rica 40 53 39 44 176
Paraguay 39 47 36 31 153
Ecuador 24 72 28 21 145
Guyana 45 18 19 17 99
Trinidad and Tobago 14 11 37 13 75
Nicaragua 23 30 12 5 70
Bolivia 9 23 18 12 62
Bahamas 19 18 13 11 61
Belize 24 15 9 12 60
Haiti 20 14 11 11 56
Antigua and Barbuda 21 14 10 6 51
Barbados 22 13 7 7 49
Suriname 6 9 14 7 36
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 8 11 8 8 35
St. Kitts and Nevis 14 8 7 5 34
St. Lucia 8 8 10 6 32
Grenada 10 7 7 24
Dominica 3 1 3 4 11
TOTAL 2,489 2,883 2,140 1,688 9,200

U.S. Training Institutions, International Military Education and Training, Entire Region, 2009-2014 (Maximum 20 Shown)

Institution 2009 2010 Total
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 271 543 766
Inter-American Air Forces Academy 228 502 730
Defense Language Institute English Language Center 53 107 160
Security Assistance Training Management OFC 114 114
Army Aviation Center 100 5 105
Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) 53 41 94
Army Command and General Staff College 34 55 89
Army Infantry School 62 18 80
Joint Forces Staff College 5 68 73
Coast Guard Training Center 48 15 63
INFANTRY SCHOOL 58 58
Marine Education Command 45 10 55
Army Armor School 26 29 55
Coast Guard International Training Center 48 48
USATC 11 32 43
Army Sergeants Major Academy 33 8 41
Army War College 8 22 30
Army Intelligence Center and School 15 6 21
Army Aviation Logistics School 5 16 21
Naval Command College 5 15 20
TOTAL 1,182 2,065 3,247

Official Descriptions of Aid from International Military Education and Training

U.S Department of State, 2008

Document: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

Country: Uruguay

Bilateral Cooperation. U.S. strategy has been to prevent Uruguay from becoming a major narcotics transit or processing country. USG assistance to the GOU in 2008 included support to demand reduction programs; support for narcotics interdiction operations, including provision of equipment; and assistance with police training. The increase of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds in FY 2008 permitted the USG to provide maritime law enforcement leadership, port security, and border security training to the Uruguayan Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines.

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IMET in 2008 also included a legal seminar on border security and a river patrol operations course. Assistance in the effective use of radar systems is also being provided through the State Partners program.

Department of Defense, 2006U.S. Southern Command, 2008

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International Military Education and Training:

Program Description

International Military Education and Training:

Law

Grant Aid Table Sources:

  • International Military Education and Training Antigua and Barbuda 2009; International Military Education and Training Argentina 2009; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2009; International Military Education and Training Barbados 2009; International Military Education and Training Belize 2009; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2009; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2009; International Military Education and Training Chile 2009; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2009; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2009; International Military Education and Training Dominica 2009; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2009; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2009; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2009; International Military Education and Training Grenada 2009; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2009; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2009; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2009; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2009; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2009; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2009; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2009; International Military Education and Training Panama 2009; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2009; International Military Education and Training Peru 2009; International Military Education and Training St. Kitts and Nevis 2009; International Military Education and Training St. Lucia 2009; International Military Education and Training St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2009; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2009; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2009; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, International Military Education and Training (IMET) authorized for foreign countries under Part II, Chapter 5, Arms Export Control Act (Washington: January 26, 2010) (Link to source).
  • International Military Education and Training Argentina 2010; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2010; International Military Education and Training Belize 2010; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2010; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2010; International Military Education and Training Chile 2010; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2010; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2010; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2010; International Military Education and Training Eastern Caribbean 2010; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2010; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2010; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2010; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2010; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2010; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2010; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2010; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2010; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2010; International Military Education and Training Panama 2010; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2010; International Military Education and Training Peru 2010; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2010; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2010; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2010; – United States, Department of State, FY 2012 Executive Budget Summary Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: Department of State, February 2011) (Link to source).
  • International Military Education and Training Argentina 2011; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2011; International Military Education and Training Belize 2011; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2011; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2011; International Military Education and Training Chile 2011; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2011; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2011; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2011; International Military Education and Training Eastern Caribbean 2011; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2011; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2011; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2011; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2011; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2011; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2011; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2011; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2011; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2011; International Military Education and Training Panama 2011; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2011; International Military Education and Training Peru 2011; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2011; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2011; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2011; – United States, Department of State, FY 2013 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: February 13, 2012) (Link to source).
  • International Military Education and Training Argentina 2012; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2012; International Military Education and Training Belize 2012; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2012; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2012; International Military Education and Training Chile 2012; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2012; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2012; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2012; International Military Education and Training Eastern Caribbean 2012; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2012; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2012; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2012; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2012; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2012; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2012; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2012; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2012; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2012; International Military Education and Training Panama 2012; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2012; International Military Education and Training Peru 2012; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2012; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2012; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2012; International Military Education and Training Argentina 2013; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2013; International Military Education and Training Belize 2013; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2013; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2013; International Military Education and Training Chile 2013; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2013; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2013; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2013; International Military Education and Training Eastern Caribbean 2013; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2013; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2013; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2013; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2013; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2013; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2013; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2013; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2013; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2013; International Military Education and Training Panama 2013; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2013; International Military Education and Training Peru 2013; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2013; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2013; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2013; International Military Education and Training Argentina 2014; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2014; International Military Education and Training Belize 2014; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2014; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2014; International Military Education and Training Chile 2014; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2014; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2014; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2014; International Military Education and Training Eastern Caribbean 2014; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2014; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2014; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2014; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2014; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2014; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2014; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2014; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2014; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2014; International Military Education and Training Panama 2014; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2014; International Military Education and Training Peru 2014; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2014; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2014; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2014; – United States, Department of State, FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary – Function 150 and Other International Programs (Washington: April 10, 2013) (Link to source).

Economic Aid Table Sources:

  • International Military Education and Training ; 

Trainees Table Sources:

  • International Military Education and Training Antigua and Barbuda 2009; International Military Education and Training Argentina 2009; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2009; International Military Education and Training Barbados 2009; International Military Education and Training Belize 2009; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2009; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2009; International Military Education and Training Chile 2009; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2009; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2009; International Military Education and Training Dominica 2009; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2009; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2009; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2009; International Military Education and Training Grenada 2009; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2009; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2009; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2009; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2009; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2009; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2009; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2009; International Military Education and Training Panama 2009; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2009; International Military Education and Training Peru 2009; International Military Education and Training St. Kitts and Nevis 2009; International Military Education and Training St. Lucia 2009; International Military Education and Training St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2009; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2009; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2009; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2009; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 (Washington: February 2011) (Link to source).
  • International Military Education and Training Antigua and Barbuda 2010; International Military Education and Training Argentina 2010; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2010; International Military Education and Training Barbados 2010; International Military Education and Training Belize 2010; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2010; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2010; International Military Education and Training Chile 2010; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2010; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2010; International Military Education and Training Dominica 2010; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2010; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2010; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2010; International Military Education and Training Grenada 2010; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2010; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2010; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2010; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2010; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2010; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2010; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2010; International Military Education and Training Panama 2010; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2010; International Military Education and Training Peru 2010; International Military Education and Training St. Kitts and Nevis 2010; International Military Education and Training St. Lucia 2010; International Military Education and Training St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2010; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2010; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2010; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2010; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (Washington: February 2012) (Link to source).
  • International Military Education and Training Antigua and Barbuda 2011; International Military Education and Training Argentina 2011; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2011; International Military Education and Training Barbados 2011; International Military Education and Training Belize 2011; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2011; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2011; International Military Education and Training Chile 2011; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2011; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2011; International Military Education and Training Dominica 2011; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2011; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2011; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2011; International Military Education and Training Grenada 2011; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2011; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2011; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2011; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2011; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2011; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2011; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2011; International Military Education and Training Panama 2011; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2011; International Military Education and Training Peru 2011; International Military Education and Training St. Kitts and Nevis 2011; International Military Education and Training St. Lucia 2011; International Military Education and Training St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2011; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2011; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2011; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2011; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012 (Washington: December 2012) (Link to source).
  • International Military Education and Training Antigua and Barbuda 2012; International Military Education and Training Argentina 2012; International Military Education and Training Bahamas 2012; International Military Education and Training Barbados 2012; International Military Education and Training Belize 2012; International Military Education and Training Bolivia 2012; International Military Education and Training Brazil 2012; International Military Education and Training Chile 2012; International Military Education and Training Colombia 2012; International Military Education and Training Costa Rica 2012; International Military Education and Training Dominica 2012; International Military Education and Training Dominican Republic 2012; International Military Education and Training Ecuador 2012; International Military Education and Training El Salvador 2012; International Military Education and Training Grenada 2012; International Military Education and Training Guatemala 2012; International Military Education and Training Guyana 2012; International Military Education and Training Haiti 2012; International Military Education and Training Honduras 2012; International Military Education and Training Jamaica 2012; International Military Education and Training Mexico 2012; International Military Education and Training Nicaragua 2012; International Military Education and Training Panama 2012; International Military Education and Training Paraguay 2012; International Military Education and Training Peru 2012; International Military Education and Training St. Kitts and Nevis 2012; International Military Education and Training St. Lucia 2012; International Military Education and Training St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2012; International Military Education and Training Suriname 2012; International Military Education and Training Trinidad and Tobago 2012; International Military Education and Training Uruguay 2012; – United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 (Washington: October 2013) (Link to source).

Brazil’s Military Police: Calls for demilitarization

As we have noted in a series of posts on Just the Facts, there is a trend throughout Latin America of increasingly using militaries to carry out law enforcement duties.

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In the case of Brazil, the government is using established Military Police to carry out these duties instead of directly sending in the Army. And politicians, citizens and analysts have begun calling for demilitarization of the country’s law enforcement.

Each state in Brazil has two distinct police units – the Civil Police and the Miltiary Police (PM). The PM is responsible for maintaining public order and immediately responding to crimes, while the Civil Police carry out investigations, detective work and forensics. Although the PMs are military-trained and also army reserve troops, they report to their state governments, not the Ministry of Defense. There are about 400,000 active PM members and 123,400 active members of the Civil Police.

As Global Voices explains,

The debate on the demilitarization of the military police in the country is not new. Part of the legacy of Brazil’s dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, the military police emerged as a solution through the extinction of the Public Force and Civil Guard. After the 1964 coup, the new government abandoned the idea of creating a single, civilian police and implemented a military model.

Today, almost all urban policing in Brazil is done by military police attached to the governments of each state, and the country remains the only one in the world to have a police force that operates out of the military barracks.

The issue of demilitarizing the police has reentered the debate in Brazil after several recent episodes of PM violence against demonstrators and journalists during the massive protests that swept the country in June.

A recent article in BBC Brasil, Como desmiliarizar a polícia no Brasil?, examined this issue. Here are some key points and quotes in the article (translated):

Logistical problems:

 

  • Analysts polled by BBC Brasil claim that one of the main problems of having two separate police forces is that neither carries out all responsibilities in any criminal occurrence – The PM holds a suspect who has just committed a crime and turns them over to the Civil Police, which starts investigating and reports the crime to the justice sector. However, this division of responsibility and sometimes overlap of tasks inhibits coordination and cooperation.
  • In addition, both police forces have units with similar responsibilities – investigation and patrol. In most states, the division of responsibility is blurred, creating competition and lack of cooperation between the two bodies, according to the researchers.

 

Ideological problems:

 

  • For Coronel Ibis Pereira, head of the sub-directorate of teaching for Rio de Janeiro’s military police, “militarization” is defined more by how a force views its target and less by a military structure: “It’s to see a favela and identify it as a territory that has to be conquered. To see the criminal faction as an enemy that needs to be confronted with bullets,” he says. “But we are facing criminals that have rights and guarantees.”
  • “The military is prepared to defend the country. It is a different methodology than is necessary to deal with the Brazilian people,” according to lawmaker Chico Lopes. “Some military police treat people as if they were enemies. The police have to have a social role, more humane and civilian.”
  • A survey by BBC Brasil on police killings in 2011 indicated that São Paulo’s PM killed six times more people than the Civil Police.

 

Change?

 

  • Any change to this structure would need a constitutional amendment. At least three Constitutional Amendment Proposals (PEC) related to demilitarization are being considered in the Brazilian Congress. The majority of them propose unifying the civil and military police.
  • According to legal experts, a constitutional amendment would have to be approved in two rounds by three-fifths of both the House and the Senate before moving on to be signed by the president.
  • Wilson Moraes, president of the Association of Chiefs and Soldiers PM from São Paulo, Brazil told the BBC that associations of PMs are favorable to the unification of the police – among other things because it would allow for the political participation of the military in society and make it possible for them to receive overtime.

 

In 2012, the UN Council on Human Rights asked the Brazilian government to work towards abolishing the PM, as they have been accused of numerous extrajudicial killings and abuses. Other global organizations have also spoken out about the PM for their involvement in death squads. Last year Amnesty International reported PM and Civil Police had been, “engaged in social cleansing, extortion, as well as in trafficking in arms and drugs,” as well as in enforced disappearance. The U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights have also recognized these abuses.

Militarization of law enforcement in Venezuela

As is the case with the military in Honduras and Guatemala, both profiled in previous Just the Facts posts, it looks like troops will be on the streets in Venezuela for the next few months, if not longer. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has been under pressure to reduce the high levels of crime and violence that continue to plague the country, which has the highest homicide rate in South America. In May, President Maduro deployed troops throughout the country following reports in April of a record high of 58 homicides a day. The soaring crime rate is caused by several compounded factors: a weak judicial system, a dysfunctional penal system, and rampant corruption among government officials,

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the police and the military, the latter of which has been accused of having entire branches that function like drug trafficking organizations.

Critics of Plan Patria Segura, or the “Safe Homeland Plan,” say the only thing it has done is militarize the country, pointing to some data that indicate June was one of the most violent monthsin 2013. For its part, the Venezuelan government says it is making progress and that the opposition and media are attempting to delegitimize the government by magnifying the crime rate.

However, it is difficult to obtain specific data on crime, as the Venezuelan government has admittedto keeping figures secret from the public. In an interview with InSight Crime, WOLA’s Venezuela analyst David Smilde noted that the country has a military tradition that does not promote transparency. “There is very little tradition of transparency or the people’s right to know,” said Smilde. “The military assumes it is the moral backbone of the country, and [Interior Minister] Rodriguez is a military person. From their perspective, the only reason you would release information is if it supports what you’re doing.”

The “Safe Homeland Plan,” or “Plan Patria Segura,” is part of Venezuela’s “Full Life Mission,” an anti-crime initiative launched under President Chávez in June of last year that had a budget of over five billion bolivars (US$ 1.16 billion) for its first year, according to the Venezuelanalysis blog. Marino Alvarado, director of human rights organization PROVEA (Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos), has noted that Plan Patria Segura goes against the philosophy of the mission, which promoted the armed forces “should only act under exceptional circumstances and not be used to for public order.” According to the BBC, it is the 21st citizen security plan since 1999, when Hugo Chávez first took office.

Plan “Patria Segura”

On May 13, the Venezuelan government sent 3,000 members of the Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) to the streets of Caracas, marking the start of Plan Patria Segura. The country’s minister for justice and internal affairs, Miguel Rodriguez, said the first phase of the plan was “designed to last “around six months,” at which point the soldiers would be replaced with police and members of the National Bolivarian Police.

 

  • So far, according to some government numbers, about 40,000 soldiers have been deployed. In total, 80,000 troops will be deployed and the military will have a presence in every state in the country.
  • In early July, 1,541 troops were sent to the Guárico state in northern Venezuela and on July 1, President Maduro announced on his Twitter account that there would be a “new stage” of the plan, which included increasing the amount of troops and implementing “intelligent patrol,” which means units now assigned to territories of about a square kilometer will use GPS technology.He also ordered more troops be sent to the Miranda state, which he claimed has double the rate of crime compared to the rest of the county.
  • Most recently 30,000 troops were deployed to the Amazonas, Apure, Portuguesa, and Nueva Esparta states on July 15.
  • WOLA’s Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights blog noted the government is using the plan to “to round up undocumented immigrants in poor barrios of Caracas and eventually deport them.”

 

The government claims there have been significant reductions in crime, such as a 200 percentdecrease in kidnappings, a 53 percent drop in homicides in Caracas, and a 30-35 percent decline in crime in areas where the plan was focused. In an interview with Venezuelan newspaper El Nacional, Interior Minister Miguel Rodriguez claimed there had been a 53 percent drop in crime in the first month of the initiative and a five percent decline in murders overall. However, last month Rodriguez claimed there had been dramatic drop in murders of just over 60 percent. As WOLA’s Adam Isacson pointed out in a previous Just the Facts podcast, the government has only presented percentages and no absolute counts, giving little credence to its claims. Smilde highlighted this tendency in the InSight Crime interview, noting, “Any given year if you add up the percent reduction in crime that the government claims, you would end up with zero crime at the end of the year.”

While human rights activists have opposed the measure, saying it marks a return to the country’s tradition of militarized policing, Interior Minister Miguel Rodriguez has said, “There is no militarization here.” “The National Armed Boliviarian Force is meeting with community councils. You tell people in El Valle (…) you’re going to take the Army away and they will revolt, because they love their Armed Forces.”

Other critiques

In May, when the plan was first announced, Venezuela Politics and Human Rights blog highlighted several reasons to question the initiative. Among them were:

 

  • Impunity: Deploying military to the streets does nothing to address the issue of high rates of impunity for criminals. The Economist reported in January of this year that there was 96% impunity for homicides.
  • Human rights training: In 2008, as an attempt to move away from a militarized police force, former President Hugo Chávez created the National Bolivarian Police (PNB) to create a “preventative, professional, and non-militarized citizen security force.” Before the reform, the National Guard was responsible for training the police. The PNB officers now receive training with an emphasis on human rights and deferential force from a civilian-run policing university. As the crime rate continues to climb, citizens and other police officers have accused the PNB of being “soft” for their less aggressive tactics.Deploying the military, which receives no such training, to high-crime areas gives weight to the notion that repression is more effective. Human rights organizations worry the military is not ready to handle law enforcement in a humane way. Such criticism arose recently after three people were killed in two states by the National Guard.
  • Lack of oversight: There are no mechanisms through which citizens can regulate military corruption or abuses against themselves or other citizens. The military and National Guard are not subject to the oversight bodies created by the policing university, the General Police Council and new policing laws. In some states there are citizen-run police oversight committees — some police officers have even expressed concern that the military may commit abuses against detainees and are worried that in the event abuses occur that the police would be blamed, once the detainee is transferred.

 

However, this is not to say that the reform has been a success. Although there has been an ongoing police reform since 2006, the notoriously corrupt force has been consistently accused of extrajudicial executions, torture, involvement with organized crime and kidnapping. Earlier this month, Transparency International published a report on worldwide corruption, which found the police to be considered the most corrupt entity in Venezuela.

Since President Nicolas Maduro took office in April, he has criticized police forces throughout the country, calling the police in Caracas “mafiosos,” alleging they were responsible for 90 percent of the kidnapping in the capital. He also has demanded several forces be investigated for corruption, and has called the force in Amazonas “a disaster,” after announcing it would be investigated for criminal activity.

Taking all this into consideration, Isacson cited several “longer-term solutions” to Venezuela’s security problems, including:

 

  • Improving the capabilities of the new national police force, the PNB
  • Ensuring that the PNB patrol more often and in crime-ridden areas where they often have no presence
  • Reforming the justice system and the notoriously violent prison system.

 

Some aspects of the above recommendations were included in recent public security reforms, however they have yet to be implemented. It will be interesting to see if any non-governmental statistics mark improvement in the midst of Plan Patria Segura and if there will be any indication that some of the foundational flaws with security see some improvement. As Isacson noted, it is “unclear at best” if the Plan Patria Segura’s goals include targeting central problems with law enforcement in the country, such as shortening response times, giving patrols real-time crime-mapping data, improving relations with communities or improving crime investigations.

Podcast: Militaries as Police

Militaries are getting involved in policing throughout Latin America. Adam talks to Sarah Kinosian of the Center for International Policy, who wrote a series of posts to the Just the Facts blog documenting this trend in GuatemalaHonduras, and Venezuela.

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Colombia: Secretary of State Kerry’s visit, and Senator Kerry’s record

Secretary of State Kerry and Colombian Foreign Minister María Ángela Holguín.

John Kerry is about to make his second trip to Latin America as secretary of state. The first was in June, when he attended the OAS General Assembly meeting in Guatemala. This time, he is to go to Colombia on Sunday and Monday, and then to Brazil.

In Colombia, Secretary of State Kerry is expected to discuss with President Juan Manuel Santos the ongoing peace talks with the FARC guerrillas, for which the Obama administration has expressed support; the issue of security and Colombia’s provision of security assistance to third countries; and the state of bilateral trade two years after approval of a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement.

In his 28 years as a U.S. senator with a strong interest in foreign affairs, John Kerry has a long record of positions on U.S. policy toward Latin America. He opposed the Reagan administration’s massive aid to abusive regimes in Central America, especially aid to the Nicaraguan contras, during the civil wars of the 1980s. He has criticized the U.S. approach to Cuba as “frozen, stalemated.”

During the past 15 years, though, Senator Kerry consistently supported the aid packages that made Colombia by far the number-one recipient of U.S. military assistance in Latin America.

His support for “Plan Colombia,” however, was neither full-throated nor wholehearted. While Senator Kerry supported assistance to curtail drug trafficking, he criticized insufficient emphasis on drug treatment to reduce demand at home. He expressed concerns about the possibility that counter-drug aid could evolve into a larger counter-insurgency mission (as it did during the 2000s). He criticized the Colombian government’s human rights record, and endorsed human rights conditions that his Senate colleagues applied to U.S. military assistance. He has even at times urged the State Department not to certify improvements in the Colombian military’s human rights record, as required by foreign aid law.

Here are excerpts from Senator John Kerry’s record on Colombia, the country that Secretary of State John Kerry will be visiting in a few days.

From his 1998 book The New War, where he characterized drug cartels as a principal threat.

Drugs have made Colombia rich; the nation is awash in profits earned by the export of cocaine to the US and the rest of the world.

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But the country has been all but stolen from its people, virtually taken over by the drug cartels. … A willing army of young Colombians enlist with the cartels, dreaming of easy money, while some young Colombians join the police, army, and customs department just to make money by cooperating with drug criminals.

From the June 22, 2000 Senate debate on the “Plan Colombia” aid appropriation, where he supported the aid package as a flawed but necessary option. Here, he raised concerns about counterinsurgency entanglements, displacement, human rights, and insufficient attention to domestic drug demand. He said he expected Europe to counter-balance the U.S. aid package’s lopsided emphasis on military aid. This did not happen.

Colombia’s situation is bleak, and this may be its last chance to begin to dig its way out. If we fail to support aid to Colombia, we can only sit back and watch it deteriorate even further.
… My first concern is the fine line that exists between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations, particularly since they are so intertwined in Colombia. It is impossible to attack drug trafficking in Colombia without seriously undercutting the insurgents’ operations. We must acknowledge that the more involved in Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts we become the more we will become involved in its counterinsurgency, regardless of our intentions to steer clear of it. But, because the drug trade is the most destabilizing factor in Colombia, our cooperation with the government will over the long run, advance the development and expansion of democracy, and will limit the insurgents’ ability to terrorize the civilian population. But our military involvement in Colombia should go no further than this. Efforts to limit number of personnel are designed to address this.
I appreciate the concerns expressed by my colleagues that the United States contribution to Plan Colombia is skewed in favor of the military, but we must keep in mind that our contribution is only a percentage of the total Plan. … As part of our contribution, and to balance military aid, the United States must continue to support Colombian requests for additional funding from international financial institutions and other EU donors. We must also continue to implement stringent human rights vetting and end-use monitoring agreements, and make sure that our Colombia policy does not end with the extension of aid.
Second, I am concerned that even if the Plan is successful at destroying coca production and reducing the northward flow of drugs, large numbers of coca farmers will be displaced, worsening the current crisis of internally displaced people in Colombia.
My third major concern with respect to this aid package is that it does not adequately address Colombia’s human rights problem. … I would like to commend my colleagues on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee for bolstering the human rights component of this legislation.
Despite my reservations, the potential benefits of this plan are too large to ignore. In light of the changes made by the committee, I believe the plan can help advance United States interests by reducing drug trafficking and thereby promoting stability and democracy in Colombia. We must now work to ensure that our concerns do not become realities.
… Increasing funding and expanding drug treatment and prevention programs are absolutely imperative if we are to coordinate an effective counterdrug campaign, particularly if we are to expect any real improvement in the situation in Colombia.
… As we support Colombia’s efforts to attack the sources of illegal drugs, we need to make sure we are addressing our own problems. … It is clear that drug treatment works, and there is no excuse for the high numbers of addicts who have been unable to receive treatment. As we increase funding for supply reduction programs in Colombia, we must increase funding for treatment to balance and complement it.

A July 26, 2004 letter to Colombian President Álvaro Uribe from 23 U.S. senators, including Senator Kerry, expressing human rights concerns and supporting the work of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

We remain deeply concerned about the continued levels of violence directed at the civilian population. There are reports of increased violations, such as extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances, attributed directly to Colombian security forces. In addition, guerrillas continued their indiscriminate use of explosive devices against civilians while paramilitary forces carried out assassinations and massacres despite the existence of a cease fire. We believe that an adherence to UNHCHR’s recommendations will help to establish the “democratic security” for all Colombians to which you are personally committed.

The most urgent of UNHCHR’s recommendations is to cut ties between the army and paramilitary forces engaged in abuses, by suspending, investigating and vigorously prosecuting officials engaged in such collaboration.

… We remain concerned about the commitment of the Attorney General’s office to investigate high-level officials implicated in human rights violations and links to paramilitary groups.

The United Nations also raises important points regarding the vulnerability of human rights defenders, journalists and union leaders. Your government’s protection program for human rights and union leaders is important. However, progress investigating and prosecuting threats and attacks against such leaders is essential.

An October 15, 2004 statement from the Kerry for President campaign

President Uribe has achieved deserved popular support for his efforts to make Colombia more secure. I have been encouraged by declining levels of murders, massacres and kidnappings and progress in addressing the challenges of drug trafficking, guerrillas and paramilitaries. I am further encouraged that the Colombian government has agreed to use the recommendations of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a framework for achieving the just peace that all Colombians deserve.
A persistent cycle of violence, such as that occurring in Colombia, can ultimately be broken only by combining greater security efforts with ending impunity, strengthening the rule of law and the defense of human and labor rights. For Colombians, that means condemning and putting a stop to the kidnappings, killings, and extortion practiced by outlawed guerrilla groups and by paramilitary groups who continually violate international humanitarian law. It also requires severing all links between the security forces and the paramilitaries; punishing those in uniform who have perpetrated these links and engage in extrajudicial killings and abuses; and better protecting judges, prosecutors, journalists, human rights activists and unionists from intimidation, violence and murder.
In Colombia, we must focus on the fight against narco-trafficking and counterinsurgency at the same time as we support the rule of law, alternative development, and the expansion of legitimate state authority to achieve a durable peace. As a Senator I have consistently supported Plan Colombia; and, as President, I will work with President Uribe to keep the bipartisan spirit in Washington alive in support of Plan Colombia, while insisting on progress on ending the violence against civilians.

A July 1, 2005 letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice from 22 U.S. senators, including Senator Kerry. The letter urges the secretary of state not to “certify” that the Colombian military’s human rights record is improving, thus freeing up a portion of military assistance. This letter includes an early mention of a practice that, three years later, would erupt in Colombia as the “false positives” scandal of extrajudicial executions.

We believe there has been insufficient progress in suspending from the armed forces, investigating and vigorously prosecuting security force members who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, or who have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations. Even some of the highest-profile cases have not advance.
… Greater progress in breaking links between the army and paramilitary forces is
imperative. The United Nations notes “continued reports… of cases in which
coordinated operations have been carried out by members of the security forces and
paramilitary groups, and cases in which the victims had been detained by members of the paramilitary forces and subsequently reported by the army as having been killed in combat.”
… We believe that it is time for the State Department to make clear to the Colombian government that further progress regarding its own security forces is necessary prior to certification. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Statement on World Refugee Day, June 20, 2012

In Colombia, where conflict has displaced an estimated 4 million people, our partners are helping the government to provide reparations and land restitution to affected individuals and families.

September 4, 2012 statement upon the announcement of peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC

Colombians have suffered for far too long from the violence and insecurity associated with its decades-long internal armed conflict. President Santos has taken the difficult steps toward negotiating a political solution and has indicated that lessons learned from prior peace talks will be taken into consideration. This is an important and welcome sign. Any negotiation that helps strengthen Colombia’s democracy, promote the respect for the rule of law and human rights, and bring peace to the country is a good thing and deserves support.

Senator Kerry at his January 24, 2013 confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

One of the great stories of Latin America is Colombia … President Uribe stepped up in a critical moment and began the process of rescuing that nation, President Santos is now doing an amazing job, we strengthened the relationship by passing the economic trade agreement. We have to build on that. And that is an example for the rest of Latin America of what awaits them… [Also] hope to bridge the gap with some of the other countries.

Murders of human rights defenders jump sharply in Colombia

study by Somos Defensores, a non-governmental protection program for human rights defenders, reveals shocking growth in murders of Colombian human rights defenders.

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The chart below illustrates that in 2012, the number of murders was nearly 14 times what it was in 2006. And 2013 is on a pace to be even worse.

The number of murders, although still high, remained relatively consistent around 30 per year between 2008 and 2011. But in 2012, the year after Colombia’s government passed a land restitution law encouraging displaced victims to come forward and claim stolen property, the number more than doubled to 69. The chart posted here, compiled by the Colombian newsmagazine Semana, puts the horrifying jump in context.

The first half of this year exhibited a 27% increase over the same time period in 2012. Thirty-seven human rights defenders were killed between January and June, a rate of one every five days. Of these 37, 12 reported receiving threats prior to their murder, suggesting the “evident institutional weakness for the security and control of the implementation of public policy in human rights,” reports Somos Defensores.

Podcast: The Week Ahead, August 2, 2013

Adam looks at the foreign aid bill that’s moving through Congress, the state of the gang truce in El Salvador, and Venezuela’s latest effort to fight crime by sending soldiers into the streets.

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